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Abstract
Households must take into account various sources of uncertainty when making ﬁnancial
decisions. In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008 some of these uncertain-
ties have increased and, arguably, households may have become more aware of the
uncertainties they encounter. The purpose of this thesis is to examine to what extent
diﬀerent sources of uncertainty inﬂuence household ﬁnancial decision making, in par-
ticular regarding saving, portfolio choice and the choice of ﬁnancial products such as
mortgages.
We show that uncertainty related to the outcome of future policies (i.e. limiting the
mortgage interest deduction), induce households to save more than optimal to absorb
possible ﬁnancial setbacks. We further demonstrate that ﬁnancially less sophisticated
households, who do not fully understand the complex nature of mortgage loans, tend
to choose less risky mortgages, unless they consult a mortgage broker.
Using detailed tax records, we provide evidence that elderly households are on average
wealthy, but do not dissave. This contrasts with the prediction of the life-cycle theory
of saving and cannot be explained by uncertainty regarding income or out-of-pocket
medical expenses. Health plays an important role in explaining diﬀerences in wealth
between households.
Using self-reported health combined with objective health measures from medical
records, we show that health is more persistent and deteriorates at a faster rate in old
age than can be inferred from subjective health measures alone. We further show that
mental ill-health combined with an unhealthy lifestyle (smoking and being overweight) is
a major contributor to long-term sickness among self-employed (with income insurance).
Abstract (in Dutch)
De ﬁnanciële crisis van 2007-2008 maakt duidelijk dat onzekerheid er toe doet. De sterke
daling in aandelen- en huizenprijzen, in combinatie met riskante hypotheekleningen,
heeft een grote invloed op de ﬁnanciële positie van huishoudens. Het doel van dit
proefschrift is te achterhalen in welke mate onzekerheid het ﬁnanciële keuzegedrag van
huishoudens beïnvloedt, zoals het spaargedrag en de aanschaf van ﬁnanciële producten
zoals een hypotheek.
Wij laten zien dat de onzekerheid omtrent toekomstig beleid met betrekking tot
een hervorming van de hypotheekrenteaftrek ervoor zorgt dat huishoudens meer gaan
sparen om mogelijke ﬁnanciële tegenvallers op te vangen. Wij tonen vervolgens aan
dat huishoudens die minder kennis hebben van hypotheekleningen, geneigd zijn om
een minder riskante hypotheeklening af te sluiten, tenzij zij gebruik maken van een
tussenpersoon.
Uit een analyse van gedetailleerde belastinggegevens blijkt dat ouderen gemiddeld ge-
zien vermogend zijn, maar hun spaargeld nauwelijks aanspreken, zelfs niet op een zeer
hoge leeftijd. Deze bevinding is in tegenspraak met de economische levenscyclustheorie
en kan niet worden verklaard door onzekerheid over toekomstige inkomsten of gezond-
heidsuitgaven. De gezondheidstoestand speelt wel een belangrijke rol om verschillen in
besparingen tussen huishoudens te verklaren.
Op basis van door mensen zelf ervaren gezondheidstoestand en objectieve gezond-
heidskenmerken uit medische registers laten wij zien dat gezondheid meer persistent is
en sneller afneemt op oudere leeftijd dan kan worden geconcludeerd op basis van enkel
gerapporteerde gezondheid. Tot slot tonen wij aan dat in het bijzonder mentale gezond-
heidsproblemen in combinatie met een ongezonde levensstijl (roken en overgewicht) het
risico op langdurige arbeidsongeschiktheid onder zelfstandigen vergroot.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and research questions
Households must take into account various sources of uncertainty when making ﬁnancial
decisions. In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008 some of these uncertainties
have increased and, arguably, households may have become more aware of some of the
uncertainties they encounter.
First, there is “policy uncertainty” about the reforms policymakers my implement
in the future and the outcomes of already implemented reforms of the pension system,
labor market, health care sector and mortgage market. The aim of these reforms is
to foster economic growth, to reduce the government budget deﬁcit, and to keep the
social insurance system sustainable in view of an aging society. However, it is unclear
how such reforms will aﬀect households’ ﬁnancial situation and how policy uncertainty
inﬂuences economic decisions made by households.
Second, reforms of the social insurance system mainly result in a shift of publicly
funded social insurance to more individual responsibility. For instance, households
become more in charge of their pension savings and should make more provisions for
long-term care for themselves, in case they are no longer able to live independently.
This means that households have to take uncertainty of the return of their portfolio,
life expectancy and health more into account than in the past when making ﬁnancial
decisions.
Third, the ﬁnancial crisis, which followed a relatively stable economic period, makes
clear that ﬁnancial decisions can have a huge impact on the ﬁnancial situation of house-
holds. Many households have underestimated the uncertainty of the return of their
ﬁnancial portfolio and did not consider rare events, like a large drop in house prices.
This exempliﬁes that households may not be perfectly informed or aware of all ﬁnancial
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risks.
The empirical literature to date normally regards uncertainty as a general concept
relating to lack of knowledge about future outcomes and has been rather silent on
how these three diﬀerent sources of uncertainty inﬂuence household ﬁnancial decision
making. The purpose of this thesis is to examine to what extent diﬀerent sources of
uncertainty inﬂuence household ﬁnancial decision making and how this aﬀects economic
behavior, in particularly regarding saving, portfolio choice and the choice of ﬁnancial
products such as mortgages. The central questions of this thesis are as follows:
Does uncertainty, related to the outcome of future policy, result in precautionary saving?
Do households who do not fully understand the complex nature and the risk proﬁle of
some ﬁnancial products choose alternative, but simpler substitutes?
Does ﬁnancial advice result in better outcomes?
Does a reduction in pension beneﬁts and limitations in the provision of public long-term
care increase precautionary savings?
What is the likelihood of a deterioration in health at diﬀerent stages in life and how
persistent is this health shock?
How do health shocks relate with socio-economic variables?
What are the inﬂuences of both mental health, physical health and healthy lifestyle on
the ability to work?
When households make ﬁnancial decisions they have to consider changing circum-
stances during their life, such as retirement, having children, or a deterioration of health.
They also have to consider changing economic conditions, such as the level of income,
prices, and asset returns. How these changes aﬀect household economic behavior over
time was ﬁrst described in an economic model developed by Modigliani and Brumberg
(1954). The simple version of the life cycle theory assumes that all changes in life are
known by household in advance. It predicts how households allocate their consumption
and saving over time to make them equally well-oﬀ in every period of life.
In reality, as motivated above, future circumstances are very uncertain. Households
have to form expectations about future input variables, such as health status and income
when making ﬁnancial decisions. As time goes by, more information about these input
variables becomes available, households may have to reconsider their original plans. In
every period households have to choose their optimal allocations given their available
information and economic resources.
Financial decision making under uncertainty is not only very complex for households
but also diﬃcult to formally solve in an economic model. The important role of uncer-
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tainty to understand household behavior was recognized by Modigliani and Brumberg
when they developed the life cycle theory. At that time, the importance of uncertainty
was already extensively discussed by John Maynard Keynes (1936). In the General
theory of employment, interest and money, Keynes stresses that uncertainty is one of
the major motives to put money aside to self-insure against future contingencies. Over
the last two decades uncertainty has been incorporated in life cycle models and now
plays an important role in explaining economic behavior as has been emphasized in the
work by Deaton (1992) on consumption and saving.
The ﬁrst paper of the thesis, chapter two, describes the role of policy uncertainty
to explain household ﬁnancial behavior. Chapter three focus on ﬁnancial uncertainty,
which might be ampliﬁed for households who do not fully understand the complex na-
ture and the risk proﬁle of some ﬁnancial products. Chapter four discusses in what
manner uncertainty aﬀects motives for saving and how this relates to observed wealth
decumulation and portfolio choice of elderly households. Chapter ﬁve measure health re-
lated uncertainty over the life cycle and relates this to socio-economic variables. Finally,
chapter six takes the multidimensional concept of health into account; it examines the
role of physical ill-health, mental ill-health and healthy lifestyle on disability among self-
employed workers. The remainder of this introductory chapter ﬁrst describes the main
ﬁndings of the thesis. Then, it provides policy recommendations. Finally, directions
for future research are given.
1.2 Summary and main ﬁndings
In chapter two of the thesis we analyze whether uncertainty, related to the outcome of
future policies, results in precautionary saving. The focus is on an important example of
policy uncertainty: the possible limitation of the mortgage interest deduction (MID) in
the Netherlands. To measure policy uncertainty, we sent out dedicated questionnaires to
the CentERpanel – a panel comprising more than 2,000 Dutch households that complete
weekly Internet-based household surveys – at strategic moments in time of the reform
process. We elicited the subjective distribution of house prices in both a “policy neutral”
scenario without a reform of the MID and a realistic, but simpliﬁed hypothetical reform
scenario. We examined whether households that are more uncertain about the inﬂuence
of this particular reform on house prices also tend to save more, as economic theory
would suggest.
We ﬁnd that households recognize both aggregate house price uncertainty and policy
uncertainty. There is no clear evidence that households which are more uncertain about
aggregate house price movements save more than households that are less certain. We
do ﬁnd that policy uncertainty alone increases precautionary saving. Policy uncertainty
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accounts for approximately two percent of total saving. The main message of our study
is more general: reforms must be credible and clear enough to limit distortive second
order eﬀects, such as those caused by policy uncertainty.
The third chapter analyzes whether households who do not fully understand the com-
plex nature and the risk proﬁle of some ﬁnancial products select alternative but simpler
products. Moreover, it examines the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial advice. The chapter fo-
cuses on mortgage loan choice which is one of the largest ﬁnancial decisions that most
households make. It is commonly known that a large group of households lack basic
ﬁnancial knowledge and do not possess the ﬁnancial skills to take complex decisions,
such as selecting a mortgage loan (see Campbell, 2006). A limited understanding of
mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the origination of
the 2007-2008 ﬁnancial crisis (see Gerardi et al., 2013b).
To this end, we designed a special questionnaire for the CentERpanel. Our survey was
set up to collect information on mortgage risks, debt literacy and the role of ﬁnancial
advice in selecting a mortgage. Our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be
well aware of mortgage risks. Large loans relative to home value are perceived as more
risky, as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked
to investment vehicles. Homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could
encounter ﬁnancial problems should house prices or their income decline. Homeowners
with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with
principal repayments over the maturity of the loan. Riskier mortgages are more preva-
lent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts. Financially less
sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers, too, hold more risky mortgages.
The fourth chapter analyzes saving behavior and portfolio choice after retirement in
the Netherlands where uncertainty related to health expenditures and pensions used to
be limited. The generous pension system and almost complete coverage of the public
health and long-term care insurance system makes precautionary saving less necessary
compared to, for instance, the United States. Using detailed administrative data, we
present evidence on the extent to which the ﬁnancial resources of retirees are aﬀected
by shocks such as the decease of a spouse or deteriorating health, similar to recent
empirical studies by Poterba et al. (2011, 2012, 2014) for the United States. Moreover,
we examine the extent to which retirees who do not experience any shocks are able
to keep positive wealth at their disposal and sustain their consumption level during
retirement.
Our results show that the death of a spouse results in a signiﬁcant reduction of
household wealth. This result is also found in the United States. We do not ﬁnd
evidence of decumulation of wealth after retirement for singles, despite the fact that
retirees face limited income uncertainty and limited uncertainty about out-of-pocket
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payments for medical expenses. Although, we ﬁnd some suggestive evidence of dissaving
for high-income widowed persons. Moreover, we ﬁnd no evidence of dissaving in the
years before death, even among those in poor health who have a lower life expectancy.
This contrasts with the prediction of the life-cycle theory by Yaari (1965) and Hurd
(1989) for singles without a bequest motive. Possible explanations are that: (1) generous
pension beneﬁts are protective of household wealth, (2) most assets are stored in illiquid
housing wealth which constrains the decumulation of wealth, (3) bequests and transfers
of wealth after the death of the ﬁrst spouse are important and provide a motive for
holding assets. Finally, the results suggest that health plays an important role in
explaining diﬀerences in wealth between households. On average, retirees with health
problems have accumulated lower pensions and private savings. Moreover, we ﬁnd
evidence that the onset of a serious health problem result in an increase in wealth
holdings, probably because of lower consumption needs in poor health.
To further analyze the association between health and savings, it is important to mea-
sure health-related uncertainty at diﬀerent phases in life. In chapter ﬁve we construct
a health measurement model which combines panel survey data on self-reported health
with a rich set of health measures from administrative medical records. Our estimated
health model allows us to predict health status for the entire population. We account
both for unobserved heterogeneity and for the persistence in unobserved health shocks.
To account for inconsistent reporting in self-reported health over time we propose a ‘cor-
rected’ health measure. We show that this ‘corrected’ measure substantially increases
the estimated persistence in health status. We use predicted health status to study the
evolution of health as individuals get older. Moreover, we analyze how health interacts
with education and economic variables.
The results show that there are signiﬁcant disparities in health by gender and across
groups with diﬀerent levels of educational attainment. The age at which health starts
to decline at a greater rate diﬀers by educational level and gender. Women are on
average in worse health than men. Moreover, women have more health advantages
from higher education than men. The results also suggest that economic variables
as income and wealth are more protective for women’s health than for men’s health.
A possible explanation is that poor health is in particular detrimental for household
income when this aﬀects the earning capacity of the main earner. In the Netherlands,
women have a high labor force participation rate, but predominantly work part-time.
The previous chapter suggests that the ability to work may have important impli-
cations for the ﬁnancial situation of the household. In chapter six we analyze the
interdependence between initial mental health, physical health and lifestyle on the en-
try into and exit out of disability. The lifestyle habits that we consider are smoking,
drinking and doing sports. We also consider overweight which is linked to lifestyle
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habits such as physical inactivity and poor diet. We use a Dutch insurer’s portfolio of
income insurance contracts of self-employed workers and construct measures of physical
and mental health on the basis of current and previously diagnosed health problems as
reported upon buying income insurance.
Our results show that physical ill-health, mental ill-health and bad lifestyle habits
generally have adverse eﬀects on the inﬂow into disability and outﬂow back into employ-
ment of self-employed workers with income insurance. Mental ill-health is the major
cause of long-term disability. The results also stress that accurate assessment of the rela-
tion between health, lifestyle and disability outcomes requires a subgroup analysis that
distinguishes several groups of policyholders, such as smokers versus non-smokers and
overweight versus normal weight. The subgroup analysis is crucial because important
diﬀerences between subgroups tend to vanish in an aggregate analysis. The subgroup
analysis shows that the risk of becoming disabled is exacerbated by unhealthy lifestyle,
such as being overweight and smoking. In particular, the combination of smoking and
being overweight has a large adverse eﬀect on the recovery from disability. The results
of our study can contribute to more eﬀective criteria for risk selection and medical
underwriting, the development of risk-based insurance premiums for income insurance,
prevention of disability among self-employed and optimization of their return-to-work
process.
1.3 Policy proposals
The above results are relevant for public policies that facilitate household ﬁnancial
decision making under uncertainty. In this section we will consider policy proposals
which follow from the analysis.
Safeguard independent ﬁnancial advice
Given the complex nature of mortgage loan decisions, many households seek the help of
a mortgage broker or other ﬁnancial intermediaries who match borrowers and lenders
in the mortgage market and provide ﬁnancial advice to households. Our results show
that homeowners who consult advisers have more risky mortgages, regardless of their
level of literacy (high or low). Nevertheless, the impact of advisers on the riskiness of
the mortgage loan is less pronounced for the more literate consumers. We are not able
to address the issue of causality, given that those homeowners planning to take out a
more risky mortgage may have been the ones seeking advice from an adviser. However,
the results highlight the importance of independent ﬁnancial advice and a commission
structure without incentives to advise risky mortgages when they are less suitable.
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That is why several countries have changed the legal rules for fee structures in the
ﬁnancial advice market. In the Netherlands, for instance, commission fee payments to
intermediaries for the origination of mortgages have been banned since January 2013.
Consumers now have to pay the adviser directly for all services. This type of commission
structure reduces concerns about mortgage advisers having incentives to give advice that
goes against the interest of the consumer; see also Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) for a
discussion about how eﬀective a ban on commission fees is when it comes to selecting
ﬁnancial products.
This may result in more conservative mortgages being recommended and taken out,
and, thus, fewer households with ﬁnancial problems. On the other hand, high brokerage
fees may discourage homeowners from obtaining ﬁnancial advice. Although it is not
clear beforehand whether homeowners will display the same behavior in the new setting,
it is somewhat comforting that the results suggest that consumers with low literacy
levels who do not consult ﬁnancial advisers tend to take out less complex and more
conservative mortgages.
As a remedy, policymakers may consider making ﬁnancial advice mandatory for unso-
phisticated households or for households who plan to take out a risky mortgage product.
The Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) in the Netherlands has, for example, de-
veloped a test to assess household’s ﬁnancial capability to take out a mortgage without
ﬁnancial advice. A few mortgage lenders made a similar test mandatory for house-
holds who prefer to originate a mortgage without help. Although, overall, this would
be helpful in reducing mortgage risks to homeowners, it would put a burden on those
homeowners who are capable of taking a mortgage decision on their own.
Implement credible reforms
Despite the fact that the Dutch government implemented a reform of the mortgage
interest deduction, the majority of households expect new or additional reforms. This
suggests that the implemented reforms were not felt as being deﬁnitive and create ad-
ditional uncertainty. We show that policy uncertainty related to a possible reform of
the mortgage interest deduction could depress consumption. The government could
reduce policy uncertainty by implementing credible policy, i.e. policies that could in-
duce consumers to believe that the future policy environment will by and large remain
unchanged.
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Eligibility for public long-term care insurance should not depend
on wealth
People who ﬁnd it important to save for long-term care (LTC) are discouraged from
doing so if the eligibility for public LTC depends on the level of wealth. There is strong
empirical evidence that the introduction of asset-testing – which requires persons to
ﬁrst run down their assets in order to become eligible for public LTC – discourages
saving, particularly if the quality of publicly provided LTC is high.
A means-tested system that is based only on the level of income does not have these
disadvantages. In order to restrict the utilization of public-provided care it is more
eﬃcient to increase income-related payments. A benchmark study about LTC expenses
among OECD countries shows that income-related payments are relatively low in the
Netherlands (OECD 2011). This is in particular applicable for care at home. When a
household is unable to pay these higher income-related expenses, for example because
all savings are in illiquid housing wealth, they can be deferred until after death. At
that time, claims can be recovered from the estate before the estate is transferred to
the heirs.
Facilitate the use of housing assets for long-term care
Housing equity is rarely spent throughout old-age and is commonly left as a bequest.
Housing equity is a very suitable means to save for LTC because the elderly do not
downsize their housing equity except in the event of severe illness or after the decease
of the spouse. This implies that housing equity becomes available in situations when
health and LTC expenditures are potentially large. We show that for the vast majority
of homeowners who permanently stay in a nursing home, the proceeds from the sale
of the house can cover a nursing-home stay of more than ﬁve years. Housing equity is
therefore a valuable vehicle to save for LTC services that will not be covered by the
public LTC insurance system.
The government can encourage the accumulation of housing equity by allowing indi-
viduals to use part of their pension savings to pay oﬀ mortgage debt or by discouraging
home equity borrowing before retirement. A lower mortgage debt also reduces the costs
of living because of lower mortgage payments. This provides more scope to cover im-
mediate costs from ﬁnancial assets without the need to sell the house. In addition, the
government can discourage transfers to the children after the decease of the spouse.
Our analysis suggests that these transfers are currently substantial.
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Develop ﬁnancial products combining reverse mortgages and long-
term care
Housing equity is essentially not available for LTC expenses unless a person sells the
house and moves elsewhere. Financial products to extract home equity such as reverse
mortgages are therefore beneﬁcial if a person desires care at home or if only one of the
household members moves to a nursing home. The market for these type of products is
thin, partly because of the relative high costs of compensating the lender for the large
risk that the total amount of monthly payments exceeds the value of the house. This
could either happen because the last surviving borrower remains in the home for a long
period or because house prices decline.
A reverse mortgage product providing a line of credit that can only be used for LTC
expenses reduces this risk, for two reasons. First, persons in need of LTC are already
at an advanced age and typically remain in their home for a relatively short period.
Second, given that the line of credit can only be used for LTC-related expenses, there
is a lower risk that all home equity will be spent. This is also beneﬁcial for people who
like to leave a bequest.
Align pension beneﬁts with consumption needs in old-age
In the current pension system, pension income does not decrease with age. This does
not reﬂect the declining needs as people age, such as food consumption, spending on
cloths, durable goods and leisure activities. Our analysis provides evidence that the
marginal utility of consumption declines in old-age because of deteriorating health. This
results in higher savings in old-age due to the comprehensive coverage of health care
expenditures. It is questionable whether people take this declining consumption path
into account while planning for retirement. Besides, they are not able to borrow against
future pension beneﬁts to increase consumption at the start of retirement. To align
pension beneﬁts with actual consumption needs, policy makers may consider a pension
system with a payout that declines with age.
If desired, the required funds can be provided for LTC services that will not be covered
by the public LTC insurance system, such as residing in a nursing home with better
care facilities or more intensive home care that makes it possible to stay at home for a
longer period.
Integrate pensions and long-term care
Our analysis shows that a sizable fraction of the Dutch elderly has accumulated a
small buﬀer of ﬁnancial wealth that is suﬃcient for small incidental expenditures but
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insuﬃcient for large expenditures such as LTC. This predominantly holds for renters
and not for homeowners. The introduction of individual saving accounts for LTC is
ineﬃcient since they demand excessive wealth accumulation to self-insure against po-
tentially large LTC expenses. Moreover, it is doubtful whether these accounts generate
additional savings by people with a low income who have little room for saving.
One attractive alternative is to require persons at retirement to make an active choice
between a lower (age-declining) pension that provides additional payments when persons
are in need of LTC and a ‘normal’ pension that provides a constant stream of pension
beneﬁts. The exact additional payments will depend on the severity of the disability,
which is determined by an assessment of needs. The problem of adverse selection in
this product is limited for two reasons. First of all, persons who are in need of LTC
have a lower life expectancy and consequently a lower expected present discounted
value of future pension beneﬁts. Second, persons have to commit themselves for one
of both products already at the start of retirement when the prevalence of LTC is low.
Asymmetric information about future LTC use is also limited at an earlier age. An
additional beneﬁt of combining LTC and pensions is that it leads to a reduction in
costs. For an extensive welfare analysis of a combination of LTC and annuities, see
Murtaugh et al. (2001).
Another possibility is to use the funds released due to lower pensions to pay for the
premiums of an LTC policy, which covers the costs of LTC on top of the basic public
LTC. However, the experience from the United States and the United Kingdom shows
that the willingness to buy these insurance products is very low.
1.4 Avenues for future research
For future research, we plan to develop life cycle models to interpret the empirical facts
as provided in this thesis. Dynan et al. (2002) explain in great detail that it is diﬃcult
to disentangle diﬀerent saving motives using household wealth alone. The theoretical
insights from this model are, therefore, crucial to interpret the empirical facts on the
evolution of wealth and income over age. For instance, it not obvious why elderly
households in the Netherlands keep large amounts of housing wealth at very advanced
ages. It is not self-evident that they use this as a buﬀer against uncertain and large
medical expenses at the end of life.
One promising direction is to extend the basic life cycle model with housing choice.
The issue of household consumption smoothing and portfolio choice in the presence
of illiquid housing wealth is extensively discussed in chapter four of this thesis. High
adjustment costs of housing equity possibly constrain the evolution of retirement wealth.
The strategic bequest motive might provide an alternative explanation why the elderly
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do not reduce housing equity in old age as it provides a motive for commitment. Holding
home equity as opposed to annuity wealth may increase the parents’ bargaining power in
the event of illness and old age (see Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985). This might
lead to diﬀerent conclusions about the adequacy of retirement savings and the relative
importance of uncertainty for wealth accumulation. In addition, the extended life cycle
model must be able to explain the “puzzling” pattern between health and wealth after
retirement. We plan to thoroughly model the health dependency of consumption and
the possible interaction of wealth and health with the bequest motive.
The theoretical insights from the extended life cycle model and the empirical results
from chapter four of the thesis will be integrated in a structural model for the Nether-
lands to explain the saving behavior of the elderly. Such a model makes it possible
to quantitatively analyze the importance of various proposed but not yet implemented
policy reforms of the pension system and of the long term care system on the sav-
ing behavior and well-being of retirees. We will take the extended life cycle model of
De Nardi et al. (2010) as starting point of analysis. Their model allows for (i) an altru-
istic bequest motive, (ii) diﬀerential mortality (e.g. the observation that richer people
live longer) and (iii) uncertain medical expenses. Moreover, the model of De Nardi
et al. (2010) takes into account that the marginal utility of consumption depends on
the health status of the individual. This implies that deteriorating health aﬀects the
level of consumption and therefore aﬀects wealth holdings.
The health measurement model, which we have developed and described in chapter
four of the thesis, will be used to measure health-related uncertainty at diﬀerent phases
in life. In chapter six we have showed that physical ill-health, mental ill-health and
health related lifestyle habits have diﬀerent eﬀects on the ability to work. Moreover,
it seems that these diﬀerent “dimensions of health” exacerbate each other. In future
research we plan to take the multidimensional concept of health into account. We will
examine how diﬀerent health shocks could have very diﬀerent eﬀects on longevity, labor
supply, and savings.
In chapter four we have also analyzed the evolution of wealth and income over age
of elderly households to obtain insight into their ﬁnancial position. For a better under-
standing of whether their retirement savings are adequate it is also important to have
more insight into their spending patterns. The spending pattern of elderly households
changes over time because of changing needs when people retire (see Kalwij et al., 2015;
Soede, 2012). Spending may also change in the period after retirement when changes
such as widowhood or the onset of health problems may inﬂuence both the necessary
and preferred level of expenditures. A relevant question is with what kind of necessary
expenses elderly are confronted. For example, expenses directly related to a person’s
health status or expenses on services and equipment to help elderly stay living at home.
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In recent years, the Dutch government has implemented reforms of the long-term
care insurance system. The aim of these reforms is to stimulate elderly with minor
disabilities to stay living independently. The reform limits admissions to nursing home
care to persons with major disabilities. In addition, people are expected to pay a larger
part of the costs of a nursing home stay from their income and savings. A means
test which is based on the level of wealth has also been introduced. Municipalities
and health insurers have become responsible for the provision of care and support at
home for which less public resources will be available. People with minor care needs are
expected to ﬁrst ask for informal care from their spouse or relatives before municipalities
will arrange the necessary care. These reforms thus imply a shift away from publicly
provided long-term care to private providers, as well as more individual responsibility.
It is unclear how these reforms aﬀect the ﬁnancial position of the elderly and whether
this results in disparities in the provision of long-term care between municipalities and
for elderly with diﬀerent ﬁnancial means. Moreover, the introduction of a means test
may discourage saving and encourage inter vivos transfers as currently private nursing
home costs depend on the level of wealth.
In future research we plan to shed more light on these issues. More speciﬁcally, we will
gain more insight into the composition of health-related expenses of elderly households,
such as an adaption of the home or moving to a more suitable accommodation, buying
equipment such as a stairlift, and paying for care and support at home. There is very
limited insight in the private expenditures on long-term care and how sensitive these
expenditures are for the price that people have to pay for these expenses. Moreover,
we do not know how the demand for non-health consumption changes when health
deteriorates and how this aﬀects their savings: people will probably spend less on
leisure activities but spend more on food and transport if they are no longer able to
prepare their own meals or to drive a car. When preferences for spending on ordinary
consumption decline in poor health it allows households to pay a larger share of long-
term care expenses out of pocket.
Acquiring insights into the preference for health-related expenses of elderly house-
holds, on the one hand, allows policy makers to adjust the long-term care insurance
system to better reﬂect personal preferences regarding health related expenditures. For
example, to give patients a greater role in the choice between residing in a nursing home
or more intensive home care that makes it possible to stay at home for a longer period,
and to allow them to choose the location and quality of a nursing home, the preferred
level of services and the amount of care. In addition, it allows policy makers to assess
the adequate level of basic care needs which they have to provide without the risk of
excessive health payments among the elderly which might result in poverty. Finally,
it allows them to assess how much additional, or “luxury care”, individuals are willing
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to pay out of pocket. This could relieve some of the burden of the public funding of
long-term care.
A related question is whether there is demand for ﬁnancial products to cover “luxury
care”, such as an annuity that pays a lump sum that varies with the level of needs or
a reverse mortgage product providing a line of credit that can only be used for LTC
expenses. As described above, the experience from the United States and the United
Kingdom is that the market for these products is almost non-existent. More insight
into the willingness to buy these insurance products is relevant for the development of
these ﬁnancial products which facilitate the private provision of LTC.
The demand for these products not only depends on the patient’s needs and pref-
erences for “luxury care”, but also on the availability of informal care, preferences for
non-health consumption in poor health and personality traits such as the level of risk
aversion. In addition, there is a trade-oﬀ between spending on “luxury care” and the
amount of money left to give to the children. Persons with a bequest motive may
prefer to spend less on long-term care. To examine these questions one could use a
questionnaire for acquiring information on health expenditures and preferences. The
information on individual preferences obtained from a questionnaire can also be used
to identify the relative importance of diﬀerent motives for saving in a structural life
cycle model, as it is not possible to derive these motives using data about saving and
consumption alone. We believe that combining administrative records on wealth and
survey data on individual preferences for saving will be a very promising direction to
contribute to the long lasting debate on the determinants of wealth accumulation.

Chapter 2
Policy uncertainty and precautionary saving
2.1 Introduction
In most of the Western world, house prices have been falling since the onset of the
2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis, especially in countries with a very elastic housing supply (as
in Spain) and in countries where both the housing and mortgage markets are highly
regulated and households are highly indebted (as in the Netherlands and Denmark,
where households own a disproportionately large mortgage portfolio).1 In response to
the ﬁnancial crisis, policy makers are proposing (or have already implemented) reforms
of the mortgage and housing market to prevent future crises. These proposed reforms,
aim to limit excessive mortgage lending, and will likely aﬀect future house prices.2
The 2007-2008 ﬁnancial crisis thus makes clear that households—and also ﬁnancial
institutions that have residential mortgage-backed securities on the balance sheet—face
considerable house price risk. Housing equity is often the most important asset in the
ﬁnancial portfolio for most households and can be an important source of retirement
savings. Therefore, house price risk may have an important impact on current saving
decisions and the portfolio allocation by households.
The theory of precautionary saving predicts that the decision to save not only depends
on future income risk (e.g. Carroll and Kimball, 2008) but also on wealth invested in
This chaper is co-authored by Mauro Mastrogiacomo. We are grateful to Maarten van Rooij for his
cooperation in gathering the data and analyzing the last wave of the survey used in this study. We are
also grateful to Rob Alessie, Maarten Gelderman, Adriaan Kalwij, Jan Rouwendal and Yuxin Zhang
and seminar participants at the 2014 congress of the European Economic Association, the 2015 Netspar
International Pension Workshop, the Modena-Netspar Conference on Advances in Household Finance,
the Conference on The Institutional and Individual Investors: Saving for Old Age, the 2015 ESPE
Annual Conference, and the 2015 SOLE-EALE World Conference for useful comments and suggestions.
Views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily coincide with those of De Nederlandsche Bank.
1See e.g. Oikarinen (2009) for evidence on how ﬁnancial market liberalization inﬂuences house
prices.
2Mian and Suﬁ (2015) discuss many potential policy reforms of the mortgage and housing market.
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risky assets such as housing equity; see e.g. Pelizzon and Weber (2009) and Banks et al
(2010). In addition to idiosyncratic (house price) risk, or market-based risk, there are
other sources of non-ﬁnancial risk, or background risk, which may also induce precau-
tionary saving. As mentioned above, one important source of risk lies in the uncertainty
related to the outcome of possible future reforms. The empirical literature to date has
been rather silent on how uncertainty, which stems from an insecure policy environ-
ment, aﬀects precautionary saving. Recent studies by Giavazzi and McMahon (2012)
and Ciani et al. (2015) are an exception. This is because uncertainty is normally re-
garded as a general concept relating to lack of knowledge about future outcomes and is
not broken down into its underlying components.
The aim of this chapter is to understand how much of precautionary saving is caused
by market-based uncertainty and how much is due to policy uncertainty. We focus on
an important cause of policy uncertainty: a possible reduction of the mortgage interest
deduction (MID). In the Netherlands, there has been, and still is, a lengthy political
debate to reduce the generosity of the mortgage interest deduction.The MID is an im-
portant contribution to net household income and could also aﬀect house prices as we
will show below. Over time, the possible reform of the MID system created uncertainty
about consumers’ future income and housing wealth as the details of the reform re-
mained unclear. The exact details remained unclear due to the many diﬀerent views
of the political parties and the uncertainty surrounding their future coalitions. This
uncertainty could aﬀect saving behavior. Our research question helps to understand
how policy uncertainty can depress consumption and economic growth and what can
be done to mitigate this eﬀect, which is relevant given that an increase in saving due to
policy uncertainty reduces consumer welfare, as shown by Luttmer and Samwick (2012).
To separately identify the eﬀect of policy uncertainty on saving, we enquire whether
households who tend to become more uncertain about the eﬀect of an MID reform
on house prices also tend to save more. The MID reform was a major theme in the
2010 elections and it was highly uncertain whether the reform would gain a majority in
Parliament; the polls suggested that about 50 % of parliamentary seats would be taken
by parties opposing the reform. We ﬁelded our questionnaire during the weekend after
the 2010 elections, just before the formation of Government. At that moment, policy
uncertainty about the outcome of a possible MID reform was high. Using the Dutch
CentERpanel we directly estimate the increase in uncertainty due to a possible policy
reform by eliciting the subjective distribution of house prices in both a policy neutral
scenario and a realistic but simpliﬁed hypothetical reform scenario.
To estimate the eﬀect of policy uncertainty on saving, we follow the reduced-form
approach put forward by Carroll and Samwick (1998). We regress the household saving
rate on important background characteristics and a proxy variable for aggregate house
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price uncertainty. We extend their approach by allowing for policy uncertainty: we add
to the regression a term for subjective house price uncertainty attributable to the MID
reform. Notice that we treat in our model house price risk in a similar way as income
risk in the model of Carroll and Samwick (1998). More speciﬁcally, uncertainty about
house prices signals income uncertainty in a changing policy environment. There are
two reasons to expect a link between policy-related (income) uncertainty and the value
of a house. First, a restrictive reform of the MID system results in a less generous tax-
relief for speciﬁc groups. This means that their mortgage costs rise, leaving them with
a lower disposable income and capacity to purchase a house, resulting in falling house
prices and housing-market stagnation. In this case, uncertainty about house prices due
to the prospective reform also reﬂects uncertainty about income. Second, changes in
housing wealth aﬀect future income if people are planning to annuitize housing wealth
later on in life. In this case, uncertainty about house prices is a signal of a wealth
eﬀect on future income. Most of all, the attractiveness of this proxy is its simplicity, as
respondents are more familiar with house prices than tax rules.
Our ﬁndings are as follows: ﬁrst, we ﬁnd a strong association between our subjective
measures of uncertainty and regional variation in house prices. This suggests that the
subjective measures of house price risk contain useful information and that homeowners
do recognize both house price uncertainty and policy uncertainty. Second, households
who are more uncertain about house price movements, ceteris paribus, save more than
households who are less uncertain. Third, we ﬁnd that policy uncertainty alone increases
household saving by about two percent; a magnitude similar to that estimated by Ciani
et al. 2015 using evidence from a pension reform. Although a credible reform could
mitigate this eﬀect, we also show that reforms that are not credible could ex-post
exacerbate rather than mitigate the eﬀect on precautionary saving.
2.1.1 Related literature and contribution
There are several studies on precautionary saving which are relevant to this study. Car-
roll and Samwick (1998) estimated the ‘buﬀer stock model’ in a reduced form. With sim-
ulations based on a CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility consumer, they ﬁnd
a high positive correlation between the target wealth to income ratio and income uncer-
tainty. Kazarosian (1997) and Mastrogiacomo and Alessie (2013) have conﬁrmed these
results. Using diﬀerent measures of uncertainty and diﬀerent data sets, they showed that
the share of precautionary savings attributable to income uncertainty ranges between
30% and 46% of net worth, and is therefore substantial in relative terms. These studies
used panel data (such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the National Longitu-
dinal Survey and the DNB Household Survey) to determine the measure of income risk
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(e.g. variance of income). Guiso et al. (1992), Lusardi (1997) and Mastrogiacomo and
Alessie (2013) investigated people’s actual responses by asking direct questions about
their expectations on future income. The ﬁrst two of the mentioned studies established
the share of total savings that could be attributed to individual earnings uncertainty by
regressing the logarithm of the wealth to income ratio on the subjective earnings vari-
ance, while the third study examined household income uncertainty and the subjective
uncertainty about future household income expressed by both household members.
The studies referred to above investigated only the subjective distribution of income
changes when institutions remain constant. We add to the literature by introducing an
extra dimension to income uncertainty; more speciﬁcally, house price uncertainty which
induces income uncertainty.3 We isolate one speciﬁc source of uncertainty, namely policy
uncertainty, while previous studies have only taken one total measure of uncertainty
into account. Income uncertainty may stem from a range of diﬀerent prospective events,
including perceived unemployment risk, health deterioration, family circumstances, and
so on.4 Isolating uncertainty about ﬁscal policy is important because policy makers can
for instance take action to reduce uncertainty by adopting credible reforms. However,
they are typically unable to reduce uncertainty relating to personal circumstances.
The subject of policy uncertainty has often been investigated by macro economists
and environmental economists. Pastor et al. (2012), for example, reviewed studies on
the role of policy uncertainty in determining stock prices and also present a theoretical
model on this topic. Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) developed an index of economic
policy uncertainty based on the number of newspaper articles which mention this topic.
This method has also been used by Van der Wiel (2009) to measure the formation of
expectations regarding pension beneﬁts. Less empirical research has been conducted
at the household level. Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) showed that an increase in
uncertainty about the political outcome in the run-up to the ‘close’ German elections
in 1998 resulted in a higher household saving rate. They also showed that the increase
in policy uncertainty was related to a major debate about future pension reforms.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the lengthy
political debate and the formation of expectations concerning the reform of the MID
over time. We also discuss the timing of our questionnaire. Section 2.3 describes
the data and the design of our questionnaire. Section 2.4 discusses the measurement
3Nui and Van Soest (2015) analyzed the subjective distribution of house prices as well. They were
mainly interested in the formation of expectations among US households. They did not consider the
eﬀect of house price expectations on saving behavior.
4Lusardi (1997) considered unemployment risk as potential source of income uncertainty by including
regional dummies in the regression model. The point is that regional diﬀerences in unemployment might
not be a good proxy of unemployment risk, as unemployment protection is high in Italy in all regions.
The regional dummies are also unlikely to capture policy uncertainty as no reform of the labor market
was at hand and neither expected at that time.
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of idiosyncratic house price uncertainty, policy uncertainty and aggregate house price
uncertainty as well as providing descriptive evidence about the quality of these measures.
Section 2.5 presents the empirical model and discusses the results. The ﬁnal section
provide policy implications and concludes.
2.2 Expectations regarding a possible reform of the
MID
The Netherlands is one of the few countries (other countries include Switzerland, Sweden
and the US) where all interest paid on a mortgage loan is deductible from taxable income
and so translates into a substantial tax refund. Many other countries with MID have
already implemented major reforms in the past; either by abolishing opportunities for
mortgage interest deduction (as in the UK) or reducing it to a large extent (as in the
US).
The amount of this refund depends on factors such as the marginal tax rate, meaning
that its beneﬁt rises with income and the mortgage principal. To give an example: a
household who owns a standard house, valued at around EUR 240,000, pays on average
EUR 11,000 mortgage interest a year. The highest marginal income tax rate in the
Netherlands is 52%. This means that such a household facing this tax rate could
receive a monthly tax refund of around EUR 475, which is not too far oﬀ the monthly
social assistance beneﬁt, which equals roughly EUR 650 a month.5 The amount that
the household deducts generally does not diminish over time, since the amortization was
formerly deferred either because the mortgage was interest-only, or that the amortized
part was kept in a separate insurance that would fully repay at maturity. The fact
that high amounts are at stake could prompt a response from liquidity-constrained,
risk-averse consumers.
Faced with the high costs of these programs and some negative externalities such
as inﬂating house prices and segregation, especially in large cities (see Glaeser et al.
2003), the Dutch government introduced some limitations to the MID system over time.
In 2001 the period that a household could deduct mortgage-interest was limited to a
maximum of 30 years and a second home mortgage was excluded. Various reforms
have been proposed since then, however, the process has been slow and it generated
considerable uncertainty. Although further reforms seemed inevitable, and indeed many
lobbies were initiated, it took more than a decade, before any substantial reform of the
system was seen. In April 2012, the government agreed to abolish the MID for new
interest-only mortgages. This was announced in the so-called “Spring Agreement”,
5We refer to the average house price and average mortgage interest rate in the month of the survey.
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which was reached between the government and the opposition at a time when new
elections were already being planned.
Below we present prima facie evidence that the political debate about the MID aﬀects
expectations regarding the likelihood of a possible reform of the MID in the near future.
The DNB household survey (DHS) is a panel study which, among other things, monitors
the beliefs about a reform which reduces the generosity of the MID since 2003 (we discuss
the DHS questionnaire at length in Section 2.3). The DHS asks the head of household
whether the government will reduce the mortgage interest deduction: “Do you expect
a limitation of the mortgage deductibility in the foreseeable future, say 10 years?” We
consider the respondents who respond ‘don’t know’ as feeling uncertain about a future
limitation of the MID. We observe the exact week number at which the question is
answered.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the evolution of these beliefs over time. The ﬁgure shows
that after the 2003 political elections, 68% of the sample believed that the MID system
would be reformed within 10 years. The situation remains largely unchanged after the
November 2006 elections, with the DHS 2007 measurement for this period ending up
at around 62%. This was a period of political instability as both elections followed a
premature fall of the government. The unchanged uncertainty as shown in Figure 2.1
may reﬂect the assumption that the MID reform would occur only in the event of a
stable majority. From then on, according to respondents, the likelihood of a reform
increased. This is in line with the increasing number of political parties becoming
supportive of a reform. The number of respondents who indicate uncertainty about the
likelihood of a reform also gradually declined over time.
A new DHS measurement was conducted a week after the 2010 elections and just
before a new coalition was created, and shows that 77% of respondents were expecting
a MID reform within ten years. The reform of the MID was one of the major themes
during the 2010 elections. Also our separate questionnaire to measure house price
uncertainty was sent out in the week of the 2010 elections, since we had noticed that it
was highly uncertain at that time whether there was a majority coalition in favor of a
reform. According to the polls in terms of Parliamentary seats in the week preceding the
questionnaire both opponents and supporters of a MID reform represented about half
of the seats in Parliament. The possible reform of the MID system created uncertainty
about house prices and future income as the outcome of the coalition formation and
exact institutional details about a limitation of the MID remained unclear.
Two years later, and a few weeks before the MID reform was ﬁrst announced in
the Spring Agreement,6 the 2012 DHS measurement was conducted. About 85% of
6The Spring Agreement was an agreement between the opposition and the remaining parties sup-
porting government, after the former coalition government had failed.
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the households believed in the possibility of an MID reform possibly because of the
severely deteriorated economic outlook. The latest elections were held in September
2012; and a few weeks later the MID reform became oﬃcial. Three days after the
reform-announcement, we ﬁled a new questionnaire, in order to elicit the opinion of
respondents now that the reform had been made public and the treated group appeared
to be much smaller than expected. The reform came as a surprise, not only because
ﬁnally an agreement had been reached, but also because it did not involve all existing
mortgages, which was highly unexpected according to our data (80% of the sample
did not expect only new starters to be subject to the new amortization rules).7 Thus,
despite the fact that the government reformed the MID, according to the 2013 DHS
measurement, the majority of households expected new or additional reforms (75%).
We also observe a noticeable increase in uncertainty about possible new reforms in the
future. This suggests that the implemented reforms were not felt as being deﬁnitive
as households are more uncertain and expect additional policy measures in the future.
This is also conﬁrmed by the follow-up survey which was ﬁelded three days after the
MID reform was announced (see also ﬁgure 2.1). We discuss the results of the 2012
measurement in section2.6.
2.3 Data
In order to measure house price uncertainty we have designed a detailed questionnaire.
We will discuss this questionnaire in detail below. We have also sent out a follow-up
survey immediately after the MID reform, to measure the credibility of the announced
reform. In our study, we will merge the questionnaire on house price expectations
with the the 2010 wave of the DNB household survey (DHS). The DHS was launched
in 1993 and is the main survey based on the CentERpanel. The CentERpanel is an
Internet based panel of over 2,000 households administrated by CentERdata at Tilburg
University and sponsored by De Nederlandsche Bank. The panel is representative of
the Dutch population. Panel members without Internet access receive a set-top box
and equipment that enables them to participate through their television.
For each wave of the DHS, information has been collected by means of ﬁve question-
naires: household and work, accommodation and mortgages, health and income, assets
and liabilities and economic and psychological concepts. These questionnaires, except
the second one on accommodation and mortgages, should be ﬁlled in by all respondents,
i.e. those household members who are at least sixteen years old. The housing and ac-
commodation questionnaire is in principle ﬁlled in by the head of household. The ﬁve
questionnaires have been launched at diﬀerent weeks of the year so that the number of
7Results are available upon request.
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responding households diﬀers across the questionnaires. CentERdata also provides the
data set with ‘general information of the household’ which contains demographic and
socio-economic information for all members—also those who are younger than 16—for
households who responded to at least one of the 5 questionnaires mentioned above.
In our study we use the following information available in this data set: age, marital
status, education level, disposable income (in brackets), a dummy variable indicating
homeownership status, the number of cohabiting children, and a dummy variable indi-
cating self-employment. We will only consider the answers of the head of household.
Our question of interest is whether household saving reacts to an increase in house
price uncertainty due to a reform of the MID. Following Giavazzi and McMahon (2012)
we will use active saving as a percentage of permanent income as the dependent variable.
The DHS questionnaire on economic and psychological concepts elicits information
on active saving by asking the respondents whether or not the household has saved
in the past year and if yes how much. The amount of saving is reported in brackets.
We take the mid value to represent active saving. This saving measure does not take
the possibility of negative active saving into consideration. The minority of heads of
households who answered that they did not save might either have no saving or a
negative saving rate. We identify respondents with negative saving by means of the
question: “Would you say the expenditures of your household were higher than the
income of the household, about equal to the income of the household, or lower than the
income of the household?” We impute the amount of negative active saving using the
diﬀerence in ﬁnancial wealth. We transform this into a negative active saving bracket
similar to the question of active saving. For the few households who do not report
the amount of saving we impute saving in the same way. Permanent income has been
estimated using the procedure of Kapteyn et al. (2005).8
Alternatively, the longitudinal nature of the DHS also allows us to measure saving
by taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of net worth. The advantage of the active saving measure
is that it is less prone to measurement error than using the ﬁrst diﬀerence in net worth.
Moreover, the diﬀerence in net worth might not measure true intended savings because
of unanticipated capital gains in the housing market or stock market which is diﬃcult
to take into consideration.
In our regression analysis, we also account for expectations concerning the general
economic situation of the household which is derived from the question: “How do you
think the economic situation of your household will be in ﬁve years time in comparison
to the current situation?” We assume that this dummy variable—of an improved eco-
nomic situation of the household—is a good proxy for income expectations. As a proxy
for income uncertainty, we derive the variance of the subjective probability to become
8Kapteyn et al. (2005) provide details on the estimation of permanent income.
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unemployed (or to ﬁnd a job) in the next 12 months by the head of household.9 Unem-
ployment is for sure one of the main sources of income uncertainty. The information
on income uncertainty is available in the DHS questionnaire on health and income. We
also use information on whether or not the head of household is self-employed since this
group of workers experience a greater uncertainty of income.
2.3.1 Questionnaire on house price uncertainty
The questionnaire was ﬁelded in the CentERpanel during the weekend of June 18,
2010. Within each household both the head and the partner aged 20 or above were
interviewed. The questionnaire has been presented to 2,184 household members of
which 1,465 members (1003 households) have completed the questionnaire; this implies
a response rate of 67 percent at the individual level. This corresponds to the response
rates to the modules of the annual DHS (Teppa and Vis 2012).
We create a variable measuring the number of years in which the respondent expects
an announcement of the reform by the government. Next, in the questionnaire we ask
homeowners about expectations regarding the value of their own property, in the short-
term (next two years), if no reform were to be implemented. Tenants are asked about
general price movements on the housing market. We use the question:
“Suppose that the government decides not to change the tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing. This implies that the mortgage interest deduction remains unaltered.
What is the change out of 100 that the value of your property will (increase/decrease)
between yk % and yk+1 % in total within the next two years?”
Each respondent reports the probability of a price movement within ﬁve speciﬁc inter-
vals [yk, yk+1] : k = 1, ..., 5. We present all ﬁve intervals at the same time to the respon-
dent and provide instructions that the probabilities should add up to 100. We randomly
present the intervals in increasing or decreasing order as the order might aﬀect response
behavior. The intervals are respectively (−∞, −15], (−15, −5], (−5, 5], (5, 15], [15,∞).
The ﬁrst and ﬁnal interval are not bounded. We assume that the maximum change
of the value of the own property is 30 percent. The respondents are also given the
possibility to answer ‘don’t know’ if they are unsure about future price movements.
Next, we confront each respondent with one of three hypothetical and simpliﬁed
reform scenarios that the Dutch Social Economic Council (SER) had proposed to the
Government in 2010.
1. The maximum rate at which the mortgage interest can be deducted will reduce
from 52% to 30%, in small steps of 1%-point per year.
9The variance of the probability p to ﬁnd or loose a job in the next 12 months is p(1− p).
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2. The maximum amount over which mortgage interest can be deducted will be
reduced from EUR 500,000 to EUR 250,000, in small steps of approximately
EUR 11,000 per year. Interest on loans above EUR 250,000 will then no longer
be tax-deductible.
3. The primary residence and the mortgage will receive the same ﬁscal treatment as
taxable wealth. In other words, the maximum rate at which the mortgage interest
can be deducted will reduce to 30% in 22 years . A Mortgage interest of 4% will
be assumed, irrespective of the actual interest rate. The imputed rent on the
owner-occupied house will be abolished by then with housing wealth taxed in the
same way as savings and investments (i.e. an eﬀective wealth tax of 1.2 %).
For all the three reform scenarios, we mention that they will be implemented gradually
(starting in ﬁve years) and that they hold for both existing and new mortgage contracts.
We randomly assign the respondents to one of the above simpliﬁed reform scenarios:10
We then asked the homeowners again about their housing value uncertainty in the
short-term assuming that one of the hypothetical scenarios will be implemented. Ten-
ants are asked about price movements on the housing market. We use the question:
“Suppose that the government will announce tomorrow that they gradually change the
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. The reform will be implemented in steps in
ﬁve years after the announcement and will be fully implemented in 22 years of time.
[Simplified reform scenario 1., 2. or 3. is stated here.] What is the change out
of 100 in this scenario that the value of your property will (increase/decrease) between
yk % and yk+1 % in total within the next two years?”
Next, we repeat the previous question and ask about price movements (in the same
scenario) but ask about expected price movements in the long-term (next ten years).
Table 2.1 provides the mean and standard deviation of the reported probability distribu-
tion of the (cumulative) price movement of the own property in the no-reforms scenario
(in the next two years) and the reform scenario (in the next two years and next ten
years).
A considerable fraction of the respondents state that they are “unsure” about future
price movements in the no-reform scenario (37%) and this fraction further increases in
the reform scenario in the next two years (48%). These households are excluded from the
10The respondents were also asked how they expect the MID would be reformed. A list of 14 policy
options was presented to them. The most popular answers correspond to the simpliﬁed scenarios: more
than half (54%) of the respondents indicate that the MID would be reformed for mortgages above a
certain threshold, while 35% answers that the rates at which mortgage interest could be deducted from
tax would be reduced and approximately 38% believes that the MID would be slowly phased out. The
results of this questionnaire are available upon request.
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empirical analysis.11 We also drop 26 households who provide incomplete information
to derive the subjective distribution function about future house price movements. This
leaves us with 487 households of which 84 percent is homeowner. Upon merging our
questionnaire with the DHS the ﬁnal sample further reduces to 410 households.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.
2.4 Measuring house price uncertainty
Next, we derive separate measures of house price uncertainty which both exclude policy
uncertainty (we refer to this measure as ‘market-based uncertainty’) and include policy
uncertainty (we refer to this measure as ‘aggregate house price uncertainty’). We assume
that aggregate house price uncertainty depends on general house price uncertainty and
policy uncertainty due to a possible reform of the MID.
Suppose that the random variable Y is the price movement of the own property (or
average property for tenants) in the next two years. We assume that the distribution
of Y depends on (1) a dummy variable R where individuals can either deduct mortgage
interest from income tax (no-reform scenario: R = 0) or where the deduction of mort-
gage interest is substantially reduced or abolished all together (reform scenario: R = 1)
and (2) the probability that the government will reduce the MID, i.e. Pr(R = 1).
To proxy the probability that the government limits the MID Pr(R = 1) we use a
probit model:
Pr(R = 1|X) = Φ(X ′β), (2.1)
where R is a dummy variable whether or not the respondent expects a limitation of the
MID in the foreseeable future (see section 2.2 for the exact formulation of the question),
X is a vector of regressors from our questionnaire which are good predictors of this
probability and Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. We use the following
regressors: a dummy variable whether or not the respondent expects a reform of the
MID and a variable measuring the number of years in which the respondent expects
an announcement of the reform. Most respondents indicated that they think that
the Dutch government would announce a reform of the MID system within two years.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of the predicted probability of a reform Pr(R = 1).
The ﬁgure shows that the large majority assigns a high likelihood to a reform of the
MID in the short-term.12
11This group of ‘sure’ respondents is more often homeowner, higher educated and richer than ‘unsure’
respondents.
12As a robustness check we also pretend that R equals the probability that the government limits the
MID. We do not observe this variable for 90 observations in our sample. This does not aﬀect the results
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To derive the conditional cumulative distribution function F ri (y) = Pi(Y ≤ y|R = r)
we use the reported probability distribution by the respondent. We denote the reported
probabilities as prik, k = 1, · · · , 5, where prik = p(yk ≤ Yi ≤ yk+1|R = r), with r = {0, 1}.
After dividing the reported probabilities prik by 100 we can derive the ﬁve revealed
points on the respondents ‘subjective’ cdf




For each respondent we can ﬁt a log-normal cumulative distribution function through
the revealed points of the ‘subjective’ cdf using the method of nonlinear least squares
—following Dominitz and Manski (1997). That is, for each respondent i, we ﬁnd the
parameters µri and σri that minimize the sum of squared deviations between the point














where µri = E[ln(Yi)|R = r] and σri 2 = var[ln(Yi)|R = r] respectively represent the
mean and variance of the price movement. Next, we can easily compute the condi-
tional expectation E[Yi|R] = exp(µri + 12σri 2) and the conditional variance var[Yi|R] =
exp(2µri + 2σri 2) − exp(2µri + σri 2). We make sure that the standard deviation is zero
when the respondent is 100 percent certain that the price movement falls in one interval.
We also derive the subjective probability distribution of Y by ﬁtting a cubic spline
function through the ﬁve revealed points of the cumulative distribution function— fol-
lowing Bellemare et al., 2012). This is a more ﬂexible method to derive the subjective
probability distribution and results in very similar statistics. We use this as our pre-
ferred measure of house price uncertainty in the empirical analysis. The results are
quantitatively the same. We ﬁnd a correlation between the interquartile range (IQR)
of the non-parametric (cubic spline) distribution and the IQR of the log-normal distri-
bution of 0.92.
The above measures allow us to derive the unconditional variance, or the ‘aggregate’
uncertainty. The unconditional variance is a convex function of the conditional variance
in both scenarios.13
for both the relation between house price uncertainty and precautionary saving and policy uncertainty
and precautionary saving.
13More speciﬁc, the unconditional variance of Y given X = x is deﬁned by var[Y |X = x] = E[Y 2|X =
x] − (E[Y |X = x])2, where E(Y 2|X = x) = E[E(Y 2|R,X = x)] = E(Y 2|R = 0, X = x)Pr(R =
0|X = x) + E(Y 2|R = 1, X = x)Pr(R = 1|X = x), and where E(Y 2|R = r,X = x) = var[Y |R =
r,X = x] + (E[Y |R = r,X = x])2. The unconditional expectation of Y is given by E(Y |X = x) =
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Table 2.3 reports the average expected value of the subjective probability distribution
of price movement of the own property in diﬀerent scenarios. The reported values are
derived using the cubic splines. The table shows that households on average expect a
minor increase in house prices of 0.33 percentage points in the no-reform scenario and
a small decline of -1.92 percentage points after a reform of the interest deduction. The
average variability of expected house price movements increases slightly. The increase
in uncertainty is, on average, not statistically signiﬁcant. We do observe a signiﬁcant
increase in the variance of price movements in the reforms scenario in the long-term
(after ten years). Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish whether the increase in the
variance in the long-term is caused by the reform or by the longer time span which
makes predictions more uncertain, since we do not have information about long-term
uncertainty in a policy neutral scenario.
There are diﬀerent ways in which a reduction in the mortgage interest deduction can
be accomplished. To test whether responses diﬀer depending on how the limitation
on tax deductibility occurs we randomly assigned the respondents to three diﬀerent
policy reforms of the MID (see above). We use an F-test to assess whether the average
value of the mean expected price movement within the three groups diﬀer from each
other. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the group means for both the IQR
and expected value for all scenarios. In the empirical analysis we will, therefore, not
distinguish between the diﬀerent groups.
2.4.1 Quality of our measurement
To examine whether the calculated measures of subjective house price uncertainty con-
tain useful information we will relate the subjective measures to actual house price risk.
As a measure of actual house price risk, we use the variation in house price movements
within the region of residence of the household. Studies by Banks et al. (2010) and
Gathergood (2011) show that regional variation in house prices is an important deter-
minant for household ﬁnancial decision making in the US and the UK, such as the
accumulation of home equity, investment behavior and homeownership choice.
We use aggregate information for 76 regions on house prices. This information is
provided on a quarterly basis by NVM which is the largest association of real estate
agents in the Netherlands and represents almost 70 percent of the Dutch housing supply.
We merge this data to the respondents in our questionnaire according to the regional
postcode (i.e. ﬁrst two digits). Some postcode areas fall into more than one neighbor-
ing region. For these households we calculate the weighted average of these measures
according to the population size of each region in which the postcode falls. For each re-
E[E(Y |R,X = x)] = Pr(R = 0|X = x)E(Y |X = x,R = 0) + Pr(R = 1|X = x)E(Y |X = x,R = 1).
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spondent we calculate the standard deviation of regional house price movements in the
ﬁve year period around the time of our questionnaire, between 2008 and 2012, following
the procedure of Banks et al. (2010). This period elicits also the boom-bust cycle of
house prices. We observe sizable diﬀerences in both the volatility and movements in
house prices across regions for this period (as reported in Table 2.4).
Table 2.5 shows that the region-speciﬁc actual house price risk is signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with the perceived house price risk in the short-term by the head of household as
measured in our questionnaire. This suggests that households do recognize both house
price uncertainty and policy uncertainty.14
2.5 Empirical model and results
The starting point of our empirical analysis is the buﬀer stock model developed by
Carroll and Samwick (1998). Using simulations based on a CRRA utility function, they
notice that a reduced form model for savings could be estimated with a 99% ﬁt. This
model shows that the logarithm of savings divided by permanent income correlates
with the variance of the logarithm of income—which is a proxy of uncertainty—and a
polynomial in age since the life cycle model postulates a non-linear relation between
savings and age. Following Giavazzi and McMahon (2012), we use the ratio of active
savings to permanent income s as our dependent variable, instead of the accumulated
savings to permanent income, since an increase in the ﬂow of saving due to increased
policy uncertainty because of a reform of the MID will probably not immediately result
in a higher ‘buﬀer stock’ of wealth.
To determine whether precautionary saving is aﬀected by aggregate (i.e. uncondition)
house price uncertainty, we ﬁrst estimate the following equation:
si = β0 +
5∑
a=2
δaAgeclassai + β1iqri + β2µi + x′iθ + ϵi, (2.4)
where iqr measures the subjective aggregate house price uncertainty, Age is a dummy
variable which equals one if the head of household falls within an particular age group
a and zero otherwise, µi is the expected value of the house, and xi is a vector of control
variables. The control variables include demographic factors such as marital status
(living together with a partner) and the number of children to account for variation in
14The excess supply of houses, or market tightness, on the regional level is also signiﬁcantly related
to perceived house price risk (not reported but available upon request). For example, Mian and Suﬁ
(2014) show that excess supply within US regions plays an important role in the adjustment process of
house prices and consequently for house price risk.
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tastes over the life cycle and other important determinants of saving such as the level
of education, household income (in categories) and homeownership status. We also
account for expectations concerning the general economic situation of the household
which might be correlated with house price risk. We include a dummy variable for self-
employment to account for income uncertainty. We also experimented with the variance
of the subjective probability to become unemployed as a proxy for income uncertainty.
This variable is, however, not available for the full sample. The exclusion of income
uncertainty results in virtually similar estimation results. Moreover, the coeﬃcient of
income uncertainty is never statistically signiﬁcant. We, therefore, decide to leave this
variable out of the regression model.
To separate the contribution of policy uncertainty on precautionary saving we subse-
quently estimate the equation:
si = β0 +
5∑
a=2
δaAgeclassai + β1∆iqri + β2∆µi + β3iqr0i + β4µ0i + x′iθ + ϵi, (2.5)
where ∆iqri equals iqr1i − iqr0i which measures policy uncertainty: the additional
uncertainty—over and above the house price uncertainty in a policy neutral scenario
iqr0i—due to a possible reform of the MID. We estimate the eﬀect of policy uncertainty
on precautionary saving both in the short-term (two years time) and long-term (ten
years time). We use the same set of controls as in the previous equation.
2.5.1 Results for policy uncertainty
Table 2.6 reports the parameter estimates for the household active saving rate (expressed
as the ratio of active saving to permanent income). We ﬁrst examine whether aggregate
(or unconditional) house price uncertainty is related to precautionary saving behavior
(model 1). We ﬁnd a positive but non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for aggregate uncertainty.
Thus, we do not ﬁnd strong evidence that households who are more uncertain, with
respect to short-term house price movements indeed, save more.
Next, we examine whether those who perceived higher potential house price risk due
to the change in policy (i.e. policy uncertainty) cumulate more saving. In this spec-
iﬁcation we control for idiosyncratic house price risk (i.e. market-based uncertainty)
in a scenario without reforms of the MID (model 2). We ﬁnd a positive and signif-
icant relationship between policy uncertainty and precautionary saving. Households
who perceive higher policy uncertainty have, ceteris paribus, a higher saving rate than
households who are less uncertain about new policy.
We can use the estimated coeﬃcients to assess the importance of policy uncertainty
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with respect to total saving. We ﬁnd that policy uncertainty due to a possible reform
of the MID accounts for about 1.6 percent of total saving.15 Thus, policy uncertainty
only results in a limited amount of additional saving.
In model 3, as a robustness check, we replace our measure of perceived market-
based uncertainty by our measure of aggregate uncertainty. We thus test whether
policy uncertainty, keeping aggregate uncertainty constant, results in more saving. This
speciﬁcation is less clean than speciﬁcation 2, in the sense that aggregate uncertainty
is a compound of policy uncertainty and market-based uncertainty. We again ﬁnd that
policy uncertainty (ceteris paribus) results in a signiﬁcantly higher saving rate.
Next, we re-estimate the models for the measures of uncertainty over the 10 year
period. Model (4) shows that aggregate house price uncertainty is again positively (but
now also signiﬁcantly) related to precautionary saving. We also ﬁnd that over a longer
time-span, policy uncertainty results in a signiﬁcant higher saving rate (model 5). For
the ‘less clean’ speciﬁcation (model 6) the eﬀect of policy uncertainty turns out not to
be signiﬁcant.
We also tried to estimate models 2 and 4 using instrumental variables (IV). The
reason for resorting to IV estimation is that our subjective distribution of house prices,
using the hypothetical questions, could be measured with error which results in biased
estimates towards zero and, therefore, underestimates the importance of policy uncer-
tainty for precautionary saving. The set of explored instruments is the volatility in
house prices in the region of residence of the household (or actual house price risk).
We also include market tightness within the region of residence as an instrument. We
have shown that both instruments are relevant predictors for subjective house price
uncertainty.
The ﬁrststage regression, however, shows that explanatory power of the instruments is
rather low (not reported but available upon request). As a result, we refrain from using
IV since the F-statistic indicates a weak instrument (Staiger and Stock, 1997) and we
are therefore unable to say anything about the exact magnitude of the estimated eﬀects,
our estimates are at the lower bound. Other papers that use region-speciﬁc measures
of uncertainty to instrument subjective uncertainty also suﬀer from weak instruments;
see Lusardi (1997).
Some groups might be more sensitive to policy uncertainty regarding a reform of the
MID, for example homeowners, households who expect a reform in the near future or
households with a large precautionary savings motive. To test whether speciﬁc sub-
groups respond diﬀerently to a possible reform of the MID we distinguished between
ﬁve subgroups as deﬁned in Table 2.7. We include a dummy variable for the subgroup
and an interaction between the subgroup and the variable measuring policy uncertainty
15βˆ1∆iqr/s¯ = .005× .382/.121 = .0158. The sample means are reported in Table 2.2.
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(∆iqr). This interaction eﬀect measures whether there is a diﬀerence in the eﬀect of
policy uncertainty on precautionary savings between both groups. Within each sub-
group we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the response to policy uncertainty (see
Table 2.8).
2.6 Policy discussion
Following the premature fall of the Dutch Government in 2012, the newly elected Gov-
ernment announced plans to reform the MID. The reform became eﬀective as from 1
January 2013. The reform is, however, not comprehensive since it immediately lim-
ited the tax relief only for new mortgage contracts and most current MID receivers
are not aﬀected. Those who were aﬀected by the reform will only lose a small part of
their MID in 28 years and only if they belong to the highest tax bracket. The news of
the MID reform was given huge media coverage, and at the end of the week in which
the announcement was made we re-interviewed our sample to examine whether policy
uncertainty was taken away by the reform.
Table 2.9 shows the answers to the question whether respondents think that the re-
form will be deﬁnitive in the long-term. Only 12.5% of the respondents believe that
there will be no new reforms in a period of twenty years, while 54% thinks that new re-
forms will be announced in ﬁve years. We then asked about their response to the current
reform. Table 2.10 shows selected answers from an originally larger list. The majority
of the respondents answer that they will not do anything in response to the reform.
Those who will take action are planning to save more, also 13.9% of the homeowners
who were left unaﬀected by the reform are planning to save more.
This is a striking ﬁnding. In the questionnaire which was held before the MID re-
form, when policy uncertainty was highest, 4.1% of the respondents was planning to
save more. After the reform, when policy uncertainty was taken away, the potential
additional savings tripled. One way to interpret this ﬁnding is that respondents saw
the limited reach of the reform and did not believe that it could be deﬁnitive. This
suggests that both delaying expected reforms and reforming in a non-credible way may
depress consumption. Of course, the deteriorated economic outlook between 2010 and
2012 might also have driven the rise in potential savers, however, the other potential
behavioral responses (e.g. selling, moving, working more) did not show such dramatic
changes as that of the amount of savers.
Finally, Table 2.11 shows expectations about the future development of several market
fundamentals, such as price levels, transactions and uncertainty. Respondents expect
that price levels and the number of transactions will fall, which is hardly surprising
following the restrictive reforms for new buyers. The surprising result is that a large
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majority of respondents indicates that the reform has fueled rather than dampened
uncertainty. Combining this with the statement about additional savings, it is not
evident at all that the present MID reform has mitigated policy uncertainty.
2.7 Conclusions
We investigated the separate eﬀect of policy uncertainty caused by a possible reform of
the MID system in the Netherlands on precautionary saving. Asking questions about
standard market-based uncertainty and uncertainty linked to a hypothetical reform of
the MID, we unraveled the eﬀect of policy uncertainty on precautionary saving. This
is a novel contribution. We show that the contribution of policy uncertainty to total
saving alone is modest as it accounts for about two percent of total saving. While
the inﬂuence of policy uncertainty is small it is nontrivial and by taking away this
uncertainty consumer welfare will increase.
The Government could reduce policy uncertainty by implementing credible policy, i.e.
policies that could induce consumers to believe that the future policy environment will
stay constant. Thanks to the unique timing of our questions, asked at crucial moments
in the reform process, we were able to show how policy uncertainty can actually increase
after a reform is announced, should the reform not be considered deﬁnitive.
2.8 Tables and ﬁgures
2.8. Tables and ﬁgures 33































2003w1 2005w1 2007w1 2009w1 2011w1 2013w1 2015w1
Expects a reform (fraction)
Uncertain about a refrom (fraction)
Source: DHS 2003-2014.
Table 2.1: Subjective probability distribution of cumulative price movement of the own














p ≥ 15 6.57 5.07 11.59 9.26 7.85 12.37
(11.24) (8.57) (19.45) (12.62) (13.67) (16.50)
5 < p < 15 23.06 16.86 22.00 23.40 19.53 23.70
(22.32) (19.57) (22.11) (21.18) (19.09) (21.16)
-5 < p < 5 44.20 41.82 35.61 37.69 37.00 30.75
(26.71) (26.64) (26.82) (25.15) (23.24) (22.14)
-15 < p < -5 18.28 24.35 19.72 18.94 24.57 21.27
(17.84) (20.71) (20.10) (18.07) (20.07) (20.89)
p ≤ -15 7.89 11.90 11.09 10.71 11.06 11.91
(13.07) (18.08) (18.64) (15.49) (13.93) (17.95)
Do not know 0.31 0.45 0.47 0.56 0.70 0.72
(0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.46) (0.45)
Observations 1,032 359
Notes: N=1,391.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Saving rate (ratio of active saving to permanent income) 0.121 0.190
No. of children 0.561 0.993
Married 0.705 0.457
Self employed 0.041 0.20
Homeowner 0.841 0.366
Higher educated 0.529 0.50
Improved econ. situation 0.188 0.391
Income uncertainty 0.045 0.075
Y< EUR 1,150 0.037 0.188
EUR 1,151 < Y < EUR 1,800 0.166 0.372
EUR 1,801 < Y < EUR 2,260 0.256 0.437
Y > EUR 2,260 0.541 0.499
Age 20-34 0.083 0.276
Age 35-44 0.159 0.366
Age 45-54 0.198 0.399
Age 55-64 0.305 0.461
Age 65+ 0.256 0.437
∆iqr 0.382 4.125
Notes: N=410. The variable ‘income uncertainty’ is available for 387 households.
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Table 2.3: Average expected value and average interquartile range of the subjective
distribution of house price movement (in percentage points) derived using splines, head
of the household.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 All F-
test (p-
value)
Expected value H0 :
µ1 =
µ2 = µ3
No-reform scenario (next two years) 0.42 0.41 0.18 0.33 0.92
(5.88) (6.41) (5.33) (5.86)
Reform scenario (next two years) -2.33 -1.11 -2.25 -1.92 0.16
(6.24) (6.13) (6.66) (6.37)
Reform scenario (next ten years) 0.00 1.41 0.35 0.55 0.37
(8.68) (8.43) (9.18) (8.79)
F-test. H0 : µno-reform = µreform: next two years (p-value) 0.00
next ten years (p-value) 0.00




No-reform scenario (next two years) 9.19 9.84 8.86 9.28 0.28
(5.40) (6.09) (5.29) (5.60)
Reform scenario (next two years) 9.76 9.50 9.57 9.61 0.91
(5.32) (5.25) (5.93) (5.51)
Reform scenario (next ten years) 9.72 10.26 10.42 10.13 0.56
(5.89) (5.66) (6.29) (5.96)
F-test. H0 : iqrno-reform = iqrreform: next two years (p-value) 0.36
next ten years (p-value) 0.02
Observations 162 154 171 487
Notes: Standard deviation is given within parentheses. F-test: equality of means test for
the three randomized groups. Group 1: The maximum rate at which the mortgage interest
can be deducted will reduce to 30%. Group 2: The maximum amount over which mortgage
interest can be deducted will be reduced to EUR 250,000. Group 3: The primary residence
and the mortgage will receive the same ﬁscal treatment as taxable wealth.
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Table 2.4: Frequency distribution of regional house price volatility (%) and movement
between 2008 and 2012, head of household








0.00 — 0.04 0.0 0.00 — 0.05 6.0
0.04 — 0.06 22.0 0.05 — 0.10 29.2
0.06 — 0.08 44.6 0.10 — 0.15 38.6
0.08 — 0.10 24.6 0.15 — 0.20 21.8
0.10 — 0.12 4.3 0.20 — 0.25 3.9
0.12 — 0.14 4.5 0.25 — 0.30 0.6
Average 0.076 Average 0.118
Median 0.074 Median 0.112
SD 0.019 SD 0.048
Notes: N=410. a SD(log price indext− log price indext−1), where t is the value of the index
in the ﬁrst quarter of the stated year. b log price index2012Q1 − log price index2008Q1
Table 2.5: Association between subjective house price uncertainty (interquartile range)
and ‘actual’ house price risk, dependent variable: subjective house price uncertainty,
head of household














S.D. of house price movements
(within the region of residence)
38.117** 25.704* 23.483 27.135* 24.414
(16.382) (13.813) (17.153) (14.214) (16.838)
Notes: N=410. Results of a multivariate regression for the head of the household. Included
controls: see regression Table 2.6. Standard errors clustered at the postcode level in parenthe-
ses. Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent level.
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Table 2.6: Eﬀect of policy uncertainty on precautionary saving, dependent variable:
saving rate (ratio of active savings to permanent income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short-term (two years) Long-term (ten years)
iqr 0.003 0.002 0.004** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
µ 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
∆iqr 0.005** 0.019*** 0.004** 0.005
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.010)
∆µ 0.003** 0.003 0.002** -0.006





Age 20-34 0.071* 0.068* 0.070* 0.061* 0.061 0.063*
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Age 35-44 0.072** 0.069** 0.068** 0.067* 0.066* 0.066*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Age 45-54 0.043 0.040 0.044 0.029 0.029 0.031
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Age 55-64 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Y < 1,150 -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.150***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
1,151 < Y < 1,800 -0.127*** -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.133*** -0.131*** -0.133***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
1,801 < Y < 2,260 -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.047** -0.046** -0.048***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Married -0.040 -0.042 -0.041 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
No. of children -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Homeowner -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.018 -0.020 -0.016
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038)
Higher educated 0.044** 0.044** 0.044** 0.035* 0.034* 0.034*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Self employed 0.064 0.063 0.066 0.062 0.063 0.064
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094)
Improved econ. -0.045* -0.043* -0.046** -0.038 -0.039 -0.041*
situation (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Constant 0.140** 0.148** 0.143** 0.145** 0.151** 0.144**
(0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.061) (0.066) (0.062)
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.089 0.093 0.103 0.097 0.099
N 410 410 410 382 382 382
Notes: Regression results for the head of household. Robust standard errors between paren-
theses. Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent level.
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Table 2.7: Overview of the deﬁned subgroups
Subgroup Frequency (%)
1 Expects a reform of the MID in the near future 60.7
2 Strong precautionary savings motive 71.2
3 Homeowner 84.1
4 Already takes measures (e.g. saves more) 17.8
5 Reports an increase in policy uncertainty (due to a possible reform) 46.1
versus a decline in uncertainty.
The subgroups are dichotomous variables; yes (=1) or no (=0).
Table 2.8: Eﬀect of policy uncertainty on precautionary saving for diﬀerent subgroups,
dependent variable: saving rate (ratio of active savings to permanent income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subgroup ×∆iqr -0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Subgroup 0.052*** 0.007 -0.006 -0.013 0.018
(0.016) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.020)
∆iqr 0.005** 0.007** 0.005 0.005* 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Notes: Regression results for the head of household. Robust standard
errors between parentheses. Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent; ** 5 per-
cent; * 10 percent level. The table reports possible heterogeneity in
precautionary savings. A description of the ﬁve subgroups is provided in
Table 2.7. The variable ‘Subgroup’ is an indicator variable for the sub-
group as reported in this table. The interaction eﬀect measures whether
there is a diﬀerence in the eﬀect of policy uncertainty on precautionary
savings between both groups. Includes the same set of controls as in Ta-
ble 2.6 (not reported but available upon request).
Table 2.9: Opinion about future reforms, head of household
No, there will be no new reforms in the next 20 years 12.5%
Yes, I expect new reforms within 2 years 14.9%
Yes, I expect new reforms within 2—5 years 39.1%
Yes, I expect new reforms within 5—10 years 25.5%
Yes, I expect new reforms within 10—20 years 7.9%
Source: 2012 Follow-up questionnaire. (N=1319). We use sample weights to make sure that
the reported statistics are representative of the Dutch population age 25 and above. The sam-
ple weights are based on the joint distribution of disposable household income, homeownership
status and age of the head of household as reported by Statistics Netherlands.
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I will not respond to this reform 79.3% 68.1% 0.000
I will save more 4.1% 13.9% 0.000
Me or my partner will work more hours 0.1% 1.7% 0.003
I will postpone the purchase of a new house 1.7% 4.8% 0.002
I will move to a less expensive house 1.1% 0.08% 0.820
I will renegotiate my interest rate and ﬁx it for a longer
period of time
1.9% 3.1% 0.146
Other 6.9% 11.9% 0.001
Do not know 6.4% 2.1% 0.000
Observations 727 936
Source: 2010 Questionnaire and 2012 Follow-up questionnaire. We use sample weights to
make sure that the reported statistics are representative of the Dutch population age 25 and
above. The sample weights are based on the joint distribution of disposable household income,
homeownership status and age of the head of household as reported by Statistics Netherlands.
Does not sum to a hundred percent because respondents may provide multiple answers.






All House prices 67% 6.8% 18.5% 4.5%
Uncertainty on the housing market 20.6% 39.0% 34.5% 5.9%
Number of transactions 41.6% 20.9% 27.4% 10.4%
Owners House prices 70.1% 5.2% 20.1% 4.6%
Uncertainty on the housing market 21.1% 39.3% 35.8% 3.8%
Amount of transactions 41.2% 22.3% 29.0% 7.4%
Tenants House prices 62.9% 9.0% 16.3% 11.9%
Uncertainty on the housing market 19.8% 38.7% 32.8% 8.8%
Amount of transactions 41.3% 18.9% 25.3% 14.4%
Source: 2012 Follow-up questionnaire. (N=1319). We use sample weights to make sure that
the reported statistics are representative of the Dutch population age 25 and above. The sam-
ple weights are based on the joint distribution of disposable household income, homeownership
status and age of the head of the household as reported by Statistics Netherlands.

Chapter 3
Mortgage risks, debt literacy and financial
advice
3.1 Introduction
Taking out a mortgage loan is not an easy decision. Households are faced with an
extensive range of mortgage types, often with complicated features. Moreover, house-
holds have to take into account factors such as the tax system, expected house price
developments, expected income growth, expected interest rate movements, with these
expectations being subject to a great deal of uncertainty. There is little scope to learn
from past experiences, as mortgage loans are taken out infrequently. At the same
time, choosing a mortgage loan is an important decision with long-term ﬁnancial con-
sequences.
Given the complexity of the decision, it is important that households taking out
mortgage loans have adequate ﬁnancial knowledge or access to ﬁnancial advice. Several
recent studies, however, have suggested that ﬁnancial knowledge of households is often
limited and, arguably, insuﬃcient to take out a mortgage loan without proper guidance
(see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007 and Van Rooij et al., 2011). That is why households
may beneﬁt from ﬁnancial advice provided by a mortgage broker. Financial advice,
however, does not necessarily result in better mortgage choices, especially if brokers
receive commission fees from the lender. If commission fees are linked to mortgage
size and type, intermediaries may have ﬁnancial incentives to recommend mortgage
This chapter is based on Van Ooijen and Van Rooij (2014). We are grateful to Rob Alessie, Johan
Almenberg, Tabea Bucher-Koenen, Jakob de Haan, Arvid Hoﬀmann, Adriaan Kalwij, Arthur van Soest,
Constanza Torricelli and seminar participants in the 2014 Netspar International Pension Workshop and
the 2014 congress of the European Economic Association for their helpful comments and suggestions.
We would also like to thank Mauro Mastrogiacomo for his comments and valuable recommendations
concerning the construction of the questionnaire. Views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily
coincide with those of De Nederlandsche Bank.
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loans that are not in the best interest of households. Households with limited ﬁnancial
sophistication, in particular if they are unaware of the commission structure, are prone
to biased ﬁnancial advice. There is relatively little empirical evidence about the impact
– if any – of ﬁnancial advice on mortgage choices.1
This chapter analyses the relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and mortgage choice,
and the role of ﬁnancial advice. More speciﬁcally, it examines whether ﬁnancially
sophisticated and ﬁnancially less sophisticated households have diﬀerent perceptions
of the risks posed by their mortgage loans, and whether the former take out diﬀerent
mortgages in comparison with households with less ﬁnancial knowledge. In addition,
the chapter examines whether households that seek advice from ﬁnancial intermediaries
take out mortgages with diﬀerent features.
To this end, we designed a special questionnaire for the CentERpanel, a panel compris-
ing more than 2,000 Dutch households that complete weekly Internet-based household
surveys. Our survey was set up to collect information on mortgage risks, debt literacy
and the role of ﬁnancial advice in selecting a mortgage. More speciﬁcally, we explicitly
measured the risks of a mortgage loan and the riskiness of diﬀerent mortgage attributes
as perceived by the borrower. The debt literacy questions in our survey focus on the
understanding of characteristics of debt contracts such as mortgage loans. The debt
literacy questions designed by Lusardi and Tufano (2015) are more speciﬁc and de-
tailed than the “basic” ﬁnancial literacy questions formulated by Lusardi and Mitchell
(2007), with the latter measuring the knowledge about basic ﬁnancial principles which
are important to day-to-day ﬁnancial decision-making. The basic ﬁnancial literacy ques-
tions are important determinants of, for instance, retirement planning (as highlighted
by Alessie et al., 2011) and stock market investments (as demonstrated by Van Rooij
et al., 2011). However, adequate basic ﬁnancial literacy in itself may be insuﬃcient to
make infrequent debt decisions, including decisions about mortgage loans, given that
there is little scope to learn from past experience. Using both sets of literacy questions
enabled us to assess which component of ﬁnancial literacy inﬂuences mortgage choice.
There are several reasons why it is especially informative to examine these ques-
tions for the Netherlands. First, the mortgage market in the Netherlands is well-
developed and innovative, with a wide range of non-traditional mortgage products on
oﬀer. Interest-only mortgages and endowment mortgages linked to a life insurance pol-
icy are very popular. Second, there is no requirement to make a down payment upon
1The theoretical implications of ﬁnancial advice to unsophisticated households that are unaware of
the ﬁnancial adviser’s role are well understood (see Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012). Gabaix and Laibson
(2006) have theoretically demonstrated that ﬁnancial companies beneﬁt from oﬀering complex mortgage
terms to unsophisticated households. Woodward and Hall (2012) have provided suggestive empirical
evidence that oﬀering complex mortgages to unsophisticated households is proﬁtable for mortgage
brokers.
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the purchase of a home. It is common practice, in particular among ﬁrst-time buyers, to
raise the loan amount to include transaction costs, including property transfer tax and
notary fees. As a consequence, the mortgage loan amount often exceeds the underlying
property value. Third, Dutch mortgage loans are “recourse” loans, as is the case in most
other European countries and in some US states, which implies that the borrower is
liable for any deﬁciency in the event of default. This transfers the risks in the mortgage
contract to the borrower. Fourth, the Netherlands experienced a sharp rise in house
prices starting in the early 1990s, followed by a strong fall since 2008 reaching its lowest
level in mid 2013. With house prices continuing to rise, many households bought houses
ﬁnanced with large mortgage loans. Falling house prices and deteriorating labor market
conditions in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis put these households at great ﬁnancial
risk.
Our main ﬁndings are: ﬁrst, households demonstrate less knowledge of loan con-
tracts than of basic ﬁnancial concepts, suggesting that loans are complex products for
consumers. Moreover, the debt literacy measure is better able to explain the varia-
tion in mortgage risks than the more general basic ﬁnancial literacy measure. Second,
homeowners associate the following loan characteristics with risky mortgages: high
loan-to-value ratios, high loan-to-income ratios and complex features such as linked
life insurance policies investing part of the loan payments in the stock market. Third,
home owners with higher levels of debt literacy typically hold more risky mortgages. Fi-
nancially less sophisticated homeowners are more likely to have traditional mortgages,
including annuity-based and linear mortgages, with homeowners gradually repaying the
loan principal. Fourth, homeowners considering themselves incapable of taking out a
mortgage consult mortgage brokers more often. However, households with a limited
understanding of loan contracts – and therefore potentially beneﬁting most from advice
– did not seek ﬁnancial advice from a mortgage broker more often than more sophisti-
cated homeowners. Fifth, homeowners who had consulted mortgage brokers held more
risky mortgages. This eﬀect is more pronounced for homeowners with low levels of debt
literacy.
These results highlight a number of policy implications for ﬁnancial education and
advice. Worldwide, there are many initiatives aimed at increasing ﬁnancial knowledge
and awareness. As a ﬁrst implication, our ﬁndings suggest that initiatives should go
beyond basic ﬁnancial concepts and pay attention to the speciﬁcs of loan decisions. As
mortgage decisions are complex, with far-reaching ﬁnancial consequences, households
had better be well equipped for these decisions. Second, given the crucial role of in-
dependent ﬁnancial advice, incentives resulting from adviser compensation need to be
aligned with the interests of consumers as it is diﬃcult for consumers with limited
ﬁnancial sophistication to assess the quality of advice.
44 Chapter 3. Mortgage risks, debt literacy and ﬁnancial advice
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 motivates our
research questions and discusses related literature on mortgage choices and ﬁnancial
literacy. Section 3.3 explains the features of the Dutch mortgage market. Section 3.4
describes the survey design. Section 3.5 and 3.6 discuss our measures of mortgage
risks and ﬁnancial literacy, respectively. Section 3.7 investigates the relation between
ﬁnancial literacy, mortgage choice, mortgage risks and ﬁnancial advice. The ﬁnal section
concludes and discusses implications.
3.2 Motivation and related literature
The 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis has shown that mortgage loan decisions can have a huge
impact on the ﬁnancial situation of a household. Currently, many households ﬁnd
themselves with mortgage loans that exceed the home value because of falling house
prices. Others are struggling to make their mortgage payments due to a loss of earnings
or other adverse events, such as divorce. Distressed households unable to pay their
mortgage will ultimately default on the loan, requiring them to sell their home. The
costs of default are particularly high in the case of foreclosure. In a forced sale scenario,
houses are typically sold at a large discount.2 If the property’s selling price does not
cover the full amount of the outstanding mortgage debt, the borrower may be liable for
the shortfall, which then has to be paid from ﬁnancial assets or future income.
In many US states, lenders commonly decide not to pursue any shortfall to reduce
the length of the foreclosure process, mainly because this is prohibited or restricted by
law. These so-called non-recourse loans give homeowners with negative housing equity
an incentive to strategically default (see Ghent and Kudlyak, 2011). This resulted in
many US mortgage defaults in the course of the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis, when house
values fell and job losses pushed households into payment problems.3 In most European
countries (and some US states), mortgage loans are recourse loans, which means that
the lender has the right to pursue the borrower to pay any shortfall. As a result, the
ﬁnancial risk of default is passed onto the borrower.4
Households with negative housing equity that fall behind on their mortgage payments
may ﬁnd themselves in serious ﬁnancial problems, or even face bankruptcy. This stress-
ful situation, which is diﬃcult to overcome, might even have consequences beyond the
2Campbell et al. (2011) have found an average discount on the market value of 27% for the United
States. In the Netherlands, a foreclosure sale, typically through a public auction, results on average in
a discount of 20% (see CPB, 2009).
3 Several empirical studies indicate that default behavior is driven by a combination of payment
problems and negative equity (e.g. Elul et al., 2010; Gerardi et al., 2013b). Negative equity, in itself,
does not always lead to defaults on non-recourse loans because of the high costs of moving, the reduced
credit rating or the risk of being sued; see Guiso et al. (2013) for the determinants of strategic default.
4See for example ECB (2009) for a description of diﬀerences in housing ﬁnance between the United
States and the euro area.
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ﬁnancial domain, including depression or other health problems (see Currie and Tekin,
2015). Against this background, it is important to investigate whether borrowers are
aware of the risks of a mortgage loan.
Recent studies for the US highlight that default rates are high among borrowers with
non-traditional mortgage loans (see Mayer et al., 2009; Demyanyk and Van Hemert,
2011; Amromin et al., 2011). These alternative mortgage products diﬀer from tradi-
tional mortgages. Unlike traditional mortgages, they are characterized by low (initial)
mortgage payments, and require limited or deferred repayment of the principal. Low
mortgage payments make owner-occupied housing more aﬀordable for households antic-
ipating strong increases in future income or house prices. Moreover, in some countries,
deferred repayment of the principal in combination with tax-deductible mortgage inter-
est payments allows borrowers to reduce their tax burden. Hence, non-traditional mort-
gages may be beneﬁcial for sophisticated borrowers; see Cocco (2013) for an overview
of the beneﬁts of non-traditional mortgage products. However, despite the complex
nature of these mortgages, they can also be taken out by less sophisticated borrowers,
who are not aware of the risks.
High-leverage loans entail both beneﬁts and risks. Access to no-down-payment mort-
gage loans may increase household welfare as high-leverage mortgages enable young
households to smooth consumption over the life cycle (see Ghent, 2015). Indeed, access
to mortgage loans with low down payments enabled many households to raise mortgage
ﬁnance in the run-up to the ﬁnancial crisis. However, this loosening of mortgage stan-
dards contributed considerably to the rise in defaults after the onset of the crisis (see
Corbae and Quintin, 2015).
In light of the US subprime mortgage crisis, several recent studies have examined the
default behavior and ﬁnancial sophistication of households taking out risky mortgage
products. Gerardi et al. (2013a) have demonstrated that ﬁnancially illiterate borrowers
are more likely to default on their mortgage loans. However, they have found no evidence
of higher default rates resulting from riskier mortgage terms, such as high loan values
relative to income and house value or adjustable rate mortgages. They have suggested
that borrowers with a lower level of ﬁnancial literacy default more often after taking
out the loan because of their inability to accumulate suﬃcient wealth to absorb income
shocks, for example when macroeconomic shocks give rise to involuntary unemployment.
Klapper et al. (2013) have documented that individuals with relative low ﬁnancial
literacy are indeed less able to deal with macroeconomic shocks.
Another potential channel through which ﬁnancial literacy aﬀects default is the in-
ability to assess the aﬀordability of the mortgage over the life of the loan, for example
because of having incorrect expectations about income growth, investment returns or
house price appreciation. Staﬀord et al. (2012) have shown that US households allocate
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too much of their household income to mortgage payments in times when the labor
market is performing well and house prices appreciate. On the other hand, Amromin
et al. (2011) have suggested that a lower level of ﬁnancial literacy might also increase the
likelihood of default, because less sophisticated households may underestimate the costs
of default such as reputation loss, penalty charges, or a lower credit rating. By contrast,
for non-traditional mortgages, such as interest-only mortgages, Amromin et al. (2011)
have found that more sophisticated borrowers (based on credit scores and income) are
more likely to default on the mortgage loan, possibly because of strategic reasons. They
have also shown that more sophisticated individuals are more likely to hold interest-only
mortgages. This has also been found by Cox et al. (2014), who have studied the link
between mortgage type choice and self-assessed ﬁnancial knowledge among households
in the Netherlands.5
Mortgage brokers6 may provide ﬁnancial advice and help households reach mortgage
decisions. This can be particularly helpful for those who feel incapable of taking these
decisions on their own. Conklin (2015) has indeed found that illiterate households who
receive face-to-face advice have a lower probability of default. Investigating several
explanations, Conklin has concluded that this positive correlation is due to mortgage
brokers advising borrowers on their broad ﬁnancial situation and explaining the features
and consequences of mortgage loans. However, there is also an alternative view accord-
ing to which mortgage brokers may extract additional income from illiterate consumers
by advising suboptimal loans, e.g. with higher interest rates (see the literature overview
in Conklin, 2015).
We contribute to this literature by explicitly measuring the riskiness of the mortgage
loan and risk perception instead of analyzing default behavior (which might be unrelated
to the “objective riskiness” of the mortgage loan). In addition, we examine the role of
ﬁnancial advice in mortgage choice. There is limited empirical literature on the role of
ﬁnancial advice in shaping consumer decisions, and it mainly focusses on investment
decisions. Finally, we measure both the understanding of basic ﬁnancial concepts, as
well as the understanding of complex loan contracts.
5Interestingly, our results conﬁrm that individuals who report a higher self-assessed ﬁnancial knowl-
edge own an interest-only mortgage more often. However, we were able to analyze the relation with
objective knowledge and we do not ﬁnd that having an interest-only mortgage is related to the actual
level of ﬁnancial literacy.
6When we use the term mortgage broker, we refer to traditional mortgage brokers and other ﬁnancial
intermediaries who bring together borrowers and lenders in the mortgage market and provide ﬁnancial
advice to households.
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3.3 An outline of the Dutch mortgage market
The Netherlands has an extensive menu of residential mortgage types available com-
pared with other countries. Over the years, several innovative mortgage types have
been developed which take full advantage of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest.
Mortgage interest payments are fully deductible at a maximum rate of 52% for persons
in the highest tax bracket.7
The most common mortgage loan is an interest-only loan, on which the borrower
pays interest without making principal repayments. The principal has to be repaid
when the loan matures, usually after 30 years. As the outstanding mortgage balance
does not change over the life of the mortgage, borrowers make maximum use of the
tax deductibility of interest payments over the whole period. Another widely avail-
able mortgage type is the endowment mortgage, consisting of an interest-only mortgage
which is linked to a savings account in the form of a universal life insurance policy.
The borrower pays both interest and an insurance premium (part of) which is set aside
to repay the principal after 30 years. The cash value of the savings accumulated un-
der the life insurance policy is exempted from wealth taxation.8 A related mortgage
type concerns the investment-based mortgage, whose premium is invested in the stock
market. Borrowers with investment-based mortgages run the risk of ending up with
insuﬃcient funds to repay the mortgage at maturity in the event of poor investment
returns. Traditional fully amortizing mortgages – whose principal is gradually repaid
based on a linear or annuity-based repayment scheme – are rare in the Netherlands
because of the tax relief. The majority of mortgages are ﬁxed rate mortgages (FRMs)
with ﬁxed terms ranging between ﬁve and ten years. A small fraction of the purchased
mortgages have an adjustable rate (adjustable rate mortgage – ARM) closely linked to
market interest rate developments.9
The combination of generous mortgage interest tax relief and relaxation of lending
criteria by ﬁnancial institutions in the second half of the 1990s encouraged households to
take out large mortgage loans (see DNB, 2000). In principle, mortgage lenders require
no down payment and transaction costs are typically included in the loan amount.
Mortgage loans which exceed the property value are very common: mortgages with a
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio between 110% and 115% were the norm until fairly recently.
In 2010, there was no cap on mortgage loans as a percentage of the house value (see
AFM, 2009). The typical LTV ratio is much lower in other countries. In the United
7The government has decided to gradually reduce the maximum deduction from 52% in 2013 to 38%
in 2041. Many other countries with mortgage interest deduction changed their rules at an earlier stage;
either by abolishing or signiﬁcantly reducing mortgage interest tax relief.
8Endowment mortgages are also common in the United Kingdom. However, they are rare in other
countries (see Devereux and Lanot, 2003).
9DNB Statistics (2010); available from: <http://www.statistics.dnb.nl>, [2 October 2014]
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States, LTV ratios of about 75% are common, and they are even lower in countries such
as the United Kingdom and Germany, with typical LTVs of about 70% (see Green and
Wachter, 2005). As a consequence of the large mortgage loans and limited mortgage
principal repayments, outstanding mortgage debt in the Netherlands amounts to 107%
of GDP, versus 76.5% in the United States and less than 50% in Germany in 2012
(see EMA, 2012). In fact, the Netherlands is among the countries with the largest
outstanding mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP in the world. Thus, borrowers are
exposed to signiﬁcant risk if house prices decline, which has been the case in recent
years.10
Some borrowers have the option to take out a mortgage loan under the Dutch national
mortgage guarantee (NMG) scheme, which protects both lenders and borrowers against
losses upon default. The aim of the NMG scheme is to encourage home ownership.11
Borrowers with a mortgage under the NMG scheme are protected against loss if default
is related to a number of clearly deﬁned liquidity shocks, for example owing to divorce,
involuntary unemployment, or the death of a spouse. These borrowers are released from
the obligation to repay the remaining debt (if they have insuﬃcient housing equity or
ﬁnancial assets to repay the mortgage loan). The NMG scheme insures mortgages for
houses up to a ceiling amount (EUR 290,000 in 2013). One of the conditions to qualify
for a mortgage loan under the NMG scheme is that at least half of the value of the
mortgage has to be fully amortizing. After paying a modest premium to buy NMG,
borrowers with an NMG mortgage pay a slightly lower interest rate because the lender
bears less risk.12
3.4 Data
3.4.1 The mortgage risks questionnaire
We designed a detailed questionnaire on mortgage risks, debt literacy and ﬁnancial
advice. The questionnaire was ﬁelded in the CentERpanel in the weekend of 18 June
2010. The CentERpanel is an Internet-based panel of over 2,000 households adminis-
tered by CentERdata at Tilburg University and sponsored by De Nederlandsche Bank.
The panel is representative of the Dutch population. Panel members without Internet
access receive a set-top box and equipment that enables them to participate through
10As a result, the Dutch government has implemented new measures to prevent disproportionately
large mortgage loans. For example, a statutory LTV cap has been introduced, which will be gradually
reduced from 106% in 2012 to 100% in 2018.
11While an NMG mortgage loan has similarities with FHA mortgages in the United States, the latter
insure the lender only against default risk.
12NMG, Conditions and Norms of the National Mortgage Guarantee (in Dutch), available from:
<http://www.nhg.nl>. [2 October 2014].
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their television sets. Within each household, both the head and the partner aged 20 or
older were interviewed. The questionnaire was presented to 2,184 household members
of which 1,464 members (1,185 households) completed the survey, implying a response
rate of 67% at the individual level. This corresponds with the response rates to the an-
nual DNB Household Survey (DHS) modules, i.e. the main CentERpanel-based survey
(see Teppa and Vis, 2012).
The rate of homeownership in our sample was 73.8% (874 households), with 85.6% of
homeowners (748 households) having a residential mortgage loan on their property. This
is somewhat higher than the ownership rate among Dutch households. We used sample
weights to ensure that the reported statistics are representative of the Dutch population.
The sample weights were based on the joint distribution of disposable household income,
homeownership status and age of the head of the household as reported by Statistics
Netherlands.13
The questionnaire on mortgage choice was combined with background information
from the 2010 DHS. The DHS is an annual panel study which collects detailed informa-
tion on wealth holdings, earnings, socio-demographic information and behavioral traits,
such as risk preferences and time preferences, to study the determinants of saving behav-
ior. The DHS consists of six modules. The module on accommodation and mortgages
was completed in the same weekend as our questionnaire. This module had to be com-
pleted by the household member in charge of household ﬁnances (designated as the
head of the household if both members participated in our questionnaire).14 Combin-
ing our survey with the annual mortgage information resulted in an 80.4% match rate
for households with a mortgage. The combined sample included 592 households (755
individuals) with a mortgage loan. For these households ﬁnancial statistics about the
mortgage loan were constructed, as described in the next section. We excluded from
our analysis of mortgage choice all households with missing values or obvious report-
ing errors on important mortgage loan characteristics, reducing the sample size to 531
households (680 individuals).
We used two sets of literacy questions (one set measuring basic ﬁnancial literacy and
the other debt literacy) to assess whether ﬁnancial literacy – and which component of
ﬁnancial literacy – is related to the features and riskiness of the mortgage loan. In
addition, we asked individuals to assess their capability to take out a mortgage loan
without ﬁnancial advice. The ﬁnancial literacy questions were ﬁelded in a separate ques-
tionnaire one week before the questionnaire on mortgage risks. The ﬁnancial literacy
questions were answered by 91.1% of respondents in the mortgage risks survey. There
13For individual household members, the weighted sample statistics match the joint distribution of
gross personal income, age and gender.
14We were able to retain some additional households by using information from adjacent years.
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were 1,080 households (1,324 individuals) with non-missing information on ﬁnancial lit-
eracy.15 The ﬁnal sample, which we used for the empirical analysis of mortgage risks
and ﬁnancial literacy, included 459 households owning a mortgage.
3.4.2 Mortgage characteristics
In line with the literature on mortgage default, we constructed several ﬁnancial measures
related to payment problems and mortgage default, for example as demonstrated by
Cocco (2013). First, we calculated the original loan-to-value ratio (OLTV), deﬁned as
the ratio of the original loan amount to the purchase price of the house. The current loan-
to-value ratio (CLTV) was deﬁned as the ratio of the outstanding mortgage loan balance
to the current self-reported house value.16 For endowment mortgages and investment-
based mortgages, we took into account the cash value of the savings account linked to
the mortgage to repay the principal at maturity. We also created a dummy variable for
households with LTV ratios exceeding 100%.
Second, to measure the ﬁnancial burden of the loan, we computed the current payment-
to-income ratio (CPTI) – i.e. the ratio of gross mortgage payments to net household
income. We deﬁned the current loan-to-net income ratio (CLTI) as the ratio of the cur-
rent loan amount to disposable household income. We were able to retrieve disposable
household income data for the year of home purchase only for households participat-
ing in the DHS in the year the house was purchased. This information was available
for about 60% of the households in our sample that had purchased a house after 1993
(which is when the DHS started). For those households, we calculated the original
loan-to-income ratio (OLTI).
Table 3.1 presents ﬁnancial characteristics of the mortgage loans by age and by year
of house purchase and year of mortgage origination. The data show an increasingly
large share of property values being funded by mortgage loans over the last decade.
For house purchases after 2007, the majority of the households took out mortgage
loans exceeding the value of their properties. The number of households with original
LTV ratios greater than 100% rose from 25.0% in the early 1990s to 67.3% for house
purchases after 2007, with an average original LTV ratio of 103% for house purchases
after 2007. Over the same period, the loan amount relative to the net household income
15We excluded from our sample six households that consistently answered “Do not know” to all basic
ﬁnancial literacy and debt literacy questions, as well as to other questions in the questionnaire. We
established that this did not aﬀect the empirical results.
16Some households have mortgages consisting of a combination of loans. A typical combination of
loans is a mortgage with an interest-only component and a component in the form of an endowment
mortgage or investment-based mortgage. In addition, some households take out second mortgages to
extract equity, for example to ﬁnance home improvements. Our analysis was based on the combined
loan amount. As regards the other characteristics, such as mortgage type, we used the characteristics
of the ﬁrst mortgage.
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(at time of purchase of the house) also increased sharply. The average original LTI ratio
increased from 6.2 between 1996 and 1999 to 9.1 after 2007. Large mortgage loans imply
that homeowners have to allocate a large share of their household income to mortgage
payments. The gross current payment-to-net income (PTI) ratio of mortgages taken
out after 2007 stood at about 50%. The net current PTI ratio was lower owing to the
impact of mortgage interest tax relief.
Mortgages with high LTV and LTI ratios were taken out principally by younger house-
holds. Households aged under 40 on average had an original LTV ratio of 103%; about
62% had original LTV ratios of more than 100%. Households aged 70 and older had an
average original LTV ratio of 75%; only 11.8% had purchased their homes with a mort-
gage loan exceeding the property value. This is probably because existing homeowners
are encouraged by tax rules to use positive housing equity for new house purchases, and
because ﬁrst-time homeowners are not required to make any down payment. Moreover,
older homeowners are better able to make a down payment if they have accumulated
ﬁnancial assets over the course of their lives.
In many cases, the average current LTV ratio was lower than the original LTV ratio
because of principal repayments or property price increases over the life of the loan.
Nevertheless, about 23% of the households younger than 40 had negative equity in
2010. Households in this group also made large mortgage payments in proportion to
total household income. It is doubtful whether they would be able to continue repaying
their mortgage loans if household income fell, for instance because of job loss or divorce.
The combination of negative equity and a signiﬁcant payment burden puts these young
households in a risky position. The price of owner-occupied houses declined on average
by 15.9% between June 2010 and its lowest level in June 2013, according to Statistics
Netherlands. The remaining mortgage debt of the older age groups was limited: fewer
than 2% of households in the 50-59 age group – and virtually none of the retired
households – had negative equity.
Table 3.2 shows the percentage of mortgage types by age and by year of house pur-
chase and year of mortgage origination. Interest-only mortgages accounted for about
55% of all mortgages originated after 2007, with more traditional repayment mortgages,
such as fully amortizing mortgages, accounting for only a small fraction. A large pro-
portion of households in the sample held an endowment mortgage: about 35% of the
mortgages taken out after 2007. Endowment mortgages were often taken out by younger
households, with older households more often holding interest-only mortgages. The rel-
ative high prevalence of repayment mortgages among younger households – which have
accumulated little housing equity – limits their risk of building up excessive debt.
Around the year 2000, many mortgages taken out were linked to investment vehicles
because stock prices were soaring in those days, and expected stock market returns were
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high. Investment-based mortgages became less popular after 2000 due to poor realized
investment returns contributing to shortfalls in investment mortgages. After 2007, new
investment-based mortgages declined to fewer than 3% of all new mortgage loans.
3.5 Measuring perceived mortgage risks
We are interested in the borrower’s mortgage risks aﬀecting the likelihood of delinquency
and mortgage default and, therefore, the quality of the lender’s mortgage loan portfolio.
The borrower’s risks associated with a mortgage contract can be classiﬁed into two
important types. First, there is an “income risk” of being unable to meet mortgage
payments, because household income declines or interest rates rise for ARMs. Second,
there is a “wealth risk” of having a mortgage which exceeds the property value, because
of house price declines, lending in excess of the property value, or a forced house sale
at a discount – i.e. below the market value – after default.
Having negative housing equity is not necessarily problematic as long as there are no
payment problems. In the event of payment problems – for example because of job loss
or a divorce – the borrower may cut non-mortgage expenses or agree with the lender
to temporarily suspend or reduce mortgage payments. If payment problems continue,
the borrower will eventually be forced to sell the house or have the property go into
foreclosure. Selling the house implies that the mortgage must be repaid. If the selling
price is insuﬃcient to repay the outstanding mortgage, the lender has the right to
demand payment of any shortfall from the borrower since, under Dutch law, these are
recourse loans.17 Note that this is diﬀerent for countries or US states with non-recourse
mortgage loans. Having negative equity may prompt strategic defaults. Nevertheless,
Bhutta et al. (2010) have documented that in recourse US states, too, defaults are
mostly related to a double trigger, i.e. negative equity and a negative income shock.
The median borrower does not strategically default before the negative home equity
falls below 62% of the home value (see Bhutta et al., 2010).
Diﬀerent mortgage contracts might balance the two sources of risk diﬀerently. The
trade-oﬀ between income risk and wealth risk is described by Campbell and Cocco
(2003). They have developed a theoretical framework for selection of conventional mort-
gage loans; Campbell and Cocco (2015) have provided a model that is also applicable to
non-traditional mortgages, such as interest-only loans. Our survey therefore measured
the borrower’s perception of the “overall” riskiness of his own mortgage contract by
asking the respondents to assess the overall riskiness on a four-point scale from 1 (“no
17NMG-insured borrowers are to a large extent protected against residual debt in case of involuntary
default as described in Section 3.3, but there is no full coverage. The insured amount decreases as if
the original mortgage is paid oﬀ according to an annuity mortgage.
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risk”) to 4 (“very risky”).
In addition, we measured both sources of risk separately. The perceived risk of a
payment problem (i.e. income risk) followed from a question relating to the respon-
dents’ ability to meet cost-of-living payments in the event of several adverse income
shocks, such as temporary unemployment, divorce, or mortgage interest rate rises. The
perceived risk of negative home equity (i.e. wealth risk) was measured by asking the
respondents about their expectations regarding ﬁnancial distress in the event case of
a 20% drop in their home value. This drop approximates the actual decline in house
prices in the years after completion of the questionnaire (between June 2010 and June
2013).
Table 3.3 presents the response frequency for the three questions on the perceived
riskiness of the mortgage contract taken out by our sampled mortgage owners. Only
a few mortgage owners considered their mortgage very risky (1.8%). The majority
of borrowers described their loans as having hardly any risks (46.3%), while about a
quarter characterized their mortgage loan as somewhat risky (27.0%), with one in ﬁve
considering the loan not risky at all (21.2%). About one-third of mortgage owners stated
their ability to meet their mortgage payments under any circumstances (31.4%), while
almost two-thirds of borrowers expected to run into payment problems after an adverse
income shock (64.6%). A signiﬁcantly smaller group of borrowers were convinced that
a drop in house prices would lead to serious ﬁnancial problems (25.7%). This group’s
main concerns related to having insuﬃcient funds to repay the mortgage at maturity
and being unable to move because of negative home equity. A relatively small group
of mortgage owners indicated that this would lead to immediate ﬁnancial problems
(16.9%).
Table 3.4 shows the relation between the perceived riskiness associated with the mort-
gage contract and the ﬁnancial characteristics of the mortgage. The ﬁnancial mortgage
characteristics (e.g. the LTV and LTI ratios) were divided into three quantiles (low,
intermediate, and high). We ﬁrst investigated the link between the overall riskiness of
the mortgage contract and ﬁnancial mortgage characteristics. Because of the small size,
the “very risky” group was combined with the “somewhat risky” group. Our results
show plausible correlations between perceived risk and actual mortgage characteristics
related to the LTV and LTI ratios, suggesting that mortgage owners do recognize impor-
tant risk characteristics of their mortgage. For example, 42.4% of mortgage owners with
a high current LTV considered their loan as risky, while just 9.6% of mortgage owners
with a low LTV perceived their loan as risky. Our results reveal the same pattern for
the other ﬁnancial mortgage loan characteristics, such as the current loan amount in
relation to net income (LTI) and mortgage payments in relation to net income (PTI).
The association between the ﬁnancial features of the mortgage loan and respectively
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income risk and wealth risk is very similar.
Table 3.5 shows that the majority of respondents with an investment-based mortgage
viewed their mortgage as risky (71.7%), while only 10.9% of respondents with a tradi-
tional amortization mortgage viewed their mortgage as risky. More common types of
mortgages, such as endowment and interest-only mortgages, were typically viewed as
hardly or not at all risky by homeowners with such mortgages. It seems that borrowers
whose mortgage interest rates can change quickly (ARMs) did not consider their mort-
gages to be more risky compared with ﬁxed-rate mortgages (FRMs). Borrowers with
a National Mortgage Guarantee (NMG) did not consider their mortgages to be less
or more risky than uninsured mortgages. However, borrowers with an NMG-secured
loan were more certain than others that they could meet mortgage payments under any
circumstances. This may be the result of strict aﬀordability rules to qualify for NMG-
secured loans. Finally, borrowers who consulted an intermediary were more likely to
rate their mortgage as risky (not reported). We cannot infer a causal direction from this:
consulting an intermediary might lead to higher risk awareness, and borrowers planning
to take out a riskier mortgage may be more likely to ask advice from an intermediary.
3.6 Measuring ﬁnancial literacy
3.6.1 Financial literacy
Do individuals who are ﬁnancially less literate and may have a limited understanding of
the features of a mortgage contract choose riskier mortgages? We assessed the respon-
dents’ understanding of basic economic principles such as interest rates, inﬂation and
portfolio diversiﬁcation using the three ﬁnancial literacy questions developed by Lusardi
and Mitchell (2007). These basic ﬁnancial literacy questions have been extensively ex-
amined in a previous study on retirement planning by Alessie et al. (2011) using the
same panel of households. We refer to these questions as “ﬁnancial literacy” questions.
The questions were worded as follows (with correct answers in bold):
1. Suppose you had EUR 100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per
year. After ﬁve years, how much do you think you would have in the account if
you left the money to grow? (i) More than EUR 102, (ii) exactly EUR 102,
(iii), less than EUR 102 or (iv) do not know.
2. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and
inﬂation was 2% per year. After one year, how much would you be able to buy
with the money in this account? (i) More than today, (ii) exactly the same, (iii)
less than today or (iv) do not know.
3. Buying a single company’s stock usually provides a safer return than a stock
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mutual fund. True or false? (i) True, (ii) false or (iii) do not know.
Table 3.6 reports the responses to these questions. The ﬁrst question was answered
correctly by 90.7% of respondents, while 6.1% of respondents did not know the an-
swer.18 This score is higher than in the United States, where about 65% of respondents
responded correctly and 13.5% did not know the answer (see Lusardi and Mitchell,
2011). However, we should be careful with comparisons between both sets of outcomes,
because the questions were translated into a diﬀerent language. Van Rooij et al. (2011)
show that a small diﬀerence in the wording of literacy questions can have an inﬂuence
on the answers by respondents. The second and third questions were answered correctly
by 84.6% and 58.1% of respondents, respectively. The third question appeared the most
diﬃcult one, with 30.4% of respondents answering “Do not know”.
The bottom panel of Table 3.6 shows the distribution of the number of correct answers.
More than half of the respondents answered all three questions correctly. It thus seems
that the majority had a good understanding of basic ﬁnancial principles. Zooming in on
speciﬁc skills, almost all respondents were able to do simple interest rate calculations,
but many found it diﬃcult to understand the basic principles of portfolio diversiﬁcation
and risk reduction.
3.6.2 Debt literacy
Given that a good understanding of the basic economic principles may not be suﬃ-
cient to comprehend complex mortgages, our survey included a number of more speciﬁc
questions to determine the respondents’ understanding of debt contracts such as mort-
gages. In particular, we asked our respondents to answer the three questions developed
by Lusardi and Tufano (2015). The authors refer to these questions as “debt literacy”
questions since they measure knowledge about debt contracts, which is important when
taking out a loan. Speciﬁcally, the debt literacy questions measure respondents’ under-
standing of compound interest, the time value of money, and the ability to distinguish
between diﬀerent payment methods. The original questions focus mainly on credit card
debt, which is common in the United States, but virtually non-existent in the Nether-
lands. We rephrased the questions slightly, referring to a personal loan extended by a
bank rather than credit card debt. The questions were drafted as follows (with correct
answers in bold):
1. Suppose you take out a EUR 1,000 personal loan from a bank and the interest
rate you are charged is 20% per year compounded annually. If you did not pay
anything oﬀ, at this interest rate, how many years would it take for the amount
you owe to double? (i) 2 years, (ii) less than 5 years, (iii) 5 to 10 years, (iv)
18Respondents were also able to refuse answering the question, which they occasionally did. We
considered these refusals as missing observations.
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more than 10 years or (v) do not know.
2. Suppose you take out a EUR 3,000 personal loan from a bank. You repay a
minimum amount of EUR 30 each month. At an annual percentage rate (APR)
of 12% (or 1% per month), how many years would it take to clear your personal
loan debt if you made no additional new charges? (i) less than 5 years, (ii) between
5 and 10 years, (iii) between 10 and 15 years, (iv) continue to be in debt or
(v) do not know.
3. You purchase an appliance which costs EUR 1,000. To pay for this appliance, you
are given the following two options: (a) Pay twelve monthly installments of EUR
100 each or (b) borrow at a 20% annual interest rate and pay back EUR 1,200 a
year from now. Which is the more advantageous oﬀer? (i) option (a), (ii) option
(b), (iii) they are the same or (iv) do not know.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 3.6 presents the frequency of correct responses to these
questions. The ﬁrst two questions invited the respondents to calculate the impact of
compounded interest on the outstanding loan amount and any reduction therein. At
ﬁrst sight, these questions are somewhat similar to the ﬁrst ﬁnancial literacy question.
The debt literacy questions, however, refer to loan contracts instead of savings accounts.
The speciﬁc context of the questions and the more advanced skills needed to answer
them make them more complex. The proportion of correct answers to both questions is
much lower in comparison with the basic literacy question on compound interest. The
ﬁrst and second debt literacy questions were answered correctly by 66.9% and 48.3% of
respondents, respectively. The results diﬀer somewhat from those for the United States
as documented by Lusardi and Tufano (2015), who have reported that both the ﬁrst and
second questions are answered correctly by about one-third of the respondents.19 The
lower score for the United States is notable in light of the much greater experience with
consumer debt, in particular credit card debt, and suggests that one’s understanding
of loans does not automatically improve with experience.20
The responses to the third debt literacy question show that the concept of the time
value of money was poorly understood: only 12.1% of respondents answered correctly
that it was advantageous to defer payment by one year. Table 3.7 provides the distri-
bution of responses in the various answer categories for this question. About half of
the respondents indicated that both payment schemes were similar, thereby overlooking
the fact that one can earn interest by deferring payment. A relatively large proportion
19Disney and Gathergood (2013) have presented results for the United Kingdom that are comparable
to those for the Netherlands with respect to the ﬁrst two debt literacy questions. They do not use the
ﬁnal debt literacy question.
20Christelis et al. (2015) have shown that non-mortgage debt, such as consumer loans and credit card
debt, is held by more than 60% of households in the United States, while the prevalence of consumer
loans and credit card debt is around 40% in the Netherlands.
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of respondents (about one-third) mistook the most expensive option for the most at-
tractive choice. Respondents appear to be quite conﬁdent about their answers, as the
percentage of “do not know” answers was relatively low (12.6%). Insuﬃcient knowledge
to answer the third question correctly has also been found by Lusardi and Tufano (2015)
for the United States, with 7% of the sample providing the correct answer. Li et al.
(2013) have found a very similar ranking with respect to respondents’ performance on
both the debt literacy and ﬁnancial literacy questions, as in our sample.21
Only 8.6% of respondents answered all three debt literacy questions correctly, while
34.7% answered two questions correctly. The scores on the debt literacy questions
indicate that while individuals may have been able to make simple interest calculations,
they had diﬃculty in grasping more complex loan decisions.
The bottom panel of Table 3.6 shows the distribution of the number of correct answers
to all six ﬁnancial literacy questions combined. About 7% of individuals answered all
six questions correctly, and about 25% of individuals had one incorrect answer, while
more than 20% of the individuals answered more than half the questions incorrectly.
Thus, there was considerable variation in the level of ﬁnancial sophistication among
individuals. This is helpful in analyzing the association between ﬁnancial literacy and
mortgage risks.
To get a better understanding of the high number of incorrect responses to the debt
literacy questions, we examined whether individuals with good scores on the basic ﬁnan-
cial literacy questions had performed well on the more speciﬁc debt literacy questions,
and vice versa. First, we compared the distribution of correct debt literacy answers
conditional on the number of correct answers to the basic ﬁnancial literacy question.
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows that individuals with perfect scores on the basic literacy
questions also performed much better on the debt literacy questions. More than half of
the individuals with perfect scores on the basic ﬁnancial literacy questions answered two
or three debt literacy questions correctly, compared with only one-third for individuals
with two correct basic ﬁnancial literacy answers and 13.6% for respondents providing
one correct basic literacy answer. The strong association between the number of cor-
rectly answered basic literacy questions and correctly answered debt literacy questions
is conﬁrmed by the Pearson chi-squared test statistic, which rejects the null hypothesis
of no association between both variables.
Panel B of Table 3.7 shows a cross tabulation of the number of correctly answered
ﬁnancial literacy questions and the answers provided to the third debt literacy ques-
tion about the time value of money, which was poorly understood. This question was
21Our empirical analysis included a sensitivity analysis in which we also attached weight to persons
who had not given a completely wrong answer to the third debt literacy question, saying that both
options were the same (i.e. answer category (iii)). This did not aﬀect the results for the relationships
between debt literacy and mortgage risks.
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answered correctly by only 17.3% of respondents with a perfect score on the ﬁnancial lit-
eracy questions. It thus seems that even individuals with a good understanding of basic
ﬁnancial concepts often overlook the fact that money earns interest. Financially literate
persons are, however, less likely to give a completely wrong answer compared with indi-
viduals who are ﬁnancially less capable. About 52.2% of individuals with a perfect basic
ﬁnancial literacy score indicated that both payment schemes were similar, and 27.8%
mixed up the most expensive scheme and the most favorable payment scheme – which
we considered to be a “completely wrong” answer. The number of respondents giving a
completely wrong answer was much higher for ﬁnancially less capable individuals, and
the same applies to the proportion of “do not know” responses.
3.6.3 Debt literacy and personal characteristics
Table 3.8 shows the distribution of the number of correct debt literacy questions across
socio-economic characteristics, revealing higher debt literacy scores for younger, higher
educated, male or home owning respondents. Alessie et al. (2011) have reported sim-
ilar results for the ﬁnancial literacy questions. The Pearson chi-squared test statistics
show that debt literacy diﬀerences among gender, age, education and homeownership
are highly signiﬁcant. As regards the relationship between age and debt literacy, we
observed an inverted U-shaped pattern of the average number of correctly answered
questions. This is consistent with the ﬁndings regarding actual credit loan decisions for
the United States by Agarwal et al. (2009) and other studies on investment decisions.22
While we cannot disentangle age and cohort eﬀects based on these cross-sectional results,
the typical interpretation of the higher literacy scores among middle-aged individuals
(aged from 40 to 49 years) is that, compared with younger generations, they have greater
debt experience, albeit with the number of correct answers falling as individuals grow
older and cognition declines.
Having answered the three debt literacy questions, respondents were asked how many
of these questions they felt they had answered correctly. 42% of respondents thought
they had answered all three debt questions correctly. In fact, only 16% of this group
provided a correct answer to all three questions (Table 3.9). While over 50% answered
two questions correctly, three in ten answered no more than one question correctly.
Thus, a sizeable group of respondents seem overconﬁdent about their debt knowledge.
At the same time, there is a smaller group of under-conﬁdent respondents, i.e. whose
actual number of correct answers exceeds the perceived number of correct debt literacy
answers.
Furthermore, we asked the survey participants to assess their ﬁnancial knowledge in
22For example, Korniotis and Kumar (2011) have shown that the eﬀect of cognitive decline on invest-
ment skills dominates the role of experience.
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general and to assess their capability to take out a mortgage without ﬁnancial advice.23
There is a strong correlation between the self-assessed measures and the number of
correct literacy questions and thus respondents seem, to a certain extent, to be aware
of their general level of ﬁnancial sophistication and skills in comparison with other
people (Table 3.9). More than 20% of the individuals who considered themselves well
capable to arrange a mortgage loan without ﬁnancial advice had three correct debt
literacy answers, while only 3% of the persons who stated their inability to take out a
mortgage without advice had perfect scores on the debt literacy questions. We found
a similar pattern with respect to self-assessed ﬁnancial knowledge. More experienced
home buyers have a better understanding of debt contracts than ﬁrst-time homeowners,
which is consistent with the increasing part of the inverted U-shaped relation of debt
literacy with age.
3.6.4 Debt literacy and ﬁnancial advice
Do less experienced homeowners or ﬁnancially less sophisticated persons seek personal
advice or do they use other sources of information to make a more informed mortgage
choice? Table 3.10 presents the sources of information used by borrowers when purchas-
ing a house. The majority of the sample considered the advice of the mortgage lender
(49.4%) or an independent mortgage broker (54.4%) as the most important source of
information when purchasing a house. Advice from family and friends (29.4%) or the
Internet (27.4%) were other important sources of information. Individuals with more
ﬁnancial knowledge often used information from ﬁnancial magazines and books (20.8%)
or other published sources – such as newspapers (9.3%), brochures (11.2%) and the
Internet (36.6%) – to acquire information rather than to rely on the advice of experts
only. Thus ﬁnancially sophisticated borrowers typically gather additional information
before deciding on the best option, and do not rely on ﬁnancial advisers only. As a
result, ﬁnancially capable borrowers are less prone to potential biased ﬁnancial advice.
We did not ﬁnd that individuals with lower debt literacy levels were more likely
to consult a mortgage broker rather than buying a mortgage directly through a bank
or lender.24 Similarly, debt literate individuals showed no greater systematic tendency
than less knowledgeable individuals to cite family or friends as an important source of in-
formation. Respondents who answered all debt literacy questions incorrectly mentioned
family or friends the least often as an important source of advice (while respondents
23Self-assessed ﬁnancial literacy was taken from the DHS module on Economic & Psychological
concepts of saving.
24There is also no statistical evidence that borrowers with a lower debt literacy more often take out
a mortgage through a ﬁnancial intermediary. Regardless of the level of literacy, somewhat fewer than
half of the mortgage owners took out their mortgages directly from the lender without the intervention
of an intermediate broker or adviser.
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who answered one question correctly most often stated the importance of advice of
family and friends).
These ﬁndings diﬀer from ﬁndings for other less complex ﬁnancial decisions, such as
investing in the stock market. Several studies have documented that for investment
decisions, households with a higher level of ﬁnancial literacy (see Van Rooij et al.,
2011) or education (see Hackethal et al., 2012) are more likely to seek professional
advice Van Rooij et al. (2011) have found that individuals with a lower level of ﬁnancial
literacy rely on family or friends more often as a source of information, while individuals
with higher ﬁnancial literacy more often rely on professional advice. Thus for mortgage
choice, unlike other less complex ﬁnancial decisions such as stock market participation,
there is no systematic relationship between ﬁnancial sophistication and advice sought
from mortgage brokers or information obtained from family or friends. However, more
sophisticated individuals use more sources of advice to make an informed decision.
By contrast, we found a strong relationship between the source of advice and the
self-assessed capability to take out a mortgage without ﬁnancial advice. Only one-third
of the respondents considering themselves well able to take out a mortgage without
advice relied on mortgage brokers, versus more than two-thirds of respondents lacking
in conﬁdence about their capability to take out a mortgage.25 Similarly, respondents
with a low self-reported capability to take out a mortgage were more likely to consult
family or friends. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by the former Financial Services Authority’s
(FSA) survey into the adequacy of information and advice among consumers who had
recently purchased a ﬁnancial product (see Finney and Kempson, 2008). The FSA
survey has found that households with a low level of self-reported ﬁnancial conﬁdence
are more likely to seek ﬁnancial advice or consult family and friends compared with
their conﬁdent counterpart.
3.7 Results on ﬁnancial literacy and mortgage risks
3.7.1 Financial literacy and perceived risk of diﬀerent mortgage
terms
Are borrowers well aware of their mortgage risks? The perceived risk associated with
the mortgage loan might not be consistent with the true underlying risk. Financially
more sophisticated individuals or individuals taking out a mortgage through a mortgage
broker may characterize their mortgages as more risky, not because their mortgages are
more risky but simply because they are better informed about the risks. To examine this
question, we asked the homeowners in our sample to rate the riskiness of six diﬀerent
25Results are not reported but are available upon request.
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mortgage features on a seven-point scale from 1 (“no risk at all”) to 7 (“very risky”). The
six features comprise short-term ﬁxed interest rate, high loan-to-value ratio, substantial
mortgage expenses in relation to household income, interest-only mortgage, investing
part of the mortgage payments in the stock market and an adjustable rate mortgage
(ARM).
The ﬁrst column of Table 3.11 shows the average perceived riskiness of the diﬀerent
mortgage risk factors. Most mortgage owners perceived a high loan-to-value ratio, a
high payment-to-income rate and having an investment-based mortgage as risky. The
relatively low perceived risk associated with adjustable rate mortgages is consistent with
the ﬁndings by Bucks and Pence (2008), who have shown that households underestimate
the extent to which ARM rates can rise. The risk associated with investment-based
mortgages can be considered as common knowledge given their wide media coverage
and the fact that many of these products incurred large investment losses after the
dotcom bubble burst in the years 2001 to 2003 and in the years after the fall of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. It is remarkable that having an interest-only mortgage was
considered the least risky feature out of the six mortgage features surveyed, given that
Dutch authorities have frequently stressed that such mortgages are risky. On the other
hand, survey responses concerning house price expectations reveal that most borrowers
were expecting house price increases at the time of the survey. Moreover, the risk of an
interest-only mortgage is limited if individuals have substantial housing equity. Many
households indeed indicated that a large drop in house prices would not lead to ﬁnancial
problems, because they had substantial housing equity (as discussed in the section 3.5
about measuring mortgage risks).
The next two columns of Table 3.11 show the association between ﬁnancial literacy
and the perceived riskiness of the diﬀerent mortgage features. The reported coeﬃcients
were derived from ordered probit models with perceived riskiness as the dependent vari-
able and the ﬁnancial literacy measure as the independent variable. Socio-economic
characteristics, experience of the housing market, and risk and time preferences were
included as control variables.26 The results show that more debt literate individuals
consider a large mortgage loan in relation to the house value (LTV) (as well as high
mortgage expenses) as more risky. The same holds for individuals with higher basic
ﬁnancial literacy. Moreover, individuals with higher debt or basic ﬁnancial literacy
consider investment-based mortgages to be more risky, though this association is in-
26To proxy for risk preferences, persons were asked to rate – from 1 (“risk averse”) to 7 (“risk tolerant”)
– the statement: “I am prepared to take the risk of losing money, if there is also a chance to earn money.”
As an indicator of time preference, persons were asked to answer the question: “Which of the time
horizons mentioned below does your household consider most important for planning expenditures and
savings?” Answer category 1 corresponds to a short-term horizon and 5 corresponds to a long-term
horizon of more than ten years from now.
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signiﬁcant for the debt literacy measure.
3.7.2 Financial literacy and features of the mortgage
Do diﬀerences in risk perception of mortgage features across diﬀerent literacy levels go
hand in hand with diﬀerent mortgage products held by more and less literate mortgage
owners? We performed a regression analysis to investigate any relationship between
ﬁnancial literacy and mortgage choices.
Table 3.12 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of a linear regression for a number of
mortgage features as the dependent variable and the ﬁnancial literacy measure as the
independent variable. The regression model contained the same control variables as
before. Borrowers with higher levels of debt literacy took out mortgages with signiﬁcant
lower LTV and LTI ratios when they bought their homes. For basic ﬁnancial literacy,
we found that more literate borrowers had mortgages with signiﬁcantly lower current
LTV and current LTI values.
Table 3.13 shows the marginal eﬀects from a multinomial regression model of the
mortgage type on ﬁnancial literacy. After controlling for socio-economic characteristics,
expectations and risk and time preferences, we found that respondents with higher
ﬁnancial literacy were less likely to have traditional fully amortizing mortgages.27 We
did not ﬁnd a relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and having an ARM versus an
FRM.
3.7.3 Financial literacy, mortgage risks and ﬁnancial advice
Do individuals with lower ﬁnancial literacy have riskier mortgages? To better under-
stand the relation between ﬁnancial literacy and the riskiness of the mortgage, we used
the measure of overall riskiness of the mortgage contract. We have shown that this
measure is strongly correlated with the risky features of a mortgage loan, such as the
LTV ratio and the LTI ratio. This measure may, however, lead to biased results if
the judgments about the riskiness of the own mortgage loan is not comparable across
respondents. A lack of comparability between respondents results in measurement er-
ror, which may result in underestimation of the association between ﬁnancial literacy
and mortgage risks. To address this issue, we followed a two-step procedure. We ﬁrst
estimated an ordered probit regression on the self-reported overall riskiness of the mort-
gage contract as a function of objective “risky” features associated with the mortgage
27Similarly, respondents with a higher self-assessed capability to take out a mortgage (without ﬁnan-
cial advice) more often had interest-only mortgages, and were less likely to own endowment mortgages.
Similarly, respondents with higher self-reported ﬁnancial knowledge more often had interest-only mort-
gages, with traditional full amortization mortgages being less common among these respondents (results
available upon request).
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loan. We used the predicted risk from this regression to create an objective measure of
individual risk of the mortgage loan, which we related to several measures of ﬁnancial
literacy in the second step.
Table 3.14 shows estimates of an ordered probit regression of the self-assessed risk of
the mortgage loan. The dependent variable is coded 0 for “no risk at all”, 1 for “hardly
risky” and 2 for “somewhat (or very) risky”. The ﬁrst column shows the estimated
coeﬃcients for a speciﬁcation which includes the ﬁnancial features of the mortgage
loan, but no information about the type of mortgage. Respondents with a higher
current loan-to-value ratio or a higher mortgage payments to net-income ratio were
more likely to consider their mortgage as risky. The second speciﬁcation includes dummy
variables for having an ARM and for the type of mortgage, with having an interest-only
mortgage as the baseline. Respondents with an investment-based mortgage considered
their mortgage more risky and respondents with traditional fully amortizing mortgages
found their mortgages less risky (conditional on the ﬁnancial features of the mortgage
loan). Those with an ARM assessed their mortgages as more risky. We did not include a
variable for having a mortgage which is insured under the NMG scheme, as this variable
appeared to be insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
We used the estimates of the ﬁnal speciﬁcation to predict the mortgage risk based
upon the features of the mortgage loan, which provides a more objective risk measure
compared with homeowners’ subjective risk perceptions of their own mortgages. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows the distribution of predicted mortgage risk for every household. We used
this measure of mortgage riskiness as the dependent variable in a multivariate regres-
sion to test whether ﬁnancial literacy is related to mortgage risks. The ﬁrst part of
Table 3.15 shows the regression coeﬃcients for debt literacy. The ﬁrst column shows
debt literacy being positively associated with mortgage risk at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
The positive coeﬃcient implies that individuals with a higher debt literacy have riskier
mortgages. We ﬁnd that one additional correct answered debt literacy questions is
associated with a 0.127 standard deviations higher mortgage risk.
The coeﬃcient of debt literacy declined after controlling for socio-economic charac-
teristics, such as educational level, age, gender, marital status and having children, but
remains signiﬁcant (speciﬁcation 2). Note that the signiﬁcant debt literacy coeﬃcients
point to an association between literacy and having a risky mortgage. This ﬁnding
does not necessarily imply a causal relation between literacy and risk taking. Indeed,
this association could also stem from households becoming more literate as a result of
taking out risky mortgages. However, regardless of the mechanism underlying this asso-
ciation, this ﬁnding suggests that owners of risky mortgages are not the most vulnerable
households in terms of their ﬁnancial literacy.
The next regression adds controls for mortgage advice (speciﬁcation 3). Controlling
64 Chapter 3. Mortgage risks, debt literacy and ﬁnancial advice
for sources of information in taking a mortgage, the regression estimates show that
borrowers who received advice from a mortgage broker had riskier mortgages. Indeed,
it makes sense for those who plan to take out a more risky loan with perhaps more
complex features to consult an independent mortgage adviser. On the other hand, the
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) has recently introduced a ban
on lender-paid commission fees owing to concerns about commission structures in which
advisers get paid by lenders based on the mortgage amount and type of mortgage taken
out.
We interacted the dummy variables for ﬁnancial advice with the ﬁnancial literacy
measure. A signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the interaction term suggests a diﬀerential eﬀect of
ﬁnancial advice for households with diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial literacy. The interacted
variables were centered such that the coeﬃcients on these variables could be interpreted
as partial eﬀects. The results show that ﬁnancial advice resulted in riskier mortgages
for less debt literate households (see Table 3.15, speciﬁcation 3). Similarly, less-debt
literate borrowers who emphasized the importance of mortgage advice from family and
friends had riskier mortgages.
Next, the regression was extended by including the perceived riskiness of diﬀerent
mortgage loan terms, past experience in the housing market and risk and time pref-
erences, and a measure for conﬁdence.28 In the previous subsection, ﬁnancially more
sophisticated individuals appeared to perceive several features of the mortgage loan as
more risky, which may inﬂuence mortgage choice. We derived the measure of the overall
perceived risk of a mortgage loan by performing a factor analysis of the perceived riski-
ness of the six diﬀerent features of a mortgage loan. We included the ﬁrst factor in the
regression model. The results in speciﬁcation 4 show that perceived mortgage risk is an
important determinant of the riskiness of the actual mortgage loan. The positive coeﬃ-
cient implies that individuals have less risky mortgages if they perceive various features
of a mortgage loan – such as a high loan-to-value ratio or an investment-based mort-
gage – as more risky. Respondents took out more risky mortgages if they had already
moved to an owner-occupied house and thus had gained experience in taking out mort-
gages. The coeﬃcients for risk and time preferences and conﬁdence were insigniﬁcant.
The inclusion of all these controls lowered the debt literacy coeﬃcient somewhat, while
the interaction term between literacy and ﬁnancial advice saw no change in qualitative
terms.
The ﬁnal speciﬁcation incorporates controls for income risk and wealth risk. The
regression estimates show that individuals with risky mortgages expected to encounter
28Conﬁdence was measured as the diﬀerence between the perceived and the actual number of correct
debt literacy responses. A positive value denotes that respondents were overconﬁdent about their debt
knowledge, while a negative score reﬂects a lack of conﬁdence.
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ﬁnancial problems more often should house prices decline or earnings losses occur.29
Table 3.16 shows the same set of estimation results for basic ﬁnancial literacy. The
ﬁrst speciﬁcation shows basic ﬁnancial literacy also being positively correlated with
mortgage risk. The eﬀect of basic ﬁnancial literacy on mortgage risk was not statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Thus, the literacy measure that explicitly zooms in on knowledge
about debt appears to be a more accurate predictor of mortgage debt decisions than
the overall measure of ﬁnancial literacy. This is consistent with Gerardi et al. (2013b),
who have found that numerical ability – the ability to perform “more advanced” compu-
tations – aﬀects default behavior among US homeowners, while basic ﬁnancial literacy
is less important to default. Similarly, Disney and Gathergood (2013) have found that
individuals who provide correct answers to debt literacy questions are less confused by
ﬁnancial concepts and more conﬁdent about ﬁnancial decisions. At the same time, they
have not found a strong signiﬁcant relationship for the basic literacy question in their
questionnaire.
3.8 Discussion
It is commonly known that a large group of households lack basic ﬁnancial knowledge
and do not possess the ﬁnancial skills to take complex decisions (see Campbell, 2006).
Our results highlight that the knowledge of basic ﬁnancial concepts exceeds the level
of knowledge of loan products, suggesting that debt decisions are particularly complex
(see also Lusardi and Tufano, 2015). As basic ﬁnancial knowledge alone is not suﬃcient
to understand more complex products as loans, it is important that ﬁnancial education
initiatives set up by many governments include special modules or pay attention to the
speciﬁcs of debt decisions.
A large number of countries witnessed housing busts in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial
crisis (including well developed countries with a highly educated population such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands), which has
demonstrated how mortgage choices may result in a heavy ﬁnancial burden. Mortgage
owners became distressed because they could no longer meet their mortgage payments,
or their debt exceeded the underlying value of their home. Our results show that, gen-
erally speaking, homeowners appear to be aware of the characteristics that increase
the ﬁnancial risks of a mortgage. Nevertheless, more knowledgeable households tend
to take out mortgages with relatively higher risk levels, being aware of their exposure
to income and wealth risk. In fact, ﬁnancial literacy seems to be a blessing as well
29We performed a sensitivity analysis in which we also attach weight to persons who do not give a
“completely wrong” answer to the third debt literacy question (i.e. answer category (iii)). This did not
alter the results.
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as a curse. It helps individuals in entering the stock market and planning for retire-
ment, but it also encourages households to choose mortgages with risky characteristics
that have put a lot of households in distress. Moreover, these developments negatively
impacted consumption at macro level and deepened the economic downturn as house-
holds reduced their expenditure in the face of diﬃculties in meeting their mortgage
payments or anxiety about negative housing equity. Given the complex nature of loan
decisions, many households seek the help of a mortgage broker or base their decisions
on other sources of information. Homeowners with more ﬁnancial knowledge typically
consult a larger number of information sources (e.g. ﬁnancial magazines, newspapers
and the Internet). While ﬁnancially illiterate homeowners may be expected to consult
a mortgage broker more often, this does not appear to be the case in practice. This is
consistent with the argument that ﬁnancial advisers are used by those who need them
the least (see Hackethal et al., 2012). However, our results show that homeowners who
consult advisers have more risky mortgages, regardless of their level of literacy (high
or low). Nevertheless, the impact of advisers on the riskiness of the mortgage loan is
less pronounced for the more literate consumers. We are not able to address the issue
of causality, given that those homeowners planning to take out a more risky mortgage
may have been the ones seeking advice from an adviser. However, the results highlight
the importance of independent ﬁnancial advice and a commission structure without
incentives to advise risky mortgages when they are less suitable.
That is why several countries have changed the legal rules for fee structures in the
ﬁnancial advice market. In the Netherlands, for instance, commission fee payments to
intermediaries for the origination of mortgages have been banned since January 2013.30
Consumers now have to pay the adviser directly for all services. This type of commission
structure reduces concerns about mortgage advisers having incentives to give advice that
goes against the interest of the consumer; see also Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) and
Gorter (2012) for a discussion about how eﬀective a ban on commission fees is when it
comes to selecting ﬁnancial products. This may result in more conservative mortgages
being recommended and taken out, and, thus, fewer households with ﬁnancial problems.
On the other hand, high brokerage fees may discourage homeowners from obtaining
ﬁnancial advice. Although it is not clear beforehand whether homeowners will display
the same behavior in the new setting, it is somewhat comforting that the results suggest
that consumers with low literacy levels who do not consult ﬁnancial advisers tend to
take out less complex and more conservative mortgages.31
30At the same time, the government has introduced a number of measures to reduce the risk level
of new mortgages, including a tax system that strongly encourages annuity-based or linear mortgages
and an LTV ratio cap of 105% in 2013, which will gradually be reduced to 100% in 2018.
31As a remedy, policymakers may consider making ﬁnancial advice mandatory for unsophisticated
households or for households who plan to take out a risky mortgage product. However, the ﬁrst
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empirical evidence shows that making ﬁnancial advice mandatory does not inﬂuence the ﬁnancial
behavior of less sophisticated households (see Hung and Yoong, 2013), while it discourages households
willing to avoid mandatory advice from taking out risky mortgages (see Agarwal et al., 2014). Although,
overall, this would be helpful in reducing mortgage risks to homeowners, it would put a burden on those
homeowners who are quite capable of taking a mortgage decision on their own.
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Table 3.1: Financial mortgage loan features across mortgage loan durations and age
groups
LTV ratio LTV ratio > 100% LTI ratio
N OLTV CLTV OLTV CLTV OLTI CLTI CPTI
Panel A. Year of house purchase
After 2007 44 1.03 0.85 67.3 25.2 9.08 5.89 0.57
2004 to 2007 98 0.96 0.81 53.0 16.8 8.88 5.72 0.51
2000 to 2003 63 0.90 0.67 41.5 5.90 5.60 4.04 0.39
1996 to 1999 69 0.92 0.49 43.1 0 6.23 3.31 0.35
1990 to 1995 91 0.94 0.36 25.0 1.81 . 2.35 0.27
Before 1990 166 0.87 0.28 17.5 0.47 . 2.42 0.26
Panel B. Year the mortgage was taken out
After 2007 61 1.00 0.77 57.1 19.6 9.18 5.21 0.49
2004 to 2007 167 0.97 0.72 47.6 12.6 8.63 5.07 0.46
2000 to 2003 82 0.90 0.55 35.5 3.34 4.93 3.60 0.34
1996 to 1999 82 0.89 0.43 34.6 0 6.64 3.03 0.34
1990 to 1995 61 0.91 0.28 19.4 0 . 1.78 0.25
Before 1990 78 0.82 0.21 15.6 1.06 . 1.88 0.24
Panel C. Age groups (household head)
Above age 70 72 0.75 0.26 11.8 0 6.01 2.36 0.23
Age 60 to 69 126 0.87 0.40 22.9 0.59 6.39 3.10 0.32
Age 50 to 59 136 0.89 0.45 30.4 1.24 6.13 3.20 0.33
Age 40 to 49 107 0.97 0.61 45.4 6.65 9.06 4.14 0.43
Below age 40 90 1.03 0.82 62.1 22.6 8.81 5.23 0.47
Mean 0.93 0.55 38.1 7.30 7.97 3.80 0.38
Notes: (N=531). Panel A displays the average value of the mortgage measures by year of
house purchase (for the head of the household). The construction and deﬁnition of these mea-
sures is described in Section 3.4.2. For the variable OLTI, the number of observations is lower
because income data for the time period in which the mortgage was taken out were not avail-
able for all households (N=170). Panel B provides the same statistics by year of purchase of
the current (ﬁrst) mortgage. This period is diﬀerent from the year of house purchase if the
original mortgage is reﬁnanced. Panel C displays the mean value of ﬁnancial characteristics of
the mortgage loan for diﬀerent age groups. The statistics are weighted averages.
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Panel A. Year of house purchase
After 2007 44 1.15 41.5 45.8 3.32 8.21 6.97 4.73
2004 to 2007 98 4.77 32.4 45.8 8.66 8.35 1.60 6.21
2000 to 2003 63 4.85 22.5 45.7 22.1 4.86 12.2 30.8
1996 to 1999 69 1.27 45.4 34.8 17.6 0.82 4.78 28.3
1990 to 1995 91 11.6 36.5 40.9 11.1 0 11.7 38.5
Before 1990 166 18.4 18.2 56.9 5.88 0.71 15.0 65.4
Panel B. Year the mortgage was taken out
After 2007 61 1.93 35.1 54.9 2.59 5.50 8.75 26.5
2004 to 2007 167 3.43 25.0 53.5 10.4 7.70 5.68 39.6
2000 to 2003 82 7.56 20.5 48.2 22.6 1.13 12.9 38.3
1996 to 1999 82 3.18 35.6 43.4 17.1 0.72 5.19 37.1
1990 to 1995 61 12.1 54.0 29.0 4.86 0 5.82 14.8
Before 1990 78 35.7 28.9 32.9 2.54 0 22.2 21.7
Panel C. Age groups (household head)
Above age 70 72 19.7 2.34 77.2 0.78 0 13.1 45.1
Age 60 to 69 126 13.4 9.90 67.5 8.62 0.59 9.55 47.4
Age 50 to 59 136 7.72 29.4 47.7 12.8 2.40 15.1 37.6
Age 40 to 49 107 4.16 42.5 35.2 14.6 3.55 5.52 25.3
Below age 40 90 4.54 50.9 24.9 11.1 8.48 3.87 16.7
Mean 8.41 31.1 46.1 10.8 3.52 8.97 32.5
Notes: (N=531). Panel A displays the percentage of households that took out a type of mort-
gage by year of house purchase (for the head of the household). The ﬁve mortgage types are
mutually exclusive and refer to the ﬁrst mortgage. A description of the diﬀerent mortgage types
is given in Section 3.3. The ﬁnal two columns of panel A report the average share of households
with adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and that of households with reﬁnanced mortgages, re-
spectively. “Reﬁnanced” is deﬁned as households taking out a mortgage sometime after the
house purchase. The same statistics are reported by year of origination of the current mort-
gage (panel B) and across ﬁve age groups (panel C). The statistics are weighted averages.
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Table 3.3: Response frequency regarding the perceived riskiness of the own mortgage
contract













1.8 27.0 46.3 21.2 3.7
Income risk - Diﬃcult to pay mortgage expenses












Substantial equity in my house 86.2
Suﬃcient net worth to absorb the losses 20.8
Financial problemsa
Insuﬃcient funds to pay oﬀ the mortgage at ma-
turity
57.4
Results in inadequate savings to support retire-
ment
11.2
Results in ﬁnancial strain 16.9
Unable to move to another house 27.6
Other 4.5
Notes: (N=930). The questions were asked to all household members with a residential mort-
gage on their property (748 households). There were 97 missing observations for the question
regarding income risk, as these individuals did not participate in the DHS module on Accom-
modation and Mortgages. The statistics are weighted averages. aDoes not add up to 100%,
because respondents may provide multiple answers.
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Table 3.4: Perceived riskiness of the mortgage contract versus ﬁnancial characteristics
of the mortgage









Yes No Yes No
Current LTV
Low 0.16 9.6 45.9 44.5 36.3 63.7 6.9 93.1
Intermediate 0.46 29.7 49.3 21.0 67.0 33.0 14.2 85.8
High 0.91 42.4 48.1 9.5 87.7 12.3 52.2 47.8
Pearson χ2 test: p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00
Current LTI
Low 1.25 8.2 50.1 41.7 41.6 58.4 7.8 92.2
Intermediate 3.24 32.4 46.7 20.9 64.8 35.2 17.5 82.5
High 6.57 42.0 47.4 10.7 87.0 13.0 51.8 48.2
Pearson χ2 test: p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00
Current PTI
Low 0.14 12.1 50.6 37.3 44.5 55.5 10.3 89.7
Intermediate 0.32 25.7 52.2 22.2 67.5 32.5 26.3 73.7
High 0.63 44.4 42.6 13.0 82.7 17.3 41.5 58.5
Pearson χ2 test: p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00
Notes: (N=680). The construction and deﬁnition of these measures is described in Sec-
tion 3.4.2. The measures are reported for the members of the households for which all mort-
gage characteristics are available. The ﬁrst column presents per quantile the average value of
the ﬁnancial measures of the mortgage. The other columns contain percentages. For every risk
measure we considered the few “Do not know” answers as missing observations. The statistics
are weighted averages.
72 Chapter 3. Mortgage risks, debt literacy and ﬁnancial advice
Table 3.5: Perceived riskiness of the mortgage contract versus features of the mortgage









Yes No Yes No
Mortgage type
Full amortization 9.1 10.9 36.5 52.5 54.1 45.9 15.0 85.0
Endowment 30.9 22.5 60.2 17.3 77.7 22.3 31.3 68.7
Interest only 45.4 28.0 47.0 25.0 58.8 41.2 24.5 75.5
Investment 10.2 71.7 21.6 6.6 80.5 19.5 33.2 66.8
Other mortgage 4.5 35.7 53.1 11.2 80.5 19.5 53.8 46.2
Pearson χ2 test: p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.04
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM)
No 91.9 29.2 48.5 22.3 67.9 32.1 28.0 72.0
Yes 8.2 34.0 41.0 25.0 61.7 38.3 26.9 73.1
Pearson χ2 test: p-value = 0.62 p-value = 0.38 p-value = 0.87
National Mortgage Guarantee (NMG)
No 66.8 30.1 45.3 24.6 64.6 35.4 26.0 74.0
Yes 33.2 28.6 53.1 18.4 73.2 26.8 31.9 68.1
Pearson χ2 test: p-value = 0.21 p-value = 0.05 p-value = 0.21
Notes: (N=680). The mortgage contract features are reported for the members of the house-
holds for which all mortgage characteristics are available. The ﬁrst column presents the fre-
quency for each mortgage type or category. The other columns contain percentages. A descrip-
tion of the diﬀerent mortgage types is given in Section 3.3. For every risk measure we considered
the few “Do not know” answers as missing observations. The statistics are weighted averages.
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Table 3.6: Percentage of correct and incorrect basic ﬁnancial literacy and debt literacy
answers
Panel A. Percentage of correct answers
Debt literacy questions Fin. literacy questions
1 2 3 1 2 3
Correct 66.9 48.3 12.1 90.7 84.6 58.1
Incorrect 21.0 35.7 76.7 3.2 6.0 11.5
Do not know 12.1 16.0 11.2 6.1 9.4 30.4
Panel B. Number of correct answers
None 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean
Financial literacy 6.1 6.9 34.6 52.5 . . . 2.3
Debt literacy 24.6 32.1 34.7 8.6 . . . 1.3
Debt & ﬁnancial literacy 4.9 4.2 12.7 19.9 25.8 25.2 7.3 3.6
Notes: The ﬁrst part of Panel A shows weighted percentages of correct debt literacy answers
for all questionnaire respondents (N=1,465). The ﬁnal three columns report the distribution
of answers to the basic ﬁnancial literacy questions included in a separate module. This module
was answered by more than 90 percent of our sample (N=1,324). Panel B displays the weighted
number of correct answers for both modules and all six questions combined (N=1,324). The
statistics are weighted averages.
Table 3.7: Debt literacy versus ﬁnancial literacy
Number of correct basic ﬁnancial literacy answers
None 1 2 All Mean
Panel A. Number of correct debt literacy answers
None (n=353) 80.6 47.2 28.3 12.1 1.72
1 (n=442) 15.3 39.2 36.4 29.7 2.35
2 (n=430) 4.1 13.6 29.6 44.4 2.63
All (n=99) 0.0 0.0 5.6 13.9 2.79
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (8.76, 11595.1) = 22.76, p-value = 0.00
Panel B. Answers to third debt literacy question
Option (a) (n=407) 13.8 41.4 31.9 27.8 2.34
Option (b) (n=145) 0.0 1.4 9.5 17.3 2.72
They are the same (n=625) 15.0 39.0 47.5 52.2 2.48
Do not know (n=147) 71.2 18.2 11.0 2.7 1.21
Notes: (N=1,324). The statistics are weighted averages. The Pearson chi-squared statistic
were corrected for the use of sample weights via the correction of Rao and Scott (1984). The
statistic is converted to an F statistic to get a valid p-value.
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Table 3.8: Debt literacy and demographics
Number of correct debt literacy answers
None 1 2 All Mean
Age classes
Age 70 and older (n=249) 42.4 35.5 18.8 3.3 0.83
Age 60 to 69 (n=362) 27.1 32.9 33.0 7.0 1.20
Age 50 to 59 (n=353) 21.2 30.0 41.0 7.7 1.35
Age 40 to 49 (n=261) 19.2 30.2 37.1 13.5 1.45
Below age 40 (n=240) 19.2 32.9 38.3 9.6 1.38
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (11.01, 16124.0) = 4.86, p-value = 0.00
Gender
Male (n=788) 18.7 29.3 37.9 14.0 1.47
Female (n=677) 30.7 35.1 31.3 2.9 1.06
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (2.97, 4352.0) = 19.1583, p-value = 0.00
Education level
Master’s degree (n=197) 5.9 24.0 51.4 18.7 1.83
Bachelor’s degree (n=408) 18.3 29.2 41.2 11.3 1.45
Secondary school (n=404) 26.2 36.5 32.0 5.3 1.16
Primary school (n=456) 41.4 36.2 19.9 2.5 0.84
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (8.79, 12870.9) = 16.0531, p-value = 0.00
Homeownership status
Tenant (n=374) 33.3 37.9 24.3 4.5 1.00
Homeowner (n=1,091) 21.5 30.1 38.4 10.0 1.37
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (2.93, 4289.1) = 10.3986, p-value = 0.00
Notes: (N=1,465). The statistics are weighted averages. The Pearson chi-squared statistic
were corrected for the use of sample weights via the correction of Rao and Scott (1984). The
statistic was converted to an F statistic to get a valid p-value.
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Table 3.9: Debt literacy versus self-assessed knowledge and experience
Number of correct debt literacy answers
None 1 2 All Mean
Perceived number of correct debt literacy answers
None (n=162) 85.3 11.4 3.2 0.0 0.18
1 (n=223) 42.6 47.8 8.7 0.8 0.68
2 (n=464) 20.9 41.8 32.8 4.5 1.21
All (n=616) 6.5 24.6 52.7 16.2 1.79
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (8.54, 12508.3) = 50.80, p-value = 0.00
Self-assessed ﬁnancial knowledge
Very knowledgeable (n=40) 17.0 18.0 40.9 24.2 1.72
Knowledgeable (n=291) 15.3 28.5 38.9 17.2 1.58
More or less knowledgeable (n=808) 24.8 34.1 34.7 6.5 1.23
Not knowledgeable (n=268) 33.1 32.5 31.5 2.8 1.04
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (11.61, 16998.9) = 4.97, p-value = 0.00
Self-assessed capability to take out a mortgage without advice
Well able (n=171) 13.4 18.4 46.5 21.7 1.76
Able (n=316) 16.6 27.1 45.4 10.9 1.51
More or less able (n=298) 18.9 37.1 34.1 9.9 1.35
Poorly able (n=314) 24.5 33.5 37.5 4.5 1.22
Not able (n=133) 34.2 37.5 25.3 3.0 0.97
Do not know (n=51) 60.8 23.0 12.8 3.4 0.59
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (17.12, 25067.7) = 7.55, p-value = 0.00
Number of house moves to an owner-occupied house
Never (n=346) 33.5 37.1 24.5 4.8 1.01
1 time (n=561) 24.1 34.1 32.6 9.3 1.27
2 times (n=364) 21.1 26.7 42.0 10.2 1.41
3 times (n=129) 16.8 31.5 39.7 12.0 1.47
4 times or more (n=65) 13.8 20.3 59.0 6.9 1.59
Pearson χ2 statistic: F (11.59, 16961.8) = 3.93, p-value = 0.00
Notes: (N=1,465). There were 182 missing observations for the ability to take out a mortgage without
ﬁnancial advice as this question was not asked of individuals who lived in rental homes and reported
that buying a house was not being considered (i.e. they strictly preferred to rent). There were 58 miss-
ing observations for self-assessed ﬁnancial knowledge as these individuals did not participate in the
DHS module on Economic & Psychological concepts of saving. The statistics are weighted averages.
The Pearson chi-squared statistic was corrected for the use of sample weights.
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Table 3.10: Financial advice versus debt literacy
Number of
correct answers
None 1 2 All Total p-value
What is your most important source of advice when purchasing a house?
Parents, friends or acquaintances 22.5 33.2 31.4 25.4 29.4 0.24
Information from newspapers 2.1 2.8 3.4 9.3 3.5 0.00
Financial magazines, guides, books 6.9 9.3 16.0 20.8 12.3 0.00
Brochures from my bank or mortgage adviser 6.4 7.7 7.3 11.2 7.6 0.99
Bank or other institution that provides the mort-
gage loan
41.7 49.5 55.3 43.4 49.4 0.27
Mortgage broker 46.6 56.3 58.2 51.8 54.4 0.28
Advertisements on TV or in other media 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.50
Financial computer programs 4.0 4.0 5.5 10.4 5.1 0.08
Financial information on the Internet 15.2 22.7 36.3 36.6 27.4 0.00
Other sources 5.1 4.3 6.2 8.0 5.5 0.22
Do not know 13.4 3.8 0.7 1.4 4.5 0.00
Notes: (N=1,283). The table reports the percentage of individuals who attach importance to
a speciﬁc source of information when purchasing a house stratiﬁed by the number of correct
debt literacy answers. The percentages do not add up to 100%, because persons indicated
multiple sources as important. The ﬁnal column reports the p-values of a Pearson χ2 test.
The p-values have been adjusted to take into account that multiple tests are being conducted
(Holm, 1979). This question was not asked of tenants without plans to purchase a house in
the future (182 individuals).
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Table 3.11: Financial literacy and perceived riskiness of diﬀerent mortgage loan features:
regression results
Mean / SD Debt literacy Basic ﬁnancial
literacy
Short ﬁxed term 4.87 -0.029 -0.075
(1.60) (0.039) (0.051)
High loan-to-value ratio 6.20 0.078* 0.129**
(1.16) (0.044) (0.058)
High mortgage expenses 5.98 0.127*** 0.074
(1.20) (0.042) (0.054)
Interest-only mortgage 4.18 -0.060 -0.059
(1.59) (0.038) (0.046)
Investment-based mortgage 5.78 0.051 0.115**
(1.34) (0.042) (0.057)
Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 5.00 -0.051 -0.008
(1.36) (0.039) (0.051)
Notes: (N=1100). The ﬁrst column shows the average perceived riskiness of diﬀerent features
of a mortgage loan. The perceived riskiness of a mortgage feature was answered on a response
scale from 1 (“no risk at all”) to 7 (“very risky”). The remaining columns of the table show
the association between ﬁnancial literacy and perceived riskiness of diﬀerent features of the
mortgage loan. The coeﬃcient was derived from an ordered probit model using the perceived
riskiness as the dependent variable and the ﬁnancial literacy measure as the independent vari-
able. The ﬁnancial literacy measure was based on the number of correct answers.
The control variables included: marital status, gender, age group, education level, monthly
household income (quartiles), homeownership status, having children, employment status, risk
and time preferences, and number of house moves to an owner-occupied house.
Clustered standard errors (at the household level) are shown in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level.
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Table 3.12: Financial literacy and ﬁnancial mortgage attributes: regression results
Debt literacy Basic ﬁnancial
literacy
Current LTV 0.007 -0.035**
(0.013) (0.015)
Current LTI 0.080 -0.247*
(0.105) (0.141)
Current PTI 0.012 -0.014
(0.010) (0.014)
Original LTV -0.033* -0.019
(0.017) (0.021)
Original LTI -0.647* -0.217
(0.378) (0.453)
Notes: N=517.
The table shows the association between ﬁnancial literacy and several mortgage loan features.
The correlation coeﬃcient was derived from an OLS regression using the mortgage feature as
the dependent variable and the ﬁnancial literacy measure as the independent variable. Con-
trols: see Table 3.11. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level.
Table 3.13: Financial literacy and mortgage type: regression results
Debt literacy Basic ﬁnancial
literacy








Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.013 -0.025
(0.015) (0.021)
Notes: N=517. The table shows the association between ﬁnancial literacy and several features
of the mortgage loan. The correlation coeﬃcient was derived from an OLS regression (ARM)
and a multinomial logit regression (mortgage type) using the mortgage feature as the depen-
dent variable and the ﬁnancial literacy measure as the independent variable (the marginal ef-
fects are reported). Controls: see Table 3.11. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level.
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Table 3.14: Riskiness of mortgage loan: regression results
[1] [2]
Current loan-to-value (LTV) 1.023*** 1.020***
(0.234) (0.247)










Adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 0.432**
(0.198)
Threshold Parameters
µ1 (no risk at all to hardly risky) -0.387** -0.548***
(0.156) (0.169)
µ2 (hardly risky to somewhat (or very) risky) 1.082*** 0.998***
(0.160) (0.172)
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.13
Notes: (N=459). The table reports the regression coeﬃcients from an ordered probit model
with the perceived riskiness of the own mortgage loan as the dependent variable, using a three-
point response scale: 0 (“no risk at all”), 1 (“hardly risky”) and 2 (“somewhat (or very) risky”).
The second column of the table includes indicators per type of mortgage (except for interest-
only mortgages) and an indicator for having an ARM versus an FRM. The investment-based
mortgage type was interacted with the ﬁnancial characteristics of the mortgage (i.e. LTV ratio
and PTI ratio). Both speciﬁcations include controls for the year in which the mortgage loan
was taken out. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at the *** 1%; **
5%; * 10% level.
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Table 3.15: Predicted mortgage risk and debt literacy: regression results
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Debt literacy score 0.127*** 0.078** 0.078** 0.072** 0.073**
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032)
Socio-economic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Most important sources of information
Mortgage broker 0.240*** 0.257*** 0.199***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058)
Lender 0.03 0.01 -0.012
(0.058) (0.058) (0.056)
Family and friends -0.108* -0.103 -0.123**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.062)
Published sources -0.031 -0.039 -0.035
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054)
Most important sources of information × debt literacy score
Mortgage broker -0.107* -0.114* -0.100*
(0.062) (0.061) (0.059)
Lender 0.008 0.015 -0.022
(0.062) (0.062) (0.060)
Family and friends -0.152** -0.131* -0.088
(0.075) (0.074) (0.072)
Published sources -0.027 -0.037 -0.027
(0.062) (0.061) (0.059)
Overconﬁdence, risk preferences, time preferences and experience
Overconﬁdence 0.021 0.029
(0.049) (0.048)
Low perceived mortgage risk 0.096*** 0.070**
(0.033) (0.033)
Risk averse 0.002 0.002
(0.019) (0.018)
Low time-preference -0.023 -0.012
(0.025) (0.024)






Constant 0.02 0.674*** 0.626*** 0.513*** 0.216
(0.056) (0.122) (0.120) (0.144) (0.149)
Observations 459 459 459 459 459
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.33
Notes: (N=459). The dependent variable is the predicted mortgage risk. The debt literacy score
measure equals the number of correctly answered debt literacy questions. Socio-economic controls in-
cluded: gender of the person managing the household ﬁnances, marital status, number of children, age
dummies, indicators of the education level, income quantiles and a dummy for retirement status. The
“perceived risk” variable measures the perceived riskiness of the attributes of a mortgage contract and
was derived from a factor analysis of the six diﬀerent mortgage loan features.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at the *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level.
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Table 3.16: Predicted mortgage risk and basic ﬁnancial literacy: regression results
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Basic literacy score 0.061 -0.005 -0.001 -0.01 -0.002
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.048)
Socio-economic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Most important sources of information
Mortgage broker 0.203*** 0.225*** 0.162***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.058)
Lender 0.002 -0.015 -0.036
(0.059) (0.059) (0.056)
Family and friends -0.117* -0.106 -0.132**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.063)
Published sources 0.008 -0.005 -0.006
(0.057) (0.057) (0.054)
Most important sources of information × basic ﬁnancial literacy score
Mortgage broker -0.01 -0.002 -0.016
(0.093) (0.091) (0.088)
Lender 0.107 0.109 0.113
(0.094) (0.094) (0.090)
Family and friends 0.019 0.027 0.133
(0.106) (0.104) (0.101)
Published sources -0.096 -0.09 -0.102
(0.092) (0.090) (0.087)
Overconﬁdence, risk preferences, time preferences and experience
Overconﬁdence 0.01 0.007
(0.044) (0.043)
Low perceived mortgage risk 0.103*** 0.080**
(0.034) (0.033)
Risk averse 0.009 0.009
(0.019) (0.018)
Low time-preference -0.028 -0.011
(0.025) (0.024)






Constant 0.046 0.795*** 0.750*** 0.652*** 0.301*
(0.124) (0.160) (0.159) (0.173) (0.176)
Observations 459 459 459 459 459
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.32
Notes: (N=459). The dependent variable is the predicted mortgage risk. The basic ﬁnancial liter-
acy score measure equals the number of correctly answered basic ﬁnancial literacy questions. Socio-
economic controls included: gender of the person managing the household ﬁnances, marital status,
number of children, age dummies, indicators of the education level, income quantiles and a dummy for
retirement status. The “perceived risk” variable measures the perceived riskiness of the attributes of
a mortgage contract and was derived from a factor analysis of the six diﬀerent mortgage loan features.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Signiﬁcant at the *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level.

Chapter 4
Saving behavior and portfolio choice after
retirement
4.1 Introduction
As the babyboomer generation has reached the statutory retirement age, public expen-
ditures on state pensions and long-term care will increase progressively in the coming
decades in the Netherlands, as in other West-European countries and the United States.
This is due to the aging of the population and increasing life expectancy. In addition,
the ﬁnancial crisis has shown that the pension system is vulnerable to shocks in ﬁnan-
cial markets. Many Dutch pension funds have had diﬃculties achieving full indexation
of accrued pension rights against inﬂation, and several pension funds have even had to
cut pension beneﬁts.
As a result, substantial reforms of the pension and long-term care insurance system
have been announced or already have been implemented in order to ensure sustainabil-
ity of public ﬁnances and the pension system. The pension reforms include a phased
increase of the statutory retirement age to 67 years in 2024. After that, the retirement
age will be linked to the rise in the life expectancy. In addition, there will be a sub-
stantial reduction in the tax-favored pension accrual rate and limited inﬂation-linking.
This will further reduce pension beneﬁts. Changes in the long-term care insurance sys-
tem imply that only the major disabilities for which self-funding is impossible will be
covered. The remainder of care has to be paid out-of-pocket, such as health expenses
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on social support and accommodation costs for persons who stay in a nursing home.
The proposed reforms thus demand that individuals take more responsibility to ﬁ-
nancially prepare for retirement and secure part of their resources for uncertain health
expenses. From a policy perspective, it is therefore important to know the extent of
ﬁnancial resources available to current retirees; whether these resources are suﬃcient
to support them in case of ﬁnancial shocks such as adverse health events, widowhood
or nursing home entry; and whether they will adjust their savings in response to the
proposed policy reforms. Answering these questions requires a thorough understanding
of saving decisions in retirement. Does a reduction in the provision of health insurance
by the Government increase precautionary savings? Will a reduction in pension beneﬁts
increase the importance of private wealth holdings and result in smaller bequests? Will
the elderly invest more in the stock market to have a larger return on their savings or
will they reduce their holdings in risky stocks because of increased health expenditure
risk?
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature about saving behavior
and portfolio choice after retirement. Detailed administrative data are then used to
provide descriptive evidence about saving behavior and portfolio choice of the elderly
in the Netherlands. The linked administrative records contain information on assets,
liabilities, pension income, health status and demographics for the period 2005 to 2010.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to use these administrative records
to investigate this topic. The advantage of our data is that we measure assets and
also health status with a higher quality than survey data. In addition, rich and poor
households are not underrepresented. Data quality problems such as measurement error,
sample attrition and item-nonresponse are important concerns for longitudinal analysis
such as saving behavior (Venti, 2011; Card et al., 2010).
It is informative to study saving behavior in the Netherlands because of the very
diﬀerent institutional background compared to the US. The almost complete coverage
of the health- and long-term care insurance system makes precautionary saving less
necessary. Also in the future, saving for long-term care expenses will probably be
limited, since the eligibility for public long-term care will depend on the level of wealth.
This requires persons to ﬁrst run down their assets to become eligible for long-term care
and penalizes those who ﬁnd it important to save for this purpose.
The outline is as follows. Section 4.2 surveys theoretical and empirical work on
saving- and portfolio behavior after retirement. Section 4.3 describes the administrative
data sources. Section 4.4 provides a descriptive analysis of the wealth distribution and
portfolio choice of the Dutch elderly. In addition, we indicate how wealth holdings
evolve during old-age. Section 4.5 examines how assets are aﬀected by the death of a
spouse. Section 4.6 investigates the relationship between health status and the savings
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and portfolio choices of the elderly. Section 4.7 investigates the trajectory of wealth in
the last years of life. The ﬁnal section draws conclusions and provides implications for
public policy to facility the use of private savings in retirement.
4.2 Theory on saving behavior and portfolio choice af-
ter retirement
A simple version of the life-cycle theory of consumption (Modigliani and Brumberg,
1954) without uncertainty and a bequest motive predicts that people accumulate wealth
during working life and draw down their savings after retirement to support consump-
tion when income is low. This predicted pattern— that wealth should eventually decline
with age— is, however, not found by many empirical studies for several Western coun-
tries. According to recent empirical research by Love et al. (2009) and Poterba et
al. (2011), median wealth holdings rise in retirement for both single-person households
and two-person households— although the rise in wealth tends to be limited among
the oldest cohort of single elderly. Their data come from the 1992 to 2006 US Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS). These ﬁndings hold for diﬀerent measures of wealth in-
cluding ﬁnancial assets, housing equity and ”annualized comprehensive wealth”, which
also includes the expected net present value of pension wealth as well as social security
wealth. Similar ﬁndings are found in countries with very diﬀerent institutional settings
such as the Netherlands (Alessie et al., 1999) and Germany (Börsch-Supan, 1992).
These results are diﬀerent from earlier studies that report high rates of dissaving in the
1970s (e.g. Hurd, 1987; Diamond and Hausman, 1984). A possible explanation for the
diﬀerence is that these studies use a cohort of relatively young retired households who
might use their savings to ﬁnance involuntary early retirement. Another explanation
are the relative high capital gains over the 1992 to 2006 period due to the rise in housing
prices and stock prices. This may have caused the observed change in savings to diﬀer
from the planned change in savings. French et al. (2007) show that wealth holdings
would have declined over the same period if the rates of return on assets were equal to
historical rates. Hence, it is important to account for capital gains in the analysis of
saving behavior.
All of the studies mentioned above also reported considerable heterogeneity in saving
behavior. In particular, richer households and households with a higher level of edu-
cation tend to save more (see also Hubbard et al., 1995; Dynan et al., 2004; De Nardi
et al., 2010). The life-cycle model can be extended in several directions to account for
these observations and to provide a more realistic description of the saving behavior of
the elderly.
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4.2.1 A life-cycle model with lifetime uncertainty
If individuals are uncertain about their remaining lifetime, this might result in a slower
decumulation of wealth, as was ﬁrst shown by Yaari (1965) and Davies (1981). Risk-
averse individuals seek to safeguard themselves from outliving their assets in case they
become very old. However, the possibility of not getting old also induces individuals
to consume more at the start of retirement and reduce consumption at the end of life,
as the probability of surviving becomes smaller. In addition, the availability of annuity
income, such as social security and pensions, insures individuals against longevity risk
and reduces the need to slow down the decumulation of wealth.
In a life-cycle model with lifetime uncertainty, consumption and saving choices depend
on two behavioral parameters: the subjective discount rate and the degree of relative
risk aversion.1 Individuals prefer a high level of consumption at the start of retirement
if their discount rate is larger than the real interest rate. Frederick et al. (2002),
using experimental data to estimate the discount rate, report that the discount rate
surpasses the real interest rate— implying that individuals behave impatiently and
that consumption declines with age. Mortality risk is an important determinant of
saving because it increases the eﬀective discount rate. Since mortality risk increases
exponentially as individuals grow older, individuals prefer earlier consumption, and the
level of consumption and wealth will further decline with age. The degree of relative
risk aversion measures the willingness to alter consumption in response to a change
in mortality risk. Risk-averse individuals respond more cautiously to variations in
mortality risk. They consume less at the start of retirement and hold more wealth at
every age against the risk of living very long— ending up with little more than their
annuity income. Of course, with a suﬃciently high annuity income there is less need to
live frugally; also risk-averse individuals will deplete their wealth at an early age.
Mortality risk is usually measured by life-tables that report the probability of death
for the entire population in the next year, for a given age and gender. These life-tables
do not account for other important determinants of mortality risk such as socioeconomic
status and health status. Diﬀerential mortality by socioeconomic status is observed in
many studies; Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) and Hurd (2002) show, for example, that
wealthier individuals have the tendency to live much longer than poor individuals in
the US. Kalwij et al. (2013) show that diﬀerential mortality is also an important
phenomenon in the Netherlands. As a result, it is impossible to understand saving
behavior by observing wealth holdings in cross-section because wealth will increase
artiﬁcially with age (as was ﬁrst raised by Shorrocks, 1975). Similarly, individuals born
1The referred model assumes that persons have a utility function that is of the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) form. This is widely used for modeling saving behavior under uncertainty, since it
allows for the precautionary motive for saving.
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in diﬀerent periods in time might have diﬀerent levels of wealth due to productivity
diﬀerences between cohorts or policy changes that aﬀect speciﬁc cohorts. For example,
Kapteyn et al. (2005) report the importance of the introduction of the old-age pension
system in the Netherlands to explain wealth diﬀerences between cohorts.
To assess whether the elderly decumulate their wealth, you therefore need to follow
the same households— that do not leave the sample due to death or a change in family
situation— over a period of time. The change in wealth holdings within the same sur-
viving households will be unaﬀected by diﬀerential mortality or cohort eﬀects (see e.g.
Hurd, 2002). However, in case of diﬀerential mortality, the level of wealth holdings—
among this selected sample of surviving households— will increase with age. By weight-
ing the data using wealth-dependent mortality rates, the level of the wealth-age proﬁle
can be corrected. This approach applied by Attanasio and Hoynes (2000), is contin-
gent on rather strong assumptions. An alternative solution is to stratify the sample by
household wealth, as applied by Hurd (1987), for example.
4.2.2 A life-cycle model with bequests
Although a life-cycle model with mortality risk predicts a slow decumulation of wealth
if individuals are risk averse, it does not explain why many elderly do not decumulate
their assets at all— even at the end of life. A possible explanation is that parents
derive utility from leaving a bequest. Hurd (1989) formulates a life-cycle model with
intentional bequests. This contrasts with accidental bequests that arise in a model
with mortality risk. An intentional bequest motive reduces consumption at the start
of retirement and leads to a lower level of consumption in retirement such that more
wealth is held at every age.
Hurd’s model focuses on retired individuals, such that retirement choices do not have
to be explained. Moreover, retirees face no risk of reduced income due to unemployment,
which is an important risk factor for elderly workers close to retirement. Individuals
receive a certain stream of annuity income and are not able to annuitize their wealth.
This is consistent with the low ownership rate of private annuities in the US and in
European countries, which is partly explained by the relative high importance of pension
and social security wealth in the household portfolios of most retirees (see also the
overview of Benartzi et al., 2011, for other compelling reasons). The model also assumes
that borrowing is restricted, in the sense that individuals must always have a positive
level of wealth. This implies that banks only provide loans that are secured against
collateral such as a mortgage loan. Without imposing liquidity constraints, Mariger
(1987) shows that individuals with a low degree of risk aversion, who do not plan to
leave a bequest, desire to borrow against future pension income as the prospect of death
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increases.
The model considers single-person households. For a two-person household, uncertain
lifetimes complicate the model considerably because consumption becomes conditional
on the expected lifetime of the spouse. In addition, the income of the surviving spouse
is most likely diﬀerent from the income as a couple. In both cases, the couple has to
secure suﬃcient resources for the surviving partner as well as for the planned bequest
after the death of the surviving spouse. Another complexity is the existence of returns-
to-scale in consumption for couples. If the couple shares many resources, the surviving
spouse is, all else equal, worse-oﬀ if the partner dies. Hurd (1999) describes the optimal
consumption path for elderly couples, which is computational burdensome: to derive
the consumption path for elderly couples, the consumption path of the surviving spouse
ﬁrst has to be solved at every age and for each spouse separately. Browning (2000) uses
an even more elaborate model in which both partners have independent preferences and
have to agree on the level of consumption. The model builds upon the notion that wives
are typically younger than their husbands and that they have a higher life expectancy.
Therefore, wives have a stronger incentive to save than their husbands. Browning (2000)
shows that the higher the relative income share of the wife, the higher the accumulated
assets should be, all else equal. Because of the complexity of retirement saving behavior,
most empirical studies examine it from the perspective of a single-person household.
The work of Lillard and Weiss (1997) is an exception, however; they abstract from
important sources of uncertainty which leads to somewhat unsatisfactory results.
In the model, Hurd (1989) further assumes that the marginal utility of leaving a
bequest is constant. This assumption results in a closed-form solution of the utility
function. This makes the model easier to solve, but leads to the somewhat unrealistic
conclusion that bequests are not altruistic, in the sense that they are not motivated by
the economic wellbeing of the children. The altruistic bequest motive predicts that the
elderly plan to leave a bequest if they expect their children to be less well-oﬀ (Becker
and Tomes, 1979). Laitner and Juster (1996) provide empirical evidence that planned
bequests are indeed larger for parents who have children with relative low lifetime
earnings. Hurd justiﬁes this assumption with the argument that bequests are typically
a small fraction of the lifetime wealth of the children and therefore only result in a
slight adjustment of the marginal utility of the children. It should be noted that this is
also consistent with an egoistic bequest motive— in the sense that the accumulation of
wealth provides utility by itself: for example, if people are thrifty or derive social status
out of wealth.
Another drawback of the assumption of a constant marginal utility is that consump-
tion is independent of the level of wealth at the start of retirement. As a result, wealthy
persons bequeath all savings above a certain threshold level of initial wealth and do not
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increase consumption. For higher levels of initial wealth this might even result in rising
wealth proﬁles. Carroll (2000) and De Nardi (2004) propose a less restrictive functional
form of the bequest function where bequests are a luxury good such that wealthier
persons devote a larger part of the wealth holdings to a bequest. In addition, there
is a minimum level of wealth under which the household leaves no bequests. Whether
or not the household leaves a bequest also depends on the degree of altruism. This
functional form is widely used in the recent savings literature; see e.g. De Nardi et al.
(2010); Ameriks et al. (2011); Lockwood (2012).
To test whether the bequest motive is prevalent, Hurd ﬁts the life-cycle model to
data from the Retirement History Survey (RHS) for the years 1969 to 1979. The model
is, however, not able to distinguish between the wealth trajectory of a person with a
bequest motive who has a low degree of risk aversion and a risk-averse person who does
not plan to leave a bequest. Hurd assumes that only individuals with children have
a bequest motive. As a measure of wealth, both net worth and net ﬁnancial wealth
(which excludes illiquid housing equity) are considered. The results support a life-cycle
model with lifetime uncertainty, but there is no evidence that individuals with children
behave according to a bequest motive.2 The wealth proﬁles of individuals with and
without children are very similar. Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) use a less stringent
assumption to identify the bequest motive. They allow all households to have a bequest
motive, independent of whether or not they have children, and show that many elderly
households behave according to a bequest motive.
The evidence against the presence of a bequest motive by Hurd is only valid if bequests
take place after the death of the surviving spouse. Most elderly singles have lost their
partner and it is possible that some of the estate was already split between the surviving
spouse and other heirs. For example, Poterba et al. (2011) show that widowhood results
in a sharp drop in wealth holdings for the surviving spouse, and Hurd and Smith (2001)
report that 80 percent of the estate (which generally excludes the house) is transferred
to the children upon widowhood. In addition, parents might prefer to transfer wealth
during their lifetime to support their children when they need it most— for example,
to alleviate borrowing constraints when they buy their ﬁrst house or to support them
in case of earnings loss. Empirical evidence by McGarry (1999) indicates that lifetime
transfers are important for US families, while Ando and Guiso (1994) ﬁnd no evidence
for Italian households, who are known to have strong family ties.
The limited strength of the bequest motive is consistent with survey evidence about
2The estimated coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 0.73 is considerably smaller compared to what
is usually found in the literature, and predicts that retirees will exhaust their wealth at a relative early
age. The estimated coeﬃcient of the subjective discount rate of 0.05 is larger than the assumed interest
rate of 0.03. This means that the elderly behave impatiently, which results in even faster decumulation
of wealth. The exclusion of housing equity does not signiﬁcantly alter the results.
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motives for saving. For example, Dynan et al. (2002) report that the vast majority of
retired US households mention precautionary reasons, such as illness or emergencies, as
a motive to save, while saving for a bequest is rarely mentioned. Very similar results
are found for the Netherlands, even though saving for illness is less urgent because
of the comprehensive coverage of the health insurance system (Alessie et al., 1999).
Nevertheless, many people state that they expect to leave a bequest, and a signiﬁcant
portion of the children receives an inheritance (Hurd and Smith, 2001). A possible
explanation is that savings for precautionary reasons will ultimately be bequeathed if
no unforeseen events occur (Dynan et al., 2002). Thus, savings serve a dual role and
the importance of both motives cannot be distinguished without additional information.
Ameriks et al. (2011) designed a survey question to measure the tradeoﬀ between the
size of the bequest and the amount spent on long-term care expenses— which is an
important driver of precautionary saving in the US. Their result indicates that intended
bequests are an important reason to save.
4.2.3 A life-cycle model with uncertain health expenses
As already mentioned, precautionary savings for illness is an important motive for
retirees to save. This might also explain the slow rates of decumulation among the
elderly. The amount of risk that the elderly face in case of illness depends on the
coverage of health insurance and the availability of social insurance programs.
The importance of uncertain health expenses for saving in old-age was ﬁrst examined
by Kotlikoﬀ (1989). Using a two-period savings model, Kotlikoﬀ shows that partial
insurance for severe health problems, such as a prolonged stay in nursing home, is an
important reason for middle and upper income households to save. For low-income
households, the relatively high costs of medical care in conjunction with the availability
of social insurance programs such as Medicaid in the US reduce precautionary savings.
These programs secure a subsistence level of consumption for individuals with high
out-of-pocket medical expenses. The programs do require individuals to ﬁrst run down
assets, to become eligible. The existence of an asset-test further discourages saving
among low-income households. Hubbard et al. (1995) show in a simulation study
that the asset-tested safety-net is one of the main reasons why many low-income US
households save so little, even close to retirement.
An important assumption in Kotlikoﬀ’s model is that the marginal utility of con-
sumption declines in poor health, because individuals are no longer able to consume as
much as they desire. This reduces both the level of savings and the desired coverage
of health insurance. The direction of the eﬀect can, however, also be positive; see e.g.
Finkelstein et al. (2013). For example, the derived utility from hiring a housekeeper or
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investing in home adaptations will most likely increase in poor health. Finkelstein et
al. (2013) provide empirical evidence that the marginal utility of consumption is lower
among individuals with chronic diseases compared to their healthy counterparts. This
is consistent with the empirical observation that wealth holdings of the elderly increase
with age in countries with comprehensive health insurance coverage; see e.g. Börsch-
Supan and Stahl (1991) and Alessie et al. (1999) for German and Dutch evidence on
this issue. This is because consumption needs fall below the level of pension income
when health deteriorates. Moreover, individuals are unable to borrow against future
pension income at the start of retirement, when they have no health problems.
Properly understanding the importance of uncertain health expenses for saving be-
havior requires precise information about the incidence of large out-of-pocket expenses
(similar to the necessity of life-tables to measure mortality risk). The probability dis-
tribution of health expenditures strongly depends on age and health status, but may
be inﬂuenced as well by characteristics such as income and gender. Kotlikoﬀ makes
no attempt to precisely measure these risks. Feenberg and Skinner (1994) use informa-
tion about medical deductions in a longitudinal dataset of US tax records from 1968
to 1973 to estimate the distribution and persistence of out-of-pocket health expenses.
Their estimates indicate that health expenses are highly persistent, which reﬂects the
risk of chronic conditions. They also ﬁnd that health expenses represent a greater pro-
portional risk to low-income households, which implies that they should save more in
absence of a social insurance program. French and Jones (2004) use more recent data
on out-of-pocket expenses from the HRS between 1992 and 2000. They construct an
alternative econometric model that ﬁts both the mean and the upper tail of the empir-
ical distribution of health expenses to better measure the risk of catastrophic health
expenses. The parameter estimates of the ﬁtted model are used to simulate lifetime
medical expenses. They ﬁnd that the elderly run a large risk of excessive out-of-pocket
health expenses. About 1 percent of the elderly receive a health shock at retirement
that results in a present value of lifetime health expenses of more than $ 43,500. This
is substantially more risk than indicated by the model of Feenberg and Skinner (1994),
and has important implications for the level of precautionary savings among the elderly.
There are some concerns that self-reported health expenditures are overstated in the
HRS, which increases the estimated health expenditure risk (Venti, 2011).
Subsequent studies by Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi et al. (2010) examine the impor-
tance of out-of-pocket health expenditures for precautionary saving by incorporating the
estimated health expenditure risk in a life-cycle consumption model. Their models are
based on the retirement phase of the framework of Kotlikoﬀ (1989) and Hubbard et al.
(1995). They estimate the structural parameters (such as the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion, the discount rate, the bequest motive and the health state dependent utility)
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such that the predicted wealth-age proﬁle of their simulated model closely resembles
the empirical wealth-age proﬁle. Palumbo uses data on consumption and health status
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the years 1984 through 1986 and
uses external data sources to measure health expenditure uncertainty. Palumbo argues
that in particular the risk of a prolonged stay in a nursing home explains the limited
decumulation of wealth in old-age. He does not ﬁnd evidence for health state dependent
utility.
De Nardi et al. (2010) extend the model by allowing for diﬀerences in saving behavior
between the income-poor and the income-rich, and by accounting for wealth diﬀerences
between cohorts and diﬀerential mortality. They accomplish this by simulating the life-
cycle model for diﬀerent cohorts (with diﬀerent levels of initial wealth) and by matching
the wealth-age proﬁle for diﬀerent permanent income quantiles and cohorts. The bias
due to diﬀerential mortality is further reduced by not using population life-tables— and
instead allowing mortality risk to diﬀer by permanent income, gender and health status.
The data stem from the HRS for the years 1996 through 2006. They use the method of
French and Jones (2004) to measure health expenditure risk. Their measure of wealth
includes both ﬁnancial assets and illiquid housing equity. They match the median of
wealth rather than means because medians are less sensitive to outliers. This implies
that the behavioral parameters of ‘an average’ household are matched well. The model
might be less successful in capturing the behavior of very wealthy households, who
might save a large part of their wealth to leave a bequest.
De Nardi et al. (2010) neither ﬁnd evidence in favor of a bequest motive nor health
state dependent utility. The estimated coeﬃcient for relative risk aversion is consid-
erably larger than the one from the model of Hurd (1989). This suggests that health
expenditure risk is an important driver of precautionary savings for the higher per-
manent income groups. Those who have a low permanent income have no incentives
to save because they are relatively well protected by the government-provided (asset-
tested) safety-net. In addition, out-of-pocket health expenditures are relatively low for
the income-poor. The safety-net is also important for the income-rich because they face
potential large out-of-pocket health expenditures late in life.
4.2.4 Housing and portfolio choice
While the theories discussed above can explain empirical deﬁciencies such as the ﬂat
wealth proﬁles, even until advanced ages, they do not account for the fact that the elderly
keep a large amount of their wealth in the form of illiquid housing equity (see, among
others, Sheiner and Weil, 1992; Poterba et al., 2011). The evolution of housing wealth
might be diﬀerent from the evolution of other kinds of wealth, since a house is both an
4.2. Theory on saving behavior and portfolio choice after retirement 93
asset and a consumption good. If desired housing consumption is constant throughout
retirement, this will cause housing wealth to decline more slowly than other kinds of
wealth if the ability to extract housing equity is limited (Henderson and Ioannides,
1983).
Households can disentangle the wealth part and consumption part of housing in
diﬀerent ways. First, households can borrow in the form of a second mortgage or take a
reverse mortgage. A reverse mortgage allows the household to withdraw a lump sum or
receive an annuity payment or a combination of both. The household is able to remain in
their home as long as it is their permanent residence. They pay oﬀ the accumulated debt
when the last household member dies or leaves the house permanently— for example, to
go to a nursing home. The lender takes the loss if the value of the debt exceeds the value
of the house (but also receives the appreciation in the house value). The demand for
reverse mortgages is low among the elderly. This is usually explained by the existence
of a bequest motive (e.g. Davidoﬀ, 2010; Lockwood, 2012). This is puzzling, however,
because borrowers are also able to withdraw only a part of their housing equity. The
complexity of reverse mortgages and the relative high costs— partly to compensate
the lender for the risk— are other possible reasons. As a result, households can extract
relatively little housing wealth. Sinai and Souleles (2008) calculate that about half of the
value of the house can be withdrawn as a lump sum for households at the beginning of
retirement. This amount increases for older age groups. Bridges et al. (2006) provide
evidence that housing equity withdrawal nowadays occurs more often among elderly
households. This might be related to ﬁnancial innovations in the mortgage market
over the last decade, such as the introduction of interest-only mortgages, which allow
liquidity-constrained elderly households to better smooth consumption after a ﬁnancial
shock. The obvious concern is that increasing mortgage debt holdings make the elderly
more vulnerable to housing price risks; see also Van Ooijen and Van Rooij (2013) for a
discussion about mortgage risks.
Households can also extract housing equity by selling the house and becoming a renter
or by purchasing a less expensive house. Relatively few households extract equity by
moving to a less expensive house in later life, as documented by Sheiner and Weil (1992)
and Venti and Wise (2000). This implies that a considerable amount of equity is not
used for consumption purposes. There are several potential explanations for the low
turnover rate among elderly people. First, the elderly might want to bequeath the house
to their children. The evidence about the importance of a bequest motive is, however,
not particularly strong. Second, households may use their housing wealth as a buﬀer
against catastrophic shocks such as the death of the spouse or uncertain medical care
at the end of life. They leave the remaining wealth as an incidental bequest. Suggestive
evidence in favor of this explanation is provided in a recent study by Ameriks et al.
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(2011). Third, moving involves not only large monetary costs but also emotional costs
of settling into a new environment. Venti and Wise (2000) use survey questions which
indicate that the elderly are indeed very accustomed to their house and have no intention
of moving to a smaller house. Rouwendal and Thomese (2013) show that homeowners
are more attached to their house and are less likely to become institutionalized even if
health deteriorates.
The issue of adjustment costs associated with housing wealth and consumption be-
havior was recently investigated by Chetty and Szeidl (2007). They develop a life-cycle
model in which households derive utility from housing and non-housing consumption
such as clothing and food. Households are unable to extract equity from the house
or to adjust the size of the house without selling the house and incurring adjustment
costs. Households are willing to incur the adjustment costs only when a large perma-
nent shock occurs (such as death of the spouse or deteriorating health). As a result,
they are more averse to smaller risks and keep a buﬀer of ﬁnancial assets for incidental
expenditures. When confronted with a small health shock, households ﬁrst draw down
their liquid assets before downsizing their home equity. Davidoﬀ (2010) argues that
since the desired level of housing consumption also declines after a large health shock,
housing equity serves as an ideal saving device for out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Yogo (2009) provides a model with health investments and adjustment costs that also
predicts that households primarily dissave in the form of housing equity after a large
health shock.
There are a few recent studies that empirically explore the impact of health status
on portfolio allocation of the elderly using data from the HRS, thereby explicitly taking
into account the presence of illiquid housing wealth. For example, Berkowitz and Qiu
(2006) and Coile and Milligan (2009) show that the onset of a new chronic condition
leads to a much larger decline in ﬁnancial wealth than in housing wealth. They do
not consider, however, the long-run eﬀect of a health shock. Medical expenses related
to a chronic condition last for a long time, which gradually drains household savings.
Yogo (2009) ﬁnds that individuals primarily reduce housing equity in response to a large
decline in self-reported health between two waves of the HRS.
Finally, Flavin and Yamashita (2002) and Chetty and Szeidl (2010) examine the eﬀect
of housing equity on portfolio choice. Their models predict that households will invest a
larger share of their ﬁnancial portfolio in risky assets, as their exposure to housing price
risk declines. This implies that the portfolio share of risky assets increases with age,
since people reduce their mortgage debt. Moreover, a smaller mortgage debt translates
into lower monthly payments over the remaining term of the mortgage. These lower
payments make households less vulnerable to ﬁnancial shocks. Pelizzon and Weber
(2009) test these predictions using Italian household data. They show that housing
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wealth plays a key role in ﬁnancial portfolio choice.
4.3 Data sources
We use linked administrative records from Statistics Netherlands to provide descriptive
evidence about saving behavior and portfolio choice after retirement.
4.3.1 Dutch Income Panel
The Dutch Income Panel (IPO) contains detailed information on income, at both the
individual and the household level, and on assets and liabilities at the household level.
The data stem mainly from the National Tax register. It should be noted that the Dutch
tax administration levies a wealth tax (‘box 3 tax’) if net ﬁnancial wealth exceeds a
certain threshold, which depends on marital status.3 In order to check whether people
report their ﬁnancial wealth in a correct way, the tax authorities require banks and
insurance companies to provide relevant data on ﬁnancial wealth of all their clients
(data on checking and savings account balances, and on their investment portfolio).
Both income and assets are therefore accurately measured.
IPO started in 1989 and consists of about 90,000 households. The unit of observation
is the “key person” of a household, which is drawn randomly from the Dutch population
and is followed over the life course. The dataset contains information about the key
person and all household members. When the key person moves to another household
or drops out of the sample because of death or migration, we lose all information of
the remaining household members. The IPO is linked to the Dutch population register,
which includes demographic variables such as age, gender, marital status and country
of birth. We also use the population register to obtain information about the number
of children and whether an elderly person resides with an adult child.
Data on ﬁnancial wealth holdings are available from 2005 onwards. Therefore, we
only use the 2005 to 2010 waves of the IPO. Due to its administrative nature, the IPO
data has many advantages above other survey datasets on income and asset holdings.
First, it has a very low attrition rate (due only to migration) and includes individuals
who are either under-represented or not represented in most surveys (such as the rich,
immigrants, single-person households, the elderly population, and individuals living in
institutions). Another advantage of the data is that the observed wealth and income
variables are measured with high accuracy, which is of crucial importance for studying
wealth changes. In addition IPO measures precisely the following sources of pension
income: social security payments (AOW), occupational pension beneﬁts and third-pillar
3€ 20,661 for single-person households and € 41,322 for couples in 2010.
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annuity income. The IPO does not make a distinction between occupational pension
beneﬁts and income from privately purchased annuities. It only records the sum of
these two income components. Item non-response and misreporting of assets is a se-
rious problem when using survey data to study saving behavior. For example, Venti
(2011) reports that 80 percent of US households who participate in the HRS misreport
the ownership of bonds and more than 40 percent of the households provide incorrect
information about the ownership of private retirement savings. This leads to large
artiﬁcial changes in asset ownership and asset holdings between survey waves.
In principle, year-end values of all asset and debt items are reported in the IPO.
However, there are some problems with the valuation of the owner-occupied house.
Statistics Netherlands mainly bases this valuation on the WOZ value. The WOZ value,
which is determined by the government, is equal to the average value of similar houses
in the neighborhood that are sold during the previous calendar year. The WOZ value
can therefore be seen as a good proxy for the value at the beginning of year. Statistics
Netherlands has used a nationwide house price index to inﬂate the WOZ value in order
to proxy the year-end value of owner-occupied housing. This procedure works ﬁne for all
households except for those who were homeowner at the beginning of the year but moved
to a rented accommodation during the calendar year. Statistics Netherlands incorrectly
assumes that people in this group are still homeowners at the end of year, and that a
year-end house value should be assigned to this group of households. Fortunately, the
IPO dataset contains enough information to correct this; and we have done so.
4.3.2 LMR and CAK
To measure health status of IPO respondents, we merge information from the 1995
to 2010 hospital discharge register (LMR) into the IPO dataset. The LMR contains
information about hospital admission and covers all general and university hospitals
and most specialized hospitals. The information includes, among other things, the
main diagnosis and medical treatment, date of admission and discharge, and whether
the admission is acute. The diagnosis and treatment are based on the international
classiﬁcation of diseases (ICD-9).
We distinguish between three categories of health: major diseases, minor diseases
and the remaining group with no health problems. In case of the ﬁrst type, the key
person or the partner entered the hospital because of a ‘severe illness’. We say that a
person suﬀers from a ‘severe illness’ if they are diagnosed with cancer or cardiovascular
diseases in the last three waves (i.e. wave t, t − 1or t − 2). Smith (2004) and Datta
Gupta et al. (2011) identify severely ill people in a similar way. We deﬁne the second
group of households to have a ‘minor health condition’ if neither the key person nor
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the partner are severely ill, but at least one of them is admitted to the hospital during
the last three waves. The third group consists of the rest, who are not admitted to a
hospital in the past waves.
Information about long-term care utilization is provided by the CAK institute, which
executes ﬁnancial compensation programs for long-term care users. The data contains
information about the days spent in a nursing home and number of hours of nursing
and personal care provided at home for the years 2004 to 2011.
4.3.3 Sample selection
Our sample includes all households of which both the key person and the spouse are
retired. Individuals are considered to be retired if they are at least 65 years old and
receive pension income and not earnings or business income. We exclude retired indi-
viduals younger than the statutory retirement age of 65 from our sample, since early
retirement might be endogenous with respect to wealth; see Van Ooijen et al. (2010)
for evidence about the eﬀect of wealth on early retirement for households in the Nether-
lands. We also exclude a few households that left the sample between 2005 and 2010
because of migration. We also remove those households whose key person resides with
an adult child. We made this selection because IPO measures wealth at the household
level. Consequently, we cannot disentangle the wealth of the parents and their adult
children. For the same reason, we do not observe wealth of key persons who have per-
manently entered a nursing home. According to Statistics Netherlands, people living
together in one nursing home form one composite household. Again, these observations
are discarded. The prevalence of remarriage or divorce after retirement is very low in
our sample. Moreover, in economic models explaining the saving behavior of retirees,
it is typically assumed that individuals neither divorce nor (re)marry. Since we want
to test the predictions of these models, we limit our sample to those households who
do not change marital status other than widowhood, and thus exclude persons who
remarry or divorce during the sample period. This leaves us with a sample containing
9,280 households in 2005. The sample consists of 5,047 married couples (of which 72
married couples live separately and apart because of nursing home entrance), 1,184
never-married persons and 3,049 widowed persons.
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4.4 Saving behavior and portfolio choice of the Dutch
elderly
4.4.1 Economic resources after retirement
Retired households have three important sources (of income and wealth) to support
consumption during retirement. They depend on private savings and annuity income
which they have built up during working life. In addition, they receive income from
accumulated wealth holdings such as interest income, dividend payments and capital
gains. Homeowners also receive implicit income from housing services, since they do
not have to pay rent.
Annuity income consists of three components. In the Netherlands, all residents receive
a state pension (AOW) at the statutory retirement age of 65. The beneﬁt level is equal
to the minimum wage for a two-person household, while a single-person household
receives 70 percent of the minimum wage. Unlike the US Social Security system, the
beneﬁts do not depend on the work history. As a result, the poverty rate is very low
among the elderly. Less than three percent of the Dutch retirees receive a state pension
below the poverty line (Soede, 2012), while Poterba et al. (2012) show that about one-
third of single-person households in the US lives in poverty in the last year of life. In
addition to social security, the large majority of retirees are covered by an occupational
pension scheme (Bovenberg and Gradus, 2008). Participation is mandatory when the
employer oﬀers a pension scheme. The pension scheme is predominantly of the deﬁned-
beneﬁt type, and promises a replacement rate of 70 percent of average earnings. The
accrued pension rights depend on the years of work. In the Netherlands, pension funds
do not oﬀer the option to cash out pensions in the form of a lump-sum payment; also in
countries such as the US and Switzerland, which oﬀer the option of a lump-sum payment
at retirement, the large majority of individuals choose not to cash out (Benartzi et al.,
2011). Finally, retirees receive annuity beneﬁts from privately purchased life insurance.
The contributions are tax-deductible for individuals with income over which no pension
rights are accumulated (such as the self-employed).
Because of the generous social security and pension beneﬁts we consider not only
private wealth, but also social security and pension wealth. The present discounted
value of social security and pension wealth depends on the (joint) life expectancy of the
household members, the assumed discount rate, and the ratio of the survivor beneﬁts
to couple beneﬁts. In the Netherlands, the spouse usually receives 70 percent of the
couple beneﬁts upon entering widowhood (Brown and Nijman, 2011). This allows us
to compare the relative importance of both private wealth and annuity income for
the economic status of the elderly. We will not examine the evolution of pension and
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socials security wealth in retirement because this is in general out of control once the
youngest household member retires. In the Netherlands, banks usually do not allow
borrowing against future pension and social security income. However, banks usually
provide loans that are secured against collateral such as an interest-only mortgage—
also when borrowers are at an advanced age. Furthermore, other than the survival
beneﬁt, pensions are not bequeathable. The size of these wealth measures, therefore,
declines mechanically with age as the mortality risk increases.4
We distinguish between three deﬁnitions of private wealth holdings: net worth, net
ﬁnancial assets and housing equity. Net worth of the household is deﬁned as the value of
all assets less the value of all debts; see Wolﬀ (1998) for a deﬁnition of household wealth.
Total assets are deﬁned as the sum of the values of the owner-occupied house, other
real estate, checking and savings accounts,5 risky assets (i.e. stocks, bonds and mutual
funds), business wealth and other assets such as cash in hand and loans to family
members. Total debts are deﬁned as the sum of mortgage debt, business debt and
other debt.6 Housing equity is equal to the value of the owner-occupied house minus
the remaining mortgage debt. Net ﬁnancial wealth equals net worth minus housing
equity. These measures do not include durable goods (such as cars) or the cash value
of privately bought life insurances.
In the Netherlands, mortgages are commonly linked to a life-insurance policy: so-
called endowment mortgages. For these products, the mortgage debt remains constant
over the term of the mortgage loan, in order to take advantage of the generous tax-
deductibility of the mortgage interest. The owner pays interest over the mortgage
principal and an insurance premium to a life-insurance policy which covers the mort-
gage principal at the end of the loan. Since the cash value of the life-insurance policy is
not observed in the data, housing equity is underestimated for these households. The
ownership rate of endowment mortgages is, however, very low among elderly homeown-
ers; see Van Ooijen and Van Rooij (2014). The most common mortgage among elderly
homeowners is an interest-only mortgage where the borrower pays interest but does not
repay the principal.
4We use the formulas of Alessie et al. (1997) for the computation of pension and social security
wealth. We use cohort-speciﬁc life-tables from Statistics Netherlands. We assume that the remaining
lifetimes of the key person and spouse are independent. The discount rate is 3 percent and survivor
beneﬁts equal 70 percent of the couple beneﬁts. The maximum lifespan is 110 years.
5Financial institutions are not obliged to report to the tax administration bank account balances less
than 500 euro. Consequently, IPO slightly underestimates ownership of bank accounts at the household
level.
6Other debt is only known for those households who pay wealth tax (‘box 3 tax’). Consequently,
the debt ownership is underestimated. However, data from the DNB Household Survey (DHS) indicate
that the overwhelming majority of the 65+ households do not hold any form of consumer credit; see
Alessie et al. (2002).
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4.4.2 Household wealth holdings in 2005
We ﬁrst examine the economic status of households after retirement in 2005. This is well
before the stock markets reached rock bottom in September 2008 after the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers, which led to the ﬁnancial crisis. Table 4.1 reports on the distribution
of household wealth across diﬀerent age groups and marital status of the key person
at the end of 2005. We distinguish between married couples, widowed persons and
non-married persons (i.e. never married or divorced).
We ﬁrst look at married couples. The average net worth of married couples in their
early retirement years (age 65-69) is equal to € 267,400. Not surprisingly, the distribu-
tion of wealth holdings is skewed to the right: mean net worth equals somewhat more
than one and a half times median net worth. This implies that a large fraction of net
worth is owned by the very rich. Notice also that median net worth declines with age
from about € 159,000 for the 65-69 age group to about € 67,000 for the 85+ group. At
the same time, mean net worth remains fairly constant with age. This indicates that
wealth inequality increases with age. Housing equity is the most important component
of the household portfolio for married couples at the start of retirement: its average
value is equal to € 149,000. About 55 percent of the couples in the sample own a house
in their early retirement years. This is a sharp increase compared to the ownership rate
in the beginning of the 1990s. Alessie et al. (1995) document that approximately 23
percent of the 65-69 age group own a house in 1991. Nevertheless, the homeownership
rate is still considerably lower than that of the US, where more than 90 percent of the
just-retired couples own a house (Poterba et al., 2011). The low homeownership rate
is still prevalent among the older generation of retirees. Approximately 30 percent of
the married couples age 85 and older own a house. This does not so much reﬂect the
draw-down of housing equity as people age but the cohort diﬀerences, which is also doc-
umented by Van Der Schors et al. (2007). Wealth holdings are less equally distributed
when housing equity is excluded. Median ﬁnancial wealth amounts to about € 30,100,
while mean ﬁnancial wealth equals € 118,800; this is almost four times as high as the
median. For all but the youngest cohort, the mean level of net ﬁnancial wealth among
older cohorts is higher.
Social security and pension wealth represent an important part of total wealth hold-
ings. Together they account for more than 60 percent of total household wealth for the
age group 65-69. This percentage was even higher in the early 1990s (Alessie et al.,
1995). Almost all married couples receive occupational pension beneﬁts on top of social
security wealth. We see that the older age groups less often receive occupational pen-
sions. Among the individuals who receive occupational pensions, there is considerable
variation in pension wealth: for couples, mean pension wealth (€ 231,800) is twice as
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large as median pension wealth (€ 157,500). This reﬂects diﬀerences in lifetime income.
The skewness is similar to the distribution of net worth.
Wealth holdings of single-person households are considerably lower than those of
married couples. The table shows that mean net worth of married couples for the age
group 65-69 is about 40 percent higher than for widowed persons (€ 193,600) and almost
twice as high for non-married persons (€ 139,100). The wealth distribution of single
person-households is also more dispersed compared to married couples. For widowed
persons (age 65-69) mean net worth is almost ﬁve times as high as the median (€ 41,600).
Net worth is even more unequally distributed among non-married persons. A typical
(median) non-married person in the age group 65-69 has only € 13,700 in net worth and €
9,500 in liquid ﬁnancial assets for immediate consumption. This inequality in net worth
is again partly explained by diﬀerences in homeownership, which is about 15 percentage
points lower among widowed persons in the age group 65-69 (40.9 percent) than it is
among married couples. The homeownership rate is even lower among non-married
persons; only 28.5 percent own a house between age 65 and 69, and the homeownership
rate is less than 20 percent for persons age 85+. The diﬀerence in both median net worth
and the homeownership rate between widowed and unmarried households disappears at
older ages.
Most single-person households at the bottom half of the wealth distribution thus
highly rely on social security and pension wealth in retirement. The ownership of
pension wealth is slightly higher among married couples than among widowed persons
for all age groups. This implies that the vast majority of widowed persons receive
a survivor pension. The ownership rate is, however, substantially lower among non-
married persons: about 75 percent receive an occupational pension in the age group
65-69, with the ﬁgure dropping to only 60 percent of the persons age 85 and above.
These results suggest that the economic status of non-married households in the age
group 65-69 is lower than that of widowed persons in the same age group; for older
age groups, the economic status of non-married persons increases. In the subsequent
sections we will focus only on married couples and widowed persons.
4.4.3 Evolution of household wealth between 2005 and 2010
The described cross-sectional distribution of wealth compounds age- and cohort-eﬀects.
The panel dimension of the dataset allows us to follow the same household over time. We
can therefore distinguish between true age eﬀects and cohort-time eﬀects.7 Furthermore,
we are able to account for diﬀerential mortality. We therefore restrict the sample to all
7We could not disentangle either age or time and cohort eﬀects without making additional assump-
tions such as done in e.g. Deaton and Paxson (1994). This is because the age of an individual is
perfectly identiﬁed by the year of birth (cohort) at a speciﬁc time.
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households that remain intact to the end of the panel. This implies that we exclude all
households where one of the members dies between 2005 and 2010 and keep a balanced
panel.
Table 4.2 shows the evolution of wealth between 2005 and 2010 for married and wid-
owed persons in their early retirement years for the balanced panel. These households
are between 65 and 69 years of age in 2005 and between 71 and 75 years of age in 2010.
Note that mean and median wealth holdings for both married couples and widowed
persons in 2005 are slightly higher compared to the same statistics in Table 4.1. House-
holds with a lower level of net worth thus have higher mortality risk. The table shows
that the evolution of net worth between 2005 and 2010 is largely aﬀected by develop-
ments in the housing market and the stock market. Between 2005 and 2007, the average
net worth of married couples increased by 6 percent: from € 276,100 to € 293,600. This
is in particular due to the rise in housing prices in the years before the ﬁnancial crisis:
the mean level of housing equity rose by 7.5 percent between 2005 and 2007. Wealth
held in ﬁnancial assets did not grow as fast over the same period: mean ﬁnancial wealth
rose by about 4.5 percent between 2005 and 2007, while the Dutch stock market index
doubled over the same period. This observation that the level of ﬁnancial assets re-
mained fairly constant between 2005 and 2007 is reasonable, since risky assets are not
an important component of most household portfolios. There is a large decline in net
worth in the years after the economic crisis, particularly because a substantial amount
of the wealth holdings of the elderly is tied up in housing equity. The wealth holdings
of the elderly are thus sensitive to the volatility of housing prices in the studied period.
During the ﬁnancial crisis, the mean housing equity of couples declined by 15.4 percent—
from € 166,300 to € 140,700. As we will show below, mortgage debt is limited among
the retirees. This makes a decline in housing prices less critical for the elderly, compared
to younger generations who usually have a larger mortgage debt compared to the value
of their property. The decline in the prices of houses mainly aﬀects elderly homeowners
who move home during the downturn— because of deteriorating health, for example, or
death of the partner. For individuals who move to another owner-occupied house, the
net reduction in housing equity is limited, however, since the purchase price of the new
house declined as well (Sinai and Souleles, 2005). The data shows that elderly couples
in the age-group 65-69 do not seem to move. The homeownership rate remains fairly
constant between the years 2005 to 2010.
Mean ﬁnancial wealth declined by more than 11 percent between 2007 and 2010, while
median ﬁnancial wealth declined only slightly over the same period. Apparently, net
ﬁnancial wealth of a typical household is not aﬀected by the downturn of the ﬁnancial
markets,8 either because households sold their stocks in the ﬁrst phase of the ﬁnancial
8In 2008 the Dutch stock market exchange lost about half of its value.
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crisis when prices started to fall, or because of the limited importance of risky assets
in the average ﬁnancial portfolio. In the next section we show that households already
reduced stockownership two years before the ﬁnancial crisis.
For widowed households we observe a similar proﬁle for net worth, both before and
after the ﬁnancial crisis. The level of net worth is considerably lower compared to
married couples. The median net worth proﬁle is remarkably ﬂat among widows because
of the relative low homeownership rate. The median level of ﬁnancial wealth is just
below the threshold for the exemption of wealth taxation for single households, which
is a ﬁnding we also have for married couples.
Figure 4.1 also presents the mean wealth-age patterns for the older cohorts. In the
ﬁgure, each ‘cohort line’ is composed out of households born in ﬁve consecutive years.
The ﬁrst line matches the cohort as displayed in Table 4.2. For married couples we
use four cohorts, where the oldest cohort is 80 years and older in 2005. For widowed
households we use ﬁve cohorts, where the oldest cohort is age 85 and older in 2005.
Since a person’s year of birth is perfectly identiﬁed by his age at a speciﬁc date in
time, we cannot distinguish between age and time eﬀects without making additional
assumptions. If we assume that each cohort is aﬀected in a similar way by time eﬀects
such as developments of the stock market and housing price developments (which is not
unreasonable to assume), we can discriminate between both eﬀects by comparing the
shape of the wealth-age proﬁle of diﬀerent cohorts.
We ﬁrst look at the wealth-age proﬁles of married couples. For all cohorts we observe
that net ﬁnancial wealth rises slightly in the years before the ﬁnancial crisis and signiﬁ-
cantly declines thereafter. For all cohorts, net ﬁnancial wealth rises slightly in the wake
of the ﬁnancial crisis when stock markets recover. The shape of the wealth-age proﬁles
of the diﬀerent cohorts is thus very similar. This suggests that time-eﬀects dominate
the picture and that age-eﬀects are limited. There seems no evidence that married
couples run down their ﬁnancial wealth as they get older. Even the oldest cohort (aged
80 to 85+ in 2005) retains their ﬁnancial assets. This ﬁnding seems to be at odds with
the prediction of a simple life-cycle model which says that retirees should eventually
deplete their wealth holdings.
Median net ﬁnancial wealth holdings are signiﬁcantly lower compared to the mean
(see Figure 4.2). Notice also that the median level of ﬁnancial wealth among the oldest
cohorts is even higher compared to the youngest cohort. This might reﬂect diﬀerential
mortality, or diﬀerences in portfolio composition between cohorts (because of the lower
homeownership rate among the older cohorts). For all cohorts, median ﬁnancial wealth
does not decline over time and seems not aﬀected by the ﬁnancial downturn of the
stock market because of the limited stock ownership in the bottom half of the wealth
distribution. The pattern suggests that a typical household behaves as a buﬀer stock
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saver. They keep a target level of liquid savings for precautionary reasons— for example,
in case they become ill, to replace durable goods or to support their adult children with
ﬁnancial strain. Households will increase savings after a ﬁnancial shock until they reach
the target; see Carroll (2001).
Figure 4.2 shows that the homeownership rate is substantially lower among the older
cohorts. The jumps between the lines indicate that cohort eﬀects are important. As
households age, we observe a slight decline in the homeownership rate for all but the
youngest cohort. The cohort diﬀerences in homeownership explain the diﬀerences in
the shape of the median net worth proﬁles for couples.
For widowed persons, the proﬁle of mean net worth is very similar compared to
married couples. However, the level of net worth is signiﬁcantly lower for all cohorts.
For widows, we also observe for most cohorts a slight decline in the homeownership
rate over time. This, reduction is not large enough to explain the level diﬀerence in
homeownership between widows and married couples. In section 4.5 we show that
widowhood explains part of the diﬀerence in the level of both housing equity and net
ﬁnancial wealth between widowed persons and couples. The median net worth proﬁle
is very ﬂat among widows because of the low homeownership rate. The median level
of ﬁnancial wealth approaches the threshold for the exemption of wealth taxation for
all cohorts. It thus seems important to take account of the tax system in order to
understand the saving behavior of households.
4.4.4 Financial household portfolios in 2005
Table 4.3 summarizes the composition of the ﬁnancial portfolio for both married couples
and widowed persons in 2005. For each asset and debt item, the table presents the mean
value, the ownership rate and the mean portfolio share. The mean portfolio share of an
asset or debt item is deﬁned as the ratio of its value over the sum of total assets. We
add together other real estate, business wealth and other assets in a single asset item.
We also combine other debt and business debt in a single debt item. We refer to these
portfolio components as ‘other assets’ and ‘other debts’, respectively.
Once again, the importance of housing in the composition of wealth becomes apparent.
Housing is a very important wealth component especially for younger retired couples
(age 65-69): 56 percent of those couples own a house and its mean portfolio share is
equal to 44 percent of total assets. Interestingly, the majority of those younger retired
homeowners (36 percent out of the 56 percent) still have a considerable mortgage out-
standing: the average loan-to-value ratio (among those who have mortgage outstanding)
equals 18.3 percent. Both the fraction of homeowners with an outstanding mortgage
loan, as well as the size of the mortgage loan, are substantially lower among older age
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groups.
Checking and savings accounts comprise the second-most important item in the port-
folio of retired couples, and this item becomes the most important component at older
ages. For couples aged 65 to 69 these accounts represent 47 percent of portfolio holdings;
this fraction increases to almost 70 percent of total assets for couples aged 85 and older.
About 30 percent of the couples in the age range 65 to 69 invest in risky assets such as
stocks, bonds and/or mutual funds. The ownership rate is only slightly lower among
the older age groups.
Couples in the age group 85+ invest on average 9 percent of their total assets in
risky assets. This is a larger share than younger retired couples, who invest about 5
percent of their ﬁnancial portfolio in risky assets. This ﬁnding can be partly explained
by diﬀerential mortality; the life-cycle model with uncertainty predicts that wealthier
individuals invest a larger share of their assets in risky assets; see e.g. Gollier (2002).
Another explanation by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) is that since the portfolio of the
elderly is less dominated by risky housing equity, they can allocate a larger share of
their liquid assets to stocks and mutual funds. Coile and Milligan (2009) ﬁnd very
similar patterns for US households with respect to the share and ownership of risky
assets. The ownership rate of risky assets (excluding individual retirement accounts)
is slightly higher: approximately 40 percent of US households in the age group 65-69
invest in stocks and bonds in 2002.9
Table 4.3 also presents the composition of wealth holdings among widowed persons.
Homeownership is less common for widowed persons than for couples: the homeown-
ership rate is almost 15 percentage-points lower among all age groups. In addition,
widowed persons hold less mortgage debt: the loan-to-value ratio is about 14 percent
for younger retirees and less than 2 percent at age 85+. The main part of total assets is
kept in checking and savings accounts. Risky assets are of minor importance: between
ages 65 and 70, the ownership rate of risky assets is about 21 percent, reducing to about
14 percent above age 85. Risky assets comprise between 5 and 6 percent of total assets
for all age groups, which is slightly lower compared to couples. The fact that widowed
persons hold less risky portfolios (with respect to both assets and debts) compared to
couples might be because they possess less wealth holdings. An alternative explanation
might be that the majority of widowed persons are female. Females are more risk averse
and less experienced in making ﬁnancial decisions regarding stock ownership; Van Rooij
et al. (2011).
Table 4.4 shows that there is indeed a clear association between wealth and the
composition of the ﬁnancial portfolio. The presented information is similar to that in
9Information about dividends and capital gains in IPO (for households who pay wealth tax) indicates
that among all age groups the ownership rate of risky assets was substantially higher in 2002.
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the previous table but the results are stratiﬁed by net worth quartile for both married
couples and widowed persons (for each age group separately). For couples in the top
wealth quartile, assets in checking and savings accounts are of minor importance. They
hold a relatively large share of their wealth holdings in risky assets and housing wealth.
The share of risky assets increases with age while housing wealth becomes less important:
66 percent of the younger retired couples own risky assets and 96 percent own a house.
The homeownership rate declines to 81 percent among the oldest retirees in the top
wealth quartile, while the ownership rate of risky assets is slightly lower (about 60
percent).
For couples in the third wealth quartile we also see that housing is the dominant
asset in the portfolio. The homeownership rate is more than 95 percent at the start
of retirement and is about 40 percent for surviving couples who reached age 85. The
ownership of risky assets is signiﬁcantly lower compared to couples in the top net worth
quartile: about 27 percent of the younger couples own risky assets and the share of risky
assets to total assets is less than 3 percent. We again observe a shift, as individuals grow
older, from housing wealth to risky assets. For the second wealth quartile we observe
that housing equity is of minor importance: only 28 percent of the younger retirees
own a house, and for the oldest age group all retirees in the second wealth quartile rent
a house. Risky assets are relatively important among younger retired couples in the
second wealth quartile: the ownership rate is around 21 percent between age 65 and
age 70, and declines to 7.5 percent for couples aged 85 and above. The share of risky
assets is somewhat higher for the younger age groups compared to the third net worth
quartile (between 5 and 7 percent). Couples in the bottom wealth quartile have hardly
any assets other than checking and savings accounts.
For widows we also see the importance of housing wealth in the portfolios of the top
wealth quartiles at the start of retirement (Table 4.5). However, the homeownership
rate is almost zero for the oldest age group in the third wealth quartile. For the other
wealth quartiles checking and savings accounts are the dominant asset category. We
observe a shift from housing assets to risky assets among the older age groups in the
top of the wealth distribution. The ownership rate and portfolio share of risky assets
is much lower compared to couples for all wealth quartiles, which we already observed
in Table 4.3.
4.4.5 Evolution in household portfolios between 2005 and 2010
As we explained above, to distinguish between age, time and cohort eﬀects we have to
follow the asset holdings of the same cohort of households over time. Table 4.6 reports
the participation rate in diﬀerent asset classes for the cohort aged 65 to 69 in 2005.
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We follow the same cohort for six years. Consider ﬁrst the ownership rate of risky
assets among married couples: in 2005, slightly more than 31 percent participate in
the stock market. Subsequently, this declines to 28 percent in 2007, and drops further
during the ﬁnancial crisis to a little less than 24 percent in 2010. The decline in the
participation rate thus already set in two years before the large drop in asset prices
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. It is unclear whether this decline can be
fully attributed to a time trend or whether age-eﬀects explain this proﬁle (as predicted
by the life-cycle model).
Figure 4.3 also shows the evolution of asset classes for older cohorts spaced at ﬁve-
year intervals. The older cohorts also experience a decline in the ownership rate of
risky assets over the same period. This suggests that time-eﬀects are important and
that there is little evidence that the elderly exit the stock market as they age. This is,
however, inconclusive; a longer time series is necessary to make a decisive statement.
Table 4.6 also reports the evolution of the risky assets share of total assets, which we
refer to as the portfolio share of risky assets. The portfolio share of risky assets reduces
only slightly as people age and seems to follow the participation proﬁle. At the same
time, the portfolio share of checking and savings accounts increases. Thus, the data
suggest that the elderly rebalance their portfolio away from risky assets due to the
increased uncertainty about the economic environment.
As already mentioned, the stock market participation rate among widowed persons
is about 10 percentage-points lower compared to married couples in the 65-69 cohort.
A comparison of the risky asset-proﬁle among diﬀerent cohorts shows that the decline
in ownership slows down for the older cohorts. For the 85+ cohort, the ownership rate
stays constant at about 15 percent between 2005 and 2010. A possible explanation for
the limited liquidation of risky assets is that the elderly start managing their portfolio
more passively as their cognition declines; another explanation is that their time horizon
increases due to a bequest motive.
Next, we examine the evolution of the ownership of mortgage debt and housing.
For the 65-69 cohort of married couples, the homeownership rate in 2005 is about 60
percent, and about two-thirds of the homeowners still have a mortgage outstanding.
The homeownership proﬁle stays very ﬂat over the years. In addition, it appears that
this group of young retirees redeems their mortgage at a very slow pace: mortgage
ownership declines from 37.7 percent to 34.4 percent in 2010. Similarly, the average
portfolio share of mortgage debt stays fairly constant over the years (around 4.7 percent
of total assets). This is diﬀerent from the behavior of US households, which seem to
reduce mortgage debt after 2007 (Dynan et al., 2012). The decline in mortgage debt
is mainly caused by borrowers who default on their mortgage loan. Mortgage defaults
occur less often in the Netherlands and do not result in a decline of household debt.
108 Chapter 4. Saving behavior and portfolio choice after retirement
This is because mortgage loans in the Netherlands are with recourse, which means that
the borrower is liable for the deﬁciency in case of default. Another reason for the
low number of mortgage defaults is that lenders judge the aﬀordability of mortgage
payments when applying for a loan.
Figure 4.3 reports a more rapid decline in mortgage ownership among the older co-
horts. Nevertheless, among all cohorts the loan-to-value ratios decline only slightly in
the years before the ﬁnancial crisis, and increase slightly after 2007 when house prices
decline. This reﬂects the importance of interest-only mortgages for the elderly. The
elderly do not pay oﬀ the mortgage principal before the end of the loan. Among the
oldest cohort of couples (age 80+ in 2005), about a quarter of all homeowners still have
a mortgage outstanding (10 percent), with an average value of about 10 percent of the
value of their house. This stresses the potentially important role of interest-only loans
to extract housing equity for the elderly. The provision of home equity loans to elderly
persons is relatively riskless for ﬁnancial institutions, since the loan-to-value ratios are
relatively low.
4.4.6 Wealth holdings, ﬁnancial portfolios and pension income
As shown above, a large fraction of the elderly has accumulated signiﬁcant savings
mainly in the form of housing equity. This holds in particular for the younger cohorts.
For the bottom part of the net worth distribution and for the older cohorts, housing
equity is less important: they essentially keep all of their savings in a bank account. At
the median, we observe that the elderly have accumulated a decent buﬀer of ﬁnancial
wealth, high enough to cover small unexpected expenses but too small to signiﬁcantly
increase consumption in retirement. These households depend mainly on social security
and pension income to support retirement consumption.
Table 4.7 shows the cross-sectional wealth distribution in 2005 by age and lifetime
income tertile. We formulate lifetime income tertiles for both widows and married
couples among age groups. We take the average of the sum of pension and social
security income between 2005 and 2010 as a measure of lifetime income. This is a good
indicator of lifetime income, since it reﬂects average earnings during working life.10 First
of all, it is evident that wealth and lifetime income are strongly correlated. Among all
age groups, couples with a higher lifetime income have accumulated disproportionally
more wealth compared to individuals with a low lifetime income. Married couples
between the ages 65 and 69 in the bottom income tertile have on average € 96,200 in
net worth, the middle quantile has € 172.900 in net worth, while the upper tertile has €
533,700 in mean net worth. At older ages, the diﬀerence between the lowest two income
10The replacement rate for low-income groups is, however, somewhat higher compared to high-income
groups.
4.4. Saving behavior and portfolio choice of the Dutch elderly 109
tertiles disappears. For widowed persons, we observe very similar patterns as for couples.
Households with a low lifetime income presumably have limited possibilities to save,
which results in lower levels of wealth in retirement. There is, however, considerable
heterogeneity in savings within all lifetime income tertiles. We ﬁnd that net worth
is unequally distributed particularly among households in the lower income quartiles,
for all age groups. Consider, for example, married couples aged 70 to 74 and in the
highest income tertile; mean net worth (€ 453,600) is 1.4 times higher than median net
worth (€ 326,700), while for households in the lowest income tertile mean net worth
(€ 116,600) is 4.8 times as high as the median (€ 24,100). The diﬀerence between the
mean and median among persons with low lifetime income is less prevalent for ﬁnancial
wealth; the heterogeneity in accumulated net worth among the low-income groups is
thus largely explained by housing equity: low-income households who bought a relative
inexpensive house before the 1990s, accumulated substantial housing equity due to
the high rates of return on housing as from the early 1990s. In addition, mortgage
payments result in “forced” savings before retirement and allow them to consume more
after retirement, when they are mortgage-free and therefore have low housing costs. For
low-income groups, therefore, housing might work as a commitment device in which they
are forced to save; see Thaler and Shefrin (1981). They can signiﬁcantly improve their
economic status in retirement by extracting housing equity to increase consumption.
An important remaining question is, therefore, which factors determine homeownership
status among low-income households in working life. Potential factors that reduce the
demand for owner-occupied housing among low-income groups are the lower marginal
tax rate, which results in lower mortgage rate deduction, and subsidized rents in the
social housing sector.
Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of median net worth between 2005 and 2010 for wid-
owed persons among diﬀerent lifetime income groups and cohorts. The ﬁgure indicates
that the proﬁle of median net worth is very ﬂat for all but the highest lifetime income
group. A typical household in the bottom two income groups mainly holds riskless
assets in checking and savings accounts, which remain rather unaﬀected by economic
developments. Median savings are low among these groups and appear to be aﬀected
by the threshold for wealth taxation. For the highest lifetime income group, median
net worth is highly aﬀected by the rise and boom of ﬁnancial markets and the housing
markets. Regarding the older cohorts (age 75+), we observe that net worth already
starts to decline before the ﬁnancial crisis. This provides suggestive evidence that the
richest households start drawing down their wealth after reaching age 75.
These asset proﬁles stratiﬁed by lifetime income are completely diﬀerent compared
to the asset proﬁles in the US, as shown by De Nardi et al. (2010) for single-person
households for the years 1996 to 2006. First of all, there is more variation in median net
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worth among the income quantiles in the US, compared with the Netherlands: In the
US, the bottom income group has virtually no assets, while the middle income group
has substantially higher assets. Second, in contrast to households in the Netherlands,
US households with high incomes see net worth rise with age. The opposite is the case
for households with low income. De Nardi et al. (2010) explain the observed patterns by
out-of-pocket health expenses, which are unimportant for the Netherlands. The asset
proﬁles might also be diﬀerent because of the diﬀerent periods of analysis with diﬀerent
economic activity. For example, we observe households before and after the downturn
of the ﬁnancial markets in 2008, which signiﬁcantly aﬀected asset holdings among the
high-income group, while De Nardi et al. (2010) observed households in a period of
higher economic growth, which might partly explain the rising wealth proﬁle for the
high-income groups. The higher prevalence of homeownership in the US might provide
another explanation for the diﬀerent asset patterns.
4.4.7 Financial wealth holdings of homeowners and renters
Homeownership status has an important impact on the wealth distribution among
Dutch retirees. If we compare the tenure status in 2005 with the tenure status in
1989, we ﬁnd that there is a strong persistence in ownership of housing, particularly
among individuals in the older age groups. Among the oldest age group, less than 5
percent of the households who lived in a rental home in 1989 became homeowners in
2005. For individuals at the start of retirement, this holds true for about 18 percent.
These households did not gain from the large appreciation of housing prices from the
beginning of the nineties up to 2007.
Figure 4.5 shows the proﬁle of median net ﬁnancial wealth among homeowners and
non-homeowners (in 2004) for widowed persons. The ﬁgure shows that renters are
considerably poorer compared to homeowners. Besides the lower accumulated housing
equity, they also hold limited ﬁnancial savings. This might reﬂect their inability to
purchase a house during their working life. The ﬁgure provides no clear evidence that
elderly homeowners draw down their liquid savings.
4.5 Marital transitions and wealth holdings
We observe that widowed persons have much less wealth than married couples. To un-
derstand the diﬀerences in the level of wealth between widowed households and couples,
we consider the eﬀect of the death of a spouse on wealth holdings and the composition
of wealth holdings.
Table 4.8 examines the evolution of private wealth by marital status transition within
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two years.11 We distinguish between three groups: married couples who survive between
two waves (married-married); married couples of whom the partner dies in the next
period (married-widowed); and widowed persons in two consecutive waves (widowed-
widowed).
First, notice the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in wealth between married couples who survive
and those who lose a partner in the next period. Mean net worth of surviving couples
in the age group 65-74 is € 260,100 in 2005 and € 280,200 in 2007, while net worth of
couples of which the partner dies in the next period is € 191,900 in 2005 and € 245,200
in 2007. Similarly, persons who become widowed at older ages (age group 75+) are
wealthier compared to those who lost their partner at an earlier age. This results in a
lower level of net worth for widowed persons among all age groups.12 The diﬀerence is
caused by the survival of wealthier couples.
In addition to diﬀerential mortality, there is a direct eﬀect of widowhood on net worth.
The eﬀect of the death of a spouse on wealth holdings can be seen by comparing net
worth in the period before and (one year) after the death of the spouse. For married
couples in the age group 75 or older of whom the spouse dies within the next year, mean
net worth is € 222,900 in 2005 and declines by 9.8 percent to € 201,000 in the year after
the death of the spouse. To interpret the magnitude of the eﬀect of widowhood, we
compare the change in net worth between surviving couples and couples in which the
spouse dies in the same period. Net worth of surviving couples increases between 2005
and 2007 by 5.3 percent to € 266,700 in 2007. The relative decline in net worth due
to bereavements is thus 15.1 percent (i.e. diﬀerence between -9.8 and +5.3). For the
period between 2007 and 2009, net worth declines by 9.1 percent among surviving
couples. Wealth declines much faster when there is bereavement. For couples who
lose their spouse, mean net worth declines by 37.8 percent. We thus ﬁnd a similar net
eﬀect as in the years 2005 and 2007. For net ﬁnancial wealth we even ﬁnd a somewhat
larger drop, presumably because this is more liquid compared to housing wealth. An
explanation for the drop in ﬁnancial wealth after the death of the spouse may include
transfers to the children or estate taxes. In addition, wealth holdings might be lower if
the collected assets from the sale of the house are less than the valuation of the owner-
occupied house. Poterba et al. (2011) ﬁnd less explicit eﬀects for ﬁnancial assets but
strong eﬀects for housing equity. Sheiner and Weil (1992) and Feinstein and McFadden
(1989) also show that the decease of a partner is an important determinant of housing
turnover.
11We examine the change in wealth holdings between wave t and wave t+ 2.
12The observation that widowhood at an early age is associated with lower net worth is also illustrated
by the diﬀerence in net worth between continuing couples in 2005 and 2007, where mean net worth is
€ 276,600 in 2007, and couples who are alive in 2007 and 2009, where mean net worth is € 290,200 in
2007.
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We ﬁnd that widowhood results in a signiﬁcant decline in homeownership in the years
after the ﬁnancial crisis, but not in the period before the ﬁnancial crisis; see Table 4.9.
A possible explanation for this asymmetric eﬀect is that widowed persons decide to
sell the house sooner if future prospects about the housing market are poor or because
the supply of suitable housing is larger. Moreover, it might be more likely that the
children demand their statutory portion (of the estate) if economic prospects are poor,
which results in the sale of the house. In addition, we observe a signiﬁcant reduction
in ownership of risky assets among widowed households compared to surviving couples
(observing not only the ownership rate but also the average portfolio share). In contrast
to housing equity, the eﬀect of widowhood on risky assets is much stronger in the years
before the ﬁnancial crisis. These opposite eﬀects of risky assets and housing equity
might explain why there is no clear-cut eﬀect of widowhood on the share of savings in
checking and savings accounts.
The observation that widowhood is associated with a reduction in the portfolio share
and ownership of risky assets is not in line with Coile and Milligan (2009), who ﬁnd that
widowhood increases the share of assets held in liquid ﬁnancial assets such as stocks
and mutual funds (but also checking and savings accounts) and reduces the share of
assets held in illiquid assets such as housing. This suggests that widowed persons prefer
liquid household portfolios (to pay for health expenditures, for example). Our results
indicate that widowed persons prefer less complex and less risky household portfolios.
Whether they sell their house or stocks depends on the economic situation. The liquidity
consideration might be less relevant in the Netherlands.
4.6 Health status, wealth holdings and ﬁnancial port-
folios
We have shown above that widowhood at an early age is associated with lower wealth.
In addition, persons with low lifetime income often have little wealth holdings. This
suggests that health diﬀerences are important in explaining the ﬁnancial status of the
elderly: health problems in working life reduce the ability to work, which leads to lower
pensions and less private savings; in retirement, these health problems lead to early
death. For example, Smith (2004) shows for US households that the unfolding of a
major health event leads to a large cumulative loss in income and consequently less
wealth accumulation and reduced pensions.
There are other ways in which health status aﬀects economic resources after retire-
ment. A new health problem might lead to sizable out-of-pocket medical expenses,
which reduce savings in case of limited insurance coverage. In addition, health status
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might aﬀect the level of non-medical consumption. Finally, health shocks might reduce
the expected remaining lifetime. This reduces the marginal utility of holding wealth
in the absence of a bequest motive. Wealth holdings are not aﬀected through reduced
income in retirement, since all retirees have a certain pension income. However, as al-
ready indicated, both pension income and wealth holdings might be adversely aﬀected
by pre-existing health problems before retirement.
Since the analysis is at the household level, we account for the health status of both
partners in a household. Table 4.10 shows the association between health status and
wealth holdings for diﬀerent combinations of health and diﬀerent age groups. The table
shows that there is a strong association between wealth holdings and health for both
the median and mean. For example, a couple between the ages of 75 and 79 with no
previous health problems has an average net worth of € 237,500, while a couple of which
one or both partners has major health problems has a net worth of € 210,000. This
diﬀerence can mainly be attributed to diﬀerences in homeownership status between
households with a diﬀerent health status, as reported in the ﬁnal column. Homeowner-
ship among households aged 75-79 with no preexisting health problems is 46.0 percent,
while homeownership among couples with major health problems is 38.2 percent. The
strong association between health and ﬁnancial resources, among other things, is found
by Poterba et al. (2011), among others. Their study also shows that households in
good health have rising wealth proﬁles in retirement, while unhealthy households have
a very ﬂat wealth proﬁle.
Next, we examine whether the onset of a new major disease (cancer or cardiovascular
disease) aﬀects wealth holdings between two waves. To analyze the eﬀect of a new health
event on wealth, we control for initial health status. We compare households who had
no health problems (of any household member) between 2003 and 2005 but experienced
diﬀerent health shocks thereafter. We distinguish between ﬁve groups (see Figure 4.6).
The healthy group (dashed line) experienced no health shock (of any member) between
2005 and 2009 and serves as reference group. The other groups experienced a health
shock (of at least one member) between 2005 and 2009 that diﬀers in severity: the
second group (dotted line) experienced a minor health shock (of at least one member)
between 2005 and 2007 and is readmitted to the hospital for a minor condition between
2007 and 2009; the third group (thick line) experienced a minor health shock (of at least
one member) between 2005 and 2007 and a severe health shock between 2007 and 2009;
the fourth group (thick dashed line) experiences a severe health shock (of at least one
member) between 2005 and 2007 and is readmitted to the hospital for a similar severe
condition between 2007 and 2009; the ﬁnal group (thin line) experienced a health shock
(of at least one member) between 2005 and 2007 and one of the members dies in 2010
(not necessarily for the same cause).
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Figure 4.6 shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the level of net worth, de-
pending on health status: households experiencing a severe health shock are somewhat
poorer, compared to households who experienced a minor health shock or no health
shock. The slopes of the lines are very similar, which implies that there is no diﬀeren-
tial eﬀect of health on mean net worth. When we look at homeownership we do not
observe a clear eﬀect of health on the change in homeownership status. Health prob-
lems might deter individuals from moving, due to the high physical and psychological
burden of moving. Older people might already have moved in anticipation of getting
health problems in the near future. Since elderly persons do not move house after the
onset of a health event, it is relevant to analyze the eﬀect of health on ﬁnancial assets.
For net ﬁnancial wealth we also observe the initial diﬀerences in net ﬁnancial wealth
among diﬀerent health groups. Notice that the level of net ﬁnancial wealth eventually
diverges in 2009 for all groups (except for the group of whom one of the members dies in
2010). This implies that those groups who experience a severe health shock accumulate
relatively more ﬁnancial wealth than those who stay in good health.
These results do not match the US evidence, as provided by Poterba et al. (2011),
that households with health problems accumulate less wealth than healthy households.
Possible explanations are the comprehensive health insurance system in the Nether-
lands and the relatively high replacement rates in the Netherlands, which guarantee
a relatively constant standard of living; see, for example, García-Gómez et al. (2013).
Another possibility is a decline in the marginal utility of consumption after a health
shock, which results in more savings.
4.6.1 Household wealth before nursing home entry
Long-term care expenditures account for approximately 25.5 percent of health expen-
ditures and 2.9 percent of GDP in 2012. These expenditures are almost completely
covered by the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ), the public long-term care
insurance program (CBS, 2012). The projected growth of LTC expenditures puts fur-
ther pressure on the ﬁscal budget. As a result, there is growing interest in requiring
persons to use their own resources to pay for LTC. LTC services are costly, however,
and may require substantial savings.
The most expensive form of LTC is nursing home use. The risk of entering a nursing
home is very high: about one-third of the persons over age 65 spent at least one night
in a nursing home between 2004 and 2011. The incidence of nursing home entry is
particularly high at advanced old age; only one-third of persons aged 85 years and older
in 2004 did not stay in a nursing home; see Table 4.11.
The time that a person spends in a nursing home is distributed very unevenly, which
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makes total expenditures on LTC uncertain. LTC institutions receive a ﬁxed payment
for each patient, depending on the severity of the patient’s needs. The payment ranges
from € 65 a day for patients with lighter LTC needs, to € 270 a day for patients who are
nearing the end of life and have serious LTC needs. A year’s stay in a nursing home cost,
on average, € 58,500 in 2012 (CIZ & NZA 2012). This implies that individuals need
almost € 300,000 in ﬁnancial resources to ﬁnance a ﬁve-year stay in a nursing home.
In particular, with regard to individuals diagnosed with degenerative diseases such as
dementia, it is not unlikely that they will spend an enduring period in a nursing home;
see e.g. Hurd et al. (2013). In the Netherlands, roughly 30 percent of the nursing home
population has dementia or related disorders (CIZ, 2012).
Only a small fraction of the elderly would be able to ﬁnance nursing home expendi-
tures out-of-pocket using their income and net worth. Table 4.12 reports the distribution
of total resources of single elderly in the year before they permanently enter a nursing
home. These resources are in theory available to fund LTC costs. For the vast majority,
pension income is well under the amount required to cover these costs. A somewhat
larger group would be able to self-support a nursing home stay if they would draw down
their private savings. Table 4.13 shows the maximum number of years of nursing home
use that these persons would be able to ﬁnance from their private resources; we assume
that the costs of LTC move in line with asset prices and that there are no transaction
costs involved with selling the house. Only 40 percent of nursing home residents would
be able to pay out-of-pocket a nursing home stay of more than one year; only 20 percent
of the residents would be able to ﬁnance a nursing home stay of more than ﬁve years.
This group consists primarily of homeowners.
This calculation does not even take into account the possible use of home care services
prior to entering a nursing home. Although the cost of receiving nursing care or personal
care at home is somewhat less expensive, the likelihood of receiving home care is very
high; see Table 4.11.
4.7 Savings during the last years of life
We ﬁnd that the elderly, on average, keep large amounts of assets even at a very old
age and do not decumulate assets. In the absence of a bequest motive, they might hold
these assets because of uncertainty about the time of death or uncertain expenses in
the last years of life. In that case, we should ﬁnd that households start drawing down
their money in the last phase of life and this holds in particular for individuals in poor
health who have a lower life expectancy.
Table 4.14 reports wealth levels in the ﬁrst wave (2005) and ﬁnal wave (2010) for single
households with no pre-existing health problems. The ﬁrst set of columns of the table
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shows the trajectory of wealth holdings for individuals who do not die between 2005
and 2011. The second set of columns shows the trajectory of wealth for individuals
who die between 2005 and 2011. These columns indicate that assets decline in the
reporting period. However, there is no diﬀerence in the decline between both groups.
The table also shows the same analysis for single households with major pre-existing
health problems before 2005. The table indicates that there is diﬀerential mortality
between both groups. There is no evidence of dissaving in the years before death.
It seems that individuals in poor health save during the last years of life. These results
are not in line with evidence from US studies, which ﬁnd a large decline in assets in
late-life (e.g. French et al., 2006). Poterba et al. (2014) show that the decline in assets
at the end of life is strongly associated with deteriorating health and not caused by an
underestimation of life expectancy or lower pension beneﬁts. This suggests that medical
expenditure risk is not important in the Netherlands and that a bequest motive might
be relevant.
4.8 Conclusion
The elderly, on average, keep large amounts of assets even at a very old age, and they
leave a considerable bequest. We do not ﬁnd evidence of decumulation of wealth after
retirement for singles, despite the fact that retirees face limited income uncertainty and
limited uncertainty about out-of-pocket payments for medical expenses. We ﬁnd some
suggestive evidence of dissaving for high-income widowed persons.
At the median, we observe that the elderly have accumulated a decent buﬀer of
ﬁnancial wealth, high enough to cover small unexpected expenses but too small to
signiﬁcantly increase consumption in retirement. These households depend mainly on
social security and pension income to support retirement consumption.
Our results also show that not many homeowners sell oﬀ their house to ﬁnance their
retirement, and it is very likely that homeownership among the elderly will increase in
the future because of cohort eﬀects. There is some suggestive evidence that younger
elderly persons extract housing equity by means of interest-only mortgages.
There are large initial diﬀerences in the level of wealth holdings among diﬀerent health
groups and between couples and singles. The latter is most likely related to the socioeco-
nomic status of households, since we do not ﬁnd major diﬀerences in the decumulation
pattern for diﬀerent health groups. The onset of a newly diagnosed severe health condi-
tion even results in increased savings in ﬁnancial assets. A possible explanation for this
ﬁnding is that deteriorating health constrains non-health-care consumption. Persons in
bad health are no longer able to travel or to enjoy leisure activities and they consume
less food. It is questionable whether people take this declining consumption path into
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account when planning for retirement. This results in higher savings in old-age.
The bereavement of a spouse results in a signiﬁcant reduction of net worth compared
to surviving couples, in both the period before and after the ﬁnancial crisis. We also
observe a slight reduction in homeownership after the death of a spouse (in the years
after the ﬁnancial crisis) and a signiﬁcant reduction in the ownership rate and portfolio
share of risky assets (in the years before the ﬁnancial crisis). The reduction in homeown-
ership indicates that people downsize their housing wealth when they become widowed.
The collected assets from the sale of the house might partly be transferred to the heirs,
resulting in a drop in net worth. Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd strong evidence of diﬀerential
mortality, which also explains the diﬀerences in household portfolios between widowed
persons and married couples.
It can be concluded that a simple life-cycle model is soundly rejected. To explain
the saving behavior of the elderly, it is important to consider extended versions of this
basic model that explicitly take into account not only a bequest motive, but also the
role of lifetime uncertainty, housing, family structures and (wealth and estate) tax-rules.
In addition, it is important to allow for health-dependent utility. It is unclear whether
the observed large bequests are intended or accidental. Data on the economic status
of the children and the exact division of the estate among the heirs might allow us to
approach this important research question in future research.
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Table 4.2: Household wealth by marital status between 2005 and 2010 for households
aged 65-69 in 2005 (balanced panel)




Mean 276.1 289.1 293.6 270.9 261.1 253.3 6.3 -13.7
Median 171.0 184.3 188.4 182.6 179.8 163.5 10.2 -13.2
Mean share net worth∗ 29.1 29.9 30.5 29.8 30.5 30.6
Net Financial Wealth
Mean 121.8 127.5 127.3 110.2 115.0 112.5 4.5 -11.6
Median 31.1 30.8 32.8 32.2 34.5 32.3 5.5 -1.5
Mean share ﬁn wealth 11.4 11.6 11.8 11.5 12.4 12.7
Housing equity
Mean 154.3 161.6 166.3 160.6 146.1 140.7 7.8 -15.4
Homeownership rate 57.1 57.6 57.4 57.1 56.8 56.6 0.5 -1.4
Mean share housing eq. 17.7 18.3 18.7 18.3 18.1 17.9
Widowed (N=320)
Net Worth
Mean 199.4 207.2 212.3 192.6 178.7 177.1 6.5 -16.6
Median 46.5 44.3 40.1 35.1 31.9 28.6 -13.8 -28.7
Mean share net worth 28.1 28.0 28.2 27.5 27.0 23.5
Net Financial Wealth
Mean 82.4 83.1 87.1 76.3 72.0 74.8 5.7 -14.1
Median 17.7 17.3 18.7 17.6 16.0 16.0 5.6 -14.4
Mean share ﬁn wealth 11.6 10.9 11.0 10.2 10.4 6.3
Housing equity
Mean 117.0 124.1 125.2 116.3 106.7 102.3 7.0 -18.3
Homeownership rate 42.2 41.9 41.9 41.3 41.6 41.3 -0.7 -1.4
Mean share housing eq. 16.5 17.1 17.2 17.3 16.6 17.2
Notes: All amounts are expressed in thousands of euros and in 2010 prices using the CPI de-
ﬂator. In this table we consider a balanced panel: i.e. the same households are followed over
time for which the marital status does not change between 2005 and 2010.
∗Mean share of total wealth (%): total wealth is equal to the sum of net worth, social security
wealth and pension wealth.
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Figure 4.1: Wealth proﬁles (Mean) by Cohort and Age of the Key person of Household
(Balanced Panel)
(a) Net Worth (mean)






























(b) Net Financial Wealth (mean)






























(c) Housing equity (mean)
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Figure 4.2: Wealth proﬁles (Median) by Cohort and Age of the Key person of Household
(Balanced Panel)
(a) Net Worth (median)


























(b) Net Financial Wealth (median)


























(c) Housing equity (ownership rate)
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Table 4.3: Household portfolios by marital status and age in 2005
Married couple Widowed person




N Mean Own Share
(%)
Age 65 to 69
Checking/savings accounts 1331 51.4 96.2 47.0 369 35.4 89.7 56.7
Risky assets 50.2 29.5 5.5 21.4 21.4 5.0
House 179.7 55.6 44.2 132.5 41.2 34.8
Other assets 24.1 14.2 3.3 27.5 11.9 3.5
Mortgage 31.1 35.7 8.5 17.1 24.9 4.8
Other debts 6.9 7.5 1.8 6.1 7.9 1.1
Loan-to-value ratio‡ 18.3 13.9
Age 70 to 74
Checking/savings accounts 1591 53.2 97.5 54.0 569 30.3 89.6 62.1
Risky assets 39.4 26.6 5.5 18.4 18.3 4.8
House 152.7 48.6 37.6 109.4 35.1 31.2
Other assets 19.4 14.2 2.9 8.5 7.9 1.9
Mortgage 18.4 26.5 4.9 11.9 19.5 3.4
Other debts 3.6 6.1 1.3 4.3 4.7 0.7
Loan-to-value ratio 12.6 10.6
Age 75 to 79
Checking/savings accounts 1226 54.8 97.9 57.9 777 35.4 91.8 68.9
Risky assets 37.5 26.3 7.1 22.2 16.9 5.1
House 140.5 42.9 32.1 81.0 27.0 22.3
Other assets 18.4 13.4 2.8 14.5 10.0 3.7
Mortgage 12.5 18.5 3.5 6.9 10.8 2.1
Other debts 3.4 4.3 0.4 4.0 4.4 1.0
Loan-to-value ratio 9.7 8.7
Age 80 to 84
Checking/savings accounts 687 65.3 97.8 63.0 734 46.5 94.1 72.2
Risky assets 50.9 25.0 7.1 33.9 16.9 6.2
House 129.4 38.7 27.2 78.2 24.7 18.9
Other assets 15.3 14.1 2.7 18.2 10.6 2.7
Mortgage 9.5 13.4 2.4 3.5 6.8 1.3
Other debts 3.4 4.7 0.5 4.3 4.1 0.8
Loan-to-value ratio 8.3 5.8
Age 85+
Checking/savings accounts 212 79.7 98.6 68.3 600 49.1 94.0 77.3
Risky assets 50.5 25.5 9.0 40.5 13.7 6.0
House 96.9 30.2 19.2 57.6 18.2 13.1
Other assets 18.7 15.6 3.5 15.6 11.0 3.6
Mortgage 4.8 7.1 1.4 0.8 2.5 0.2
Other debts 1.8 6.1 0.3 5.6 4.3 0.7
Loan-to-value ratio 6.3 1.3
Notes: All amounts are expressed in thousands of euros and in 2010 prices using the CPI de-
ﬂator. ∗The column ‘Own (%)’ reports the ownership rate of the asset (debt) item.
† The column ‘share (%)’ reports the average portfolio share of each asset (debt) item in ‘total
assets’. Total assets is the sum of checking and savings accounts, risky assets, the value of the
primary residence (house) and other assets.
‡ The rows headed ‘loan-to-value’ report the average of the loan-to-value ratio.
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Table 4.4: Household portfolios by net worth quartiles and age in 2005 - Married couples
Asset (debt) item Ownership rate (%) Portfolio share (%))
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Age 65 to 69
Checking/savings accounts 88.6 99.1 97.6 99.7 96.1 67.8 13.9 15.6
Risky assets 3.6 21.3 27.0 66.3 1.3 5.6 2.4 12.1
House 2.4 28.2 95.5 96.4 2.4 25.3 81.0 63.4
Other assets 0.9 3.0 10.8 42.2 0.1 1.3 2.7 8.9
Mortgage 2.7 25.8 66.7 47.6 3.1 11.1 12.8 6.2
Other debts 1.5 4.8 7.8 16.0 4.7 0.9 0.9 1.1
Age 70 to 74
Checking/savings accounts 92.0 99.7 98.7 99.7 97.5 84.2 19.7 17.9
Risky assets 4.3 17.3 25.1 59.7 1.5 4.9 4.2 10.9
House 1.0 10.8 86.9 95.7 0.9 9.8 72.7 64.2
Other assets 0.5 4.3 12.8 39.3 0.0 1.1 3.4 7.0
Mortgage 1.0 10.3 56.0 38.8 1.2 4.4 8.8 5.1
Other debts 0.8 1.3 6.3 16.1 3.4 0.3 0.6 0.9
Age 75 to 79
Checking/savings accounts 93.8 99.3 98.7 99.7 97.7 89.0 29.1 18.3
Risky assets 3.9 17.0 27.4 56.9 1.9 7.1 6.5 12.6
House 0.3 3.3 73.6 94.4 0.3 2.9 61.6 61.8
Other assets 0.0 2.3 12.4 38.9 0.0 1.0 2.8 7.3
Mortgage 0.3 2.6 42.0 29.1 0.4 1.5 9.0 2.8
Other debts 0.3 1.6 3.3 12.1 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.8
Age 80 to 84
Checking/savings accounts 94.8 99.4 97.7 99.4 99.6 95.2 38.4 20.3
Risky assets 1.7 12.8 27.3 58.5 0.3 4.2 8.0 15.7
House 0.0 0.0 62.2 93.0 0.0 0.0 49.9 57.8
Other assets 0.6 2.3 14.0 39.8 0.1 0.6 3.7 6.2
Mortgage 0.0 0.0 32.0 21.6 0.0 0.0 7.0 2.3
Other debts 0.0 0.6 4.7 13.5 0.0 0.1 0.8 1.0
Age 85+
Checking/savings accounts 94.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.4 93.4 55.3 26.8
Risky assets 0.0 7.5 34.0 60.4 0.0 4.5 10.0 21.1
House 0.0 0.0 39.6 81.1 0.0 0.0 30.3 45.2
Other assets 1.9 3.8 17.0 39.6 0.6 2.1 4.4 6.9
Mortgage 0.0 0.0 17.0 11.3 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.8
Other debts 0.0 1.9 3.8 18.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9
Notes: The left-hand panel of this table reports the ownership rates (%) of each asset (debt)
item; the right-hand panel of this table reports the average portfolio share of each asset (debt)
item in ’total assets’. Total assets is the sum of checking and savings accounts, risky assets,
the value of the primary residence (house) and other assets.
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Table 4.5: Household portfolios by net worth quartiles and age in 2005 - Widowed
persons
Asset (debt) items Ownership rate (%) Portfolio share (%)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Age 65 to 69
Checking/savings accounts 66.7 100.0 93.5 98.9 100.0 97.4 29.2 14.3
Risky assets 0.0 7.6 30.4 47.8 0.0 2.6 7.0 8.7
House 0.0 0.0 68.5 96.7 0.0 0.0 59.1 68.8
Other assets 0.0 0.0 14.1 33.7 0.0 0.0 4.7 8.2
Mortgage 0.0 0.0 51.1 48.9 0.0 0.0 12.0 5.5
Other debts 0.0 0.0 9.8 21.7 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.0
Age 70 to 74
Checking/savings accounts 62.9 100.0 96.8 98.6 100.0 97.7 42.8 14.7
Risky assets 0.0 6.3 21.8 47.2 0.0 2.3 7.5 8.5
House 0.0 0.0 52.4 95.1 0.0 0.0 46.9 72.3
Other assets 0.0 0.0 9.7 23.2 0.0 0.0 2.8 4.5
Mortgage 0.0 0.0 41.1 42.3 0.0 0.0 8.5 5.1
Other debts 0.0 0.0 5.6 14.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.7
Age 75 to 79
Checking/savings accounts 73.3 100.0 95.9 97.4 99.5 98.6 66.3 15.4
Risky assets 0.5 4.6 27.1 38.1 0.5 1.4 9.2 9.2
House 0.0 0.0 21.2 89.7 0.0 0.0 18.6 66.9
Other assets 0.0 0.0 12.9 28.9 0.0 0.0 6.0 8.5
Mortgage 0.0 0.0 15.3 29.9 0.0 0.0 4.1 4.3
Other debts 0.0 0.5 4.1 13.4 0.0 0.2 1.4 2.2
Age 80 to 84
Checking/savings accounts 79.3 100.0 100.0 97.3 99.4 97.0 69.6 21.5
Risky assets 0.0 6.6 22.5 42.6 0.0 3.0 9.5 12.7
House 0.5 0.0 17.4 85.2 0.6 0.0 15.5 59.7
Other assets 0.0 0.0 15.2 31.1 0.0 0.0 5.5 6.1
Mortgage 0.5 0.0 10.1 19.1 0.9 0.0 3.1 1.9
Other debts 0.5 0.0 7.2 10.4 0.5 0.0 2.0 1.3
Age 85+
Checking/savings accounts 78.0 100.0 100.0 98.0 99.8 99.3 83.0 25.9
Risky assets 0.7 3.4 10.8 42.7 0.2 0.7 5.9 17.9
House 0.0 0.0 1.1 72.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 49.1
Other assets 0.0 0.5 20.4 30.7 0.0 0.0 10.2 7.1
Mortgage 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
Other debts 0.0 0.5 3.2 14.7 0.0 0.2 0.4 2.3
Notes: The left-hand panel of this table reports the ownership rates (%) of each asset (debt)
item; the right-hand panel of this table reports the average portfolio share of each asset (debt)
item in ’total assets’. Total assets is the sum of checking and savings accounts, risky assets,
the value of the primary residence (house), and other assets.
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Table 4.6: Household portfolios between 2005 and 2010, age 65-69 in 2005, balanced
panel
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 ∆ ’05 - ’07 ∆ ’07 - ’10
Married (N=1074)
Ownership rate (%)
Checking/savings accounts 96.9 96.0 98.1 97.3 98.6 97.9 1.2 -0.2
Risky assets 31.5 29.7 27.8 25.6 25.2 23.7 -13.3 -14.7
House 57.9 58.2 57.8 57.7 57.5 57.5 -0.2 -0.5
Other assets 14.6 14.9 14.2 13.7 14.5 12.8 -2.8 -9.9
Mortgage 37.7 37.8 37.2 36.3 35.2 34.2 -1.3 -8.1
Other debts 7.7 7.2 7.7 7.2 7.2 7.0 0.0 -9.1
Loan-to-value ratio 19.1 19.0 18.0 18.6 19.5 20.0 -6.1 11.1
Mean portfolio share (%)∗
Checking/savings accounts 55.0 56.0 56.9 56.8 59.1 59.9 3.3 5.3
Risky assets 5.6 5.5 5.0 4.2 4.2 3.5 -12.0 -30.0
House 36.1 35.4 35.1 35.7 33.8 34.0 -2.8 -3.1
Other assets 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.4 2.9 2.7 -17.2 -6.9
Mortgage 4.9 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 -8.9 4.4
Other debts 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.6 1.1 -42.9 57.1
Widowed (N=320)
Ownership rate (%)
Checking/savings accounts 89.1 91.6 93.1 90.6 94.1 93.1 4.3 0.0
Risky assets 22.2 22.5 19.4 18.4 17.2 15.6 -14.4 -19.6
House 42.5 42.2 42.2 41.6 41.6 41.3 -0.7 -2.1
Other assets 11.9 10.6 10.0 9.4 8.1 8.1 -19.0 -19.0
Mortgage 25.6 24.1 24.4 22.8 21.9 20.9 -4.9 -14.3
Other debts 7.8 8.4 5.6 5.0 7.2 5.3 -39.3 -5.4
Loan-to-value ratio 13.8 13.0 12.4 12.4 13.3 13.2 -11.3 6.5
Mean portfolio share (%)
Checking/savings accounts 45.0 44.1 46.0 46.6 47.8 48.3 2.2 5.0
Risky assets 5.9 5.9 5.2 3.9 3.9 3.7 -13.5 -28.8
House 46.0 46.7 45.6 46.2 44.4 44.3 -0.9 -2.9
Other assets 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.8 3.6 0.0 12.5
Mortgage 9.2 9.6 10.3 9.2 9.0 9.4 10.7 -8.7
Other debts 2.0 2.4 10.5 18.4 21.8 7.0 81.0 -33.3
Notes: In this table we consider a balanced panel: i.e. the same households are followed over
time for which the marital status does not change between 2005 and 2010.
∗ ‘Mean portfolio share (%)’ reports the average portfolio share of each asset (debt) item in
‘total assets’. Total assets is the sum of checking and savings accounts, risky assets, the value
of the primary residence (house) and other assets.
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Figure 4.3: Asset ownership by Cohort and Age of the Key person of Household (Bal-
anced Panel)
(a) Risky assets (ownership rate)






































(b) Mortgage (ownership rate)






































(c) Loan-to-value ratio (mean)
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Table 4.7: Household wealth in 2005 by age, marital status and by tertiles of the
permanent income distribution
Married Widowed
Mean Median Mean Median
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
Net Worth
65 to 69 96.2 172.9 533.7 19.6 117.8 372.7 137.2 115.3 328.2 7.8 20.3 244.6
70 to 74 116.6 158.4 453.6 24.1 53.5 326.7 86.8 75.9 289.5 12.9 15.6 211.0
75 to 79 146.5 145.4 414.4 39.4 44.5 307.5 76.5 77.5 272.7 16.2 21.1 152.2
80 to 85 122.7 139.5 481.9 39.4 40.1 357.0 83.4 80.8 343.4 14.2 17.6 182.0
85+ 134.9 125.4 460.3 25.5 46.0 291.0 48.4 70.7 350.3 15.1 21.2 109.3
Net Financial Wealth
65 to 69 32.2 52.8 271.9 10.2 28.4 92.4 77.5 40.9 116.1 6.0 12.9 39.3
70 to 74 46.4 55.7 223.6 15.8 27.9 79.5 30.7 24.7 103.7 7.7 13.7 34.7
75 to 79 68.5 65.4 188.2 21.2 29.4 80.0 41.6 34.4 128.3 12.3 17.4 35.5
80 to 85 59.9 60.8 263.7 26.4 32.9 120.5 49.5 38.0 195.6 12.4 16.7 45.7
85+ 72.5 72.7 298.3 25.0 44.6 135.3 35.4 30.7 232.7 14.5 20.1 50.6
Housing Equity
65 to 69 64.0 120.2 261.8 0.0 51.8 255.6 59.8 74.4 212.2 0.0 0.0 185.8
70 to 74 70.2 102.7 230.1 0.0 0.0 222.7 56.1 51.2 185.8 0.0 0.0 162.3
75 to 79 78.1 79.9 226.2 0.0 0.0 206.7 34.9 43.0 144.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
80 to 85 62.7 78.7 218.2 0.0 0.0 211.1 33.8 42.8 147.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
85+ 62.4 52.7 162.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 40.0 117.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: All amounts are expressed in thousands of euros and in 2010 prices using the CPI de-
ﬂator. ∗ Permanent income is deﬁned as the average of the sum of pension and social security
income between 2005 and 2010. We formulate permanent income quantiles for both widows
and married couples among age groups.
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Figure 4.4: Net Worth Proﬁle (median) by Cohort and Permanent Income Tertile for
Singles, Balanced Panel




















Figure 4.5: Net Financial Assets Proﬁle (median) by Cohort and Homeownership status
for Singles, Balanced Panel























Table 4.8: Marital status transition and wealth changes by year-of-birth cohort, in thousands of euros and in 2010 prices
Mean Median
t t+ 2 %∆ t t+ 2 %∆ t t+ 2 % ∆ t t+ 2 % ∆
2005 2007 2007 2009 2005 2007 % ∆ 2007 2009 % ∆
Net Worth
Aged 65-74 in 2005
Widowed to widowed 175.5 184.2 5.0 184.5 158.0 -14.4 27.9 27.8 -0.4 31.5 29.2 -7.3
Married to widowed 191.9 192.0 0.0 245.2 196.9 -19.7 59.7 60.2 0.8 180.1 130.1 -27.8
Married to married 260.1 276.6 6.3 280.2 252.3 -10.0 159.2 171.1 7.5 174.4 151.4 -13.2
Aged 75+ in 2005
Widowed to widowed 154.2 154.6 0.3 157.3 141.0 -10.4 24.9 24.7 -0.8 24.7 24.5 -0.8
Married to widowed 222.9 201.0 -9.8 186.6 116.1 -37.8 47.4 74.2 56.5 71.5 36.5 -49.0
Married to married 253.4 266.7 5.3 274.9 250.0 -9.1 125.6 132.8 5.7 146.3 125.3 -14.4
All
Widowed to widowed 162.7 166.3 2.3 168.3 147.9 -12.1 24.9 24.7 -0.8 24.7 24.5 -0.8
Married to widowed 208.6 196.9 -5.6 220.8 163.3 -26.1 54.6 60.4 10.6 121.7 76.0 -37.6
Married to married 257.8 273.1 5.9 278.4 251.5 -9.7 147.6 157.6 6.8 164.5 144.2 -12.3
Net Financial assets
Aged 65-74 in 2005
Widowed to widowed 67.4 69.1 2.5 69.4 59.8 -13.8 17.6 17.9 1.7 18.0 18.1 0.6
Married to widowed 84.4 77.6 -8.0 101.3 89.7 -11.5 28.2 24.6 -12.8 32.2 28.2 -12.4
Married to married 115.8 122.6 5.9 125.0 114.1 -8.7 32.4 33.9 4.6 34.6 35.4 2.3
Aged 75+ in 2005
Widowed to widowed 79.3 76.5 -3.6 77.3 70.4 -9.0 21.8 22.3 2.3 22.8 22.0 -3.5
Married to widowed 130.5 100.5 -23.0 118.6 72.4 -39.0 33.4 29.5 -11.7 42.4 24.5 -42.2
Married to married 120.1 126.9 5.7 130.0 125.5 -3.5 42.6 45.7 7.3 45.8 45.4 -0.9
All
Widowed to widowed 74.6 73.6 -1.4 74.1 66.1 -10.8 20.4 20.8 2.0 21.1 20.7 -1.9
Married to widowed 109.3 89.9 -17.7 108.5 82.5 -24.0 30.0 27.1 -9.7 39.4 25.4 -35.5
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No health problems 265.6 251.7 237.5 303.4 332.4 224.4 166.9 152.7 179.3 146.2
Minor diseases 262.6 272.7 255.6 222.8 192.9 133 130.9 119.2 164.5 143.5
Major diseases 276.2 190.4 210.4 231.6 225.8 98.4 118.2 152.2 141.4 233.4
Net ﬁnancial assets
No health problems 110.2 116.8 100.2 168.3 205.2 89.3 61.5 67.8 100.4 89.5
Minor diseases 113.1 127.6 118.8 118 113.2 55.5 42 57.7 88.7 94.5
Major diseases 141 71.2 102.7 107.3 145.4 45.3 37 91.9 83.9 155.3
Housing equity
No health problems 155.4 134.9 137.3 135 127.2 135.2 105.4 84.8 79 56.6
Minor diseases 149.5 145.2 136.8 104.8 79.6 77.5 88.9 61.6 75.8 49
Major diseases 135.2 119.1 107.7 124.3 80.5 53.1 81.2 60.3 57.5 78.1
Median balance/ homeownership %
Net worth
No health problems 175.9 146.3 143.2 101.7 122.8 133 24.9 25 24.3 24.9
Minor diseases 158.1 161.6 112.2 69.4 64.6 13.7 24.9 21.8 24.9 23
Major diseases 110 71.2 54.1 89.4 46 14.5 20.7 22.1 17.2 22.4
Net ﬁnancial assets
No health problems 31.3 34.3 38.2 41.4 46 22.5 17.2 22.5 21.2 24.6
Minor diseases 29.4 34.9 38.8 43.7 46 7.1 17.2 17.2 24 21.5
Major diseases 28.6 28.9 33.4 39.7 46 9.8 11.9 18.3 12.2 17.3
Homeownership
No health problems 60.2 48.7 46.0 39.7 37.0 48.26 36.47 30.12 25.51 17.18
Minor diseases 54.0 51.6 44.0 36.5 30.3 27.78 34.27 23.65 25.45 18.27
Major diseases 49.3 44.6 38.2 40.3 24.6 18.42 31.40 22.52 20.18 22.08
Notes: All amounts are expressed in thousands of euros and in 2010 prices using the CPI
deﬂator. We distinguish between three categories of diseases: major diseases (cancer or car-
diovascular diseases), minor diseases (all other diseases) and the remaining “healthy” group
with no hospitalization. For married couples we deﬁne the household to have a ‘minor disease’
if neither the key person nor the partner has a ‘major disease’ but at least of them is admitted
to the hospital during the last three waves.
132 Chapter 4. Saving behavior and portfolio choice after retirement
Figure 4.6: Health shock and wealth holdings
(a) Net worth: mean and median



































(b) Net ﬁnancial wealth: mean and median




























(c) Primary residence: ownership rate and fraction
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Table 4.11: Incidence of at least one day of LTC between 2004 and 2011 for the key-
person of the household














Nursing home care 12.7 19.0 32.7 49.2 67.3 74.2 83.3 34.5
Home care (personal & nursing) 26.8 38.8 54.4 63.8 60.2 48.2 29.6 47.6
Total (No.) 1,816 2,974 2,570 2,088 1,010 461 108 10,817
Notes: Information about long-term care utilization is provided by the CAK 2004-2011.
Table 4.12: Total resources of single elderly in the year before they permanently enter
a nursing home (2005-2009) (%)
Net income (in e1000s)
Net worth (in e1000s) <15 15-25 25+ Total (No.)
< 25 72.3 61.0 13.6 501
Net worth 26-50 6.6 10.1 9.5 79
Net worth 51-100 5.8 6.7 7.5 58
Net worth 101-200 7.3 5.4 10.9 61
Net worth 201-300 4.4 7.3 14.3 67
Net worth 300+ 3.6 9.5 44.2 119
Total (No.) 274 464 147 885
Table 4.13: Years of nursing home stay covered by private resources (%)
< 1
year
1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 5 > 5
year
Total
Renters 61.7 7.1 3.7 1.0 1.2 4.4 79.2
Homeowners 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.9 16.7 20.8
Total 62.5 7.1 4.3 1.8 3.2 21.1 100.0
The table shows the maximum number of years of nursing home use that single elderly would
be able to ﬁnance from private resources. The resources are measured in the year before en-
tering a nursing home and include both income and net worth.
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Mean 187.5 -2.85 -6.1 185.5 -1.62 -5.89
Median 24.85 -0.02 -0.2 24.85 0.02 -0.08
Obs 997 437
Minor health problems
Mean 158.3 -2.13 -3.17 140.9 1.3 -5.08
Median 24.85 -0.02 -0.2 22.7 0 0
Obs 587 364
Major health problems
Mean 159.7 -4.27 -4.68 149.1 -3.58 -4.7
Median 24.85 0 -0.2 20.9 0.04 0.01
Obs 526 415
Notes: All amounts are expressed in thousands of euros and in 2010 prices using the CPI
deﬂator. We distinguish between three categories of diseases: major diseases (cancer or car-
diovascular diseases), minor diseases (all other diseases) and the remaining “healthy” group
with no hospitalization. For married couples we deﬁne the household to have a ‘minor disease’
if neither the key person nor the partner has a ‘major disease’ but at least of them is admitted
to the hospital during the last three waves.
Chapter 5
Health status over the life cycle
5.1 Introduction
Health is a very important asset: if you are healthy you are able to work or produce
goods at home; health also plays an important role in ﬁnancial planning and in con-
sumption and saving decisions. Most people probably have a good sense what the word
‘health’ means; it is, however, diﬃcult to capture health in a single measure. To measure
‘true’ health we preferably like to combine diﬀerent sources of information, or dimen-
sions of health, which could explain a person’s latent health status. Many studies in
this ﬁeld use self-reported health status (SRH) as a summary measure of health. The
SRH variable is typically based on a question in which people are asked to rate their
own health on a ﬁve-point ordinal scale ranging from ‘excellent health’ to ‘poor health’.
The SRH measure has proven to be a very useful measure of health but is sometimes
criticized because it involves some biases. For example Crossley and Kennedy (2002)
show that many persons tend to change their self-reported health status within the same
survey. Inconsistent reporting over time makes it diﬃcult to analyze the evolution of
health of a person over time as it reduces the persistence in health. Psychological factors,
such as a person’s mood might also inﬂuence the reported health status between waves.
In addition to reporting bias, two persons with the same underlying health problems
might report a diﬀerent SRH, due to a diﬀerence in health perception; e.g. Lindeboom
and van Doorslaer (2004). Diﬀerences in health perception among age groups result in
a biased life cycle health proﬁle. In addition to measurement error and heterogeneity in
health perception, SRH seems also sensitive to justiﬁcation bias as was ﬁrst mentioned
by Bound et al. (1999); people outside of the labor market tend to justify their labor
This chapter is co-authored with Rob Alessie and Marike Knoef. We are grateful to Richard
Blundell, Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, Adriaan Kalwij, Arie Kapteyn, Paul Rodríguez-Lesmes,
and participants at the IFS seminar for useful comments and suggestions.
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market status by reporting worse health in a survey.
Another disadvantage, at least from our perspective, is that SRH is only available
for a relatively small sample of the population. As administrative data from medical
registers become more widely available, there is a growing interest to use these data.
Important beneﬁts of large administrative data are the possibility to focus on very
speciﬁc groups in the population and the absence of survey attrition—which is often
related to a deterioration in health (Jones et al., 2006).
In this chapter, we estimate a health measurement model where we link survey data
on SRH to a rich set of objective health conditions from medical records. Relying on
objective health measures, instead of self-reported health conditions in survey data, has
several advantages. Objective health conditions do not suﬀer from justiﬁcation bias
and are less prone to reporting bias (Baker et al., 2004). Even though the questions to
measure health outcomes in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and other similar
surveys such as SHARE, PSID and ELSA are very speciﬁc there is ample evidence that
self-reported health outcomes in survey data are sensitive to reporting bias. Johnston
et al. (2009) show that the large majority of individuals in the UK who are diagnosed
with hypertension, which is a very common disease, do not report this in a health
questionnaire, though the question is very clear.1 Also measures like ADL, which are
often used as ‘objective’ measures in health measurement models, may be prone to
reporting bias. Shulman et al. (2006), for example, ﬁnd discrepancies between patients
subjective reporting of ADL and IADL and their objective ratings.
On the other hand, SRH might contain information on ‘true’ health not being cap-
tured by the objective health conditions. It is important to take these unobserved
individual diﬀerences in health into account, otherwise the persistence in health status
might be underestimated. We account for unobserved individual diﬀerences in health
as well as the persistence in unobserved health shocks by exploiting the panel dimen-
sion of our data. One problem is that inconsistent reporting over time in SRH (i.e.
measurement error) will reduce the estimated persistence in unobserved health. The
Longitudinal Internet Study in the Social Sciences (LISS) panel, administered by Cen-
tERdata in the Netherlands, allows us to examine the existence of possible inconsistent
reporting patterns. In addition to the standard SRH question, respondents are asked
to report the change in their health compared to last year. For some respondents we
notice inconsistent reporting over time by comparing the SRH measure and the self-
reported change in health (SRCH) measure. For instance, some respondents state that
their health did not deteriorate over the last year while they report being in worse
health compared to last year, or vice versa. These inconsistencies cannot be explained
1The wording of such a question in a survey is typically as follows: “Has a doctor ever told you that
you have high blood pressure or hypertension?”
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by phenomena such as learning about health status over time, a change in social percep-
tion about certain health conditions, or medical innovations, since this would probably
result in an up- or downward trend in SRH. We use both measures of SRH to con-
struct a ‘corrected’ measure of SRH which accounts for these inconsistencies. We show
that this corrected measure substantially increases the estimated persistence in health.
Several methods have been put forward to construct a health index using survey data
on SRH and on a vector of variables x, which measure objective health conditions. A
useful overview of the diﬀerent approaches proposed in the literature is provided by
Kapteyn and Meijer (2013), Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) and Cutler et al.
(1997). Our method is closely related to the method proposed by Jürges (2007) (who
uses a similar approach that were used in Bound (1991)) which boils down to estimating
an extended ordered probit model with SRH as dependent variable and objective health
measures as explanatory variables. We will extend the approach of Jürges in three
directions. First, we exploit the fact that we have panel data on SRH at our disposal.
This allows us to take into account unobserved heterogeneity and the persistence in
unobserved health shocks. Second, we are able to enrich the LISS survey data with a
large set of health indicators stemming from administrative sources. This set of health
indicators is very similar to the variables used in the latent health index developed by
Poterba et al. (2010) who use measures collected in the HRS. Their latent health index
is widely used in recent research, and well able to explain saving and retirement behavior
as shown by Kapteyn and Meijer (2013). Related studies to our work by Lange and
McKee (2012) and Heiss et al. (2014) also emphasize the importance of using multiple
‘objective’ measures of health to construct a single index and to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in health. Third, we account for inconsistent reporting in SRH over
time which, not taking into account, reduces the estimated persistence in health. A
good understanding of the persistence in health status is crucial for explaining saving
behavior and designing health and long-term care insurance, among other things; see
e.g. De Nardi et al. (2010).
The estimated health model allows us to predict health status for the population
at large. We account for the stochastic properties of unobserved diﬀerences in health.
The advantage of using administrative data is that we can focus on speciﬁc subgroups
that are usually small in surveys–such as the oldest-old—and that we overcome health
related attrition in survey data. We use the predicted objective health status for the
large administrative data to study the evolution of health as individuals age. This allows
us to answer important questions such as: What is the likelihood of a deterioration in
health at diﬀerent stages in life and how persistent is this health shock? Does the
evolution of health diﬀer by socio-economic status and by gender? Do education and
economic variables reduce the risk to get in poor health and how does this diﬀer by
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gender?
Many studies, such as Case and Deaton (2005) for the US show, that women report a
lower SRH than men and that the health status of men deteriorates at a faster rate than
women. A recent study by Ross et al. (2012) for the US reports that the relationship
between education and health is stronger for women than for men. One explanation
for this gender gap is a diﬀerence in health perception rather than a diﬀerence in the
prevalence of chronic disease between men and women. Another explanation could be
that women are more inclined to mention health problems then men in a survey. Our
health measurement model deals with both measurement problems. Contoyannis et al.
(2004) analyze the dynamics of health status among British men using SRH, they do
not ﬁnd clear diﬀerences in the health persistence by education and income.
Our main results are as follows: First, using both the corrected and uncorrected
measure of SRH shows signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the estimated persistence in health.
For both measures of SRH, objective medical conditions, such as having diabetes,
aﬀect SRH in a similar way; using the corrected SRH measure, however, substantially
increases the persistence in health. Second, we ﬁnd that people of low socio-economic
status are more likely to stay in poor health —independent from the measure we use.
The age at which health starts to decline at a greater rate arrives earlier for males and
persons with a lower level of education. Finally, we show that women on average are
in worse health than men due to a higher prevalence of chronic diseases which have
a relative detrimental eﬀect on health. Woman’s health seems to beneﬁt more from
having higher education than men. We also provide evidence that income and wealth
are protective of health over and above education.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 explains the health measurement
model. Section 5.3 extensively discusses the survey data set and administrative data.
Section 5.4 discusses the estimation results of the health measurement model and the
ability to explain the empirical patterns in for example SRH. Section 5.5 presents
descriptive statistics on the persistence in health and the evolution of health over the
life cycle. The ﬁnal section concludes.
5.2 A longitudinal health measurement model
5.2.1 Diﬀerent approaches to model health
Several methods have been put forward to construct a health index using survey data
on SRH and on a vector of variables x, which measure health conditions or diﬃculties
with activities of daily living.
Our method is closely related to the method proposed by Jürges (2007) who estimates
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an extended ordered probit model with SRH as dependent variable and objective health
measures x as explanatory variables. The extended ordered probit model assumes the
existence of a single latent health index y∗ which is equal to x′β. The value of the health
index is predicted as follows: yˆ∗ = x′βˆ. Notice that self-reported health is only used
in the construction of the index but not in the prediction of the index. Poterba et al.
(2010) use a somewhat diﬀerent approach: in their model latent health status not only
directly inﬂuences self-reported health but also all other health measurements. This
results in a factor analysis model from which they derive the ﬁrst principal component
as their health index. In the empirical analysis Jürges uses the ﬁrst wave of the SHARE
survey, which includes information of 22,000 individuals aged 50 and above from ten
European countries. Like many others the author stresses that the SRH measure is not
comparable across countries because of diﬀerences in reporting style. For this reason
he does not use the standard ordered probit model in his analysis but an extended
version of it which allows the threshold parameters to be diﬀerent across countries,
which is known as a ‘cut-point shift’. Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) point out
that heterogeneity in reporting behavior could not only lead to a cut-point shift but also
to a so-called ‘index shift’ in the β parameters of the latent health index. They propose
some likelihood ratio tests to check whether cut-point shifting and index shifting are
relevant phenomena. Jürges deliberately does not allow for a country speciﬁc β vector
so that he does not need to choose a ‘reference country’ in the cross-country comparison
of general health.2
Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) show that reporting not only varies across
countries. They present evidence for both ‘cut-point shifts’ and ‘index shifts’ across
age groups and gender: females and older persons are more likely to understate their
health status compared to males and younger individuals.3 A possible explanation is
that persons compare their health status relative to another person of the same age and
gender—in some surveys respondents are actually asked to report their health status
relative to another person of the same age. This implies that there is a ﬂattened out
age proﬁle in SRH. Since we are interested in modelling ‘true’ health status over the
life cycle it is important to take this diﬀerence in reporting style into consideration.
Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) ﬁnd no clear evidence that reporting diﬀers by
socio-economic status; which is also shown by McFadden et al. (2009).
2To be more precise, Jürges divides the estimated coeﬃcients βˆ by the diﬀerence between the highest
and lowest predicted health level to come up with a predicted health index which takes a value between
zero and one. These scaled coeﬃcients are referred to as ‘implicit disability weights’. Poterba et al.
(2010) ranks the predicted health status in percentile scores.
3The authors use cross-sectional data from Canada. It is well-known that in a cross-section study we
cannot distinguish age eﬀects from cohort eﬀects. In other words the age eﬀect could also be interpreted
as a generation eﬀect. In our study we use panel data to allow the threshold parameters to be cohort
speciﬁc and not age speciﬁc.
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5.2.2 Constructing a health index
In this section we introduce our longitudinal ordered response model in more formal
terms. This model should enable us to predict a single latent true health index for
individual i in period t by means of a set of health indicators xit from administrative
sources. The ordered response model assumes a linear relationship between a latent
health index y∗it and xit:
y∗it = x′itβ + εit, t = 1, . . . , T, (5.1)
where εit represent unobserved factors inﬂuencing SRH which are not captured by
the explanatory variables, such as lifestyle. We assume that this error term is standard
normal distributed conditional upon xit: εit|xit ∼ N(0, 1). Notice that the β parameter
vector may vary across demographic groups. However, we do not allow for index shifting
to keep the model parsimonious.
Since we are interested in the evolution of health over the life cycle, it is important
to model the persistence in the random eﬀect εit. Persistence in health can be the
result of (1) persistence in observed medical conditions, (2) serial correlation in the
error term—for example the experience of recurring health problems after the diagnosis
of a chronic diseases such as diabetes—or (3) because of unobserved heterogeneity, for
example if unhealthy lifestyle increases the probability of experiencing health problems
and this is not captured by the observed variables. In light of these considerations, we
assume that the error term εit can be decomposed into a random individual eﬀect ci
and an idiosyncratic error term uit which represent unobserved health shocks:
εit = ci + uit
ci ∼ NID(0, σ2c )
uit ∼ N(0, σ2u)
cov(ci, uit) = 0, t = 1, . . . , T.
Given these assumptions, σ2u = 1 − σ2c because var(εit) = 1. As we said above, the
unobserved health shocks uit are likely to be rather persistent. We therefore model uit
by means of an AR(1) process:
uit = γuit−1 + ζit
ζit ∼ NID(0, σ2ζ ).
Since var(εit) = 1, it holds that σ2ζ = σ2u · (1− γ2) = (1− σ2c ) · (1− γ2).
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As we said before SRH is measured on a 5-point scale. We assume the following
relationship between SRHit and the latent health index y∗it:
SRHit = L if λgL−1 < y∗it 6 λgL, L = 1, · · · , 5; g = 1, . . . , G, (5.2)
where λg = (λg1, λg2, λg3, λg4)′ are the threshold parameters for demographic group g
(λg0 = −∞ and λg5 = ∞). We allow the thresholds to diﬀer by demographic group g
to account for reporting heterogeneity in health (’cut-point’ shifting). Based on earlier
empirical work by Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004 we distinguish on the basis of
the variables ‘gender’ and ‘year-of-birth cohort’.4
We further assume that the thresholds as well as the β parameters are constant over
time. The β parameters may change over time if medical innovations reduces the impact
of certain medical conditions on SRH. In the empirical analysis we will formally test
this assumption. We also test for ‘index-shifting’, the AR(1) structure of the error term
and whether the autocorrelation of the error term and the random eﬀect diﬀers between
gender and year of birth cohort.
5.2.3 Estimation of the health index model
In this subsection we explain how we estimate the ‘structural’ parameter vector θ =
(β′, σ2c , γ)′. For the explanation of the estimation procedure it is relevant to know that
our survey data consists of four waves (see the data description in the next section).
Estimation is done in several steps. First, we estimate for each demographic group g
the multivariate ordered probit model where the dependent variables are SRH in waves
1 till 4.5 Obviously, the vectors of threshold parameters λgt , t = 1, . . . , 4 are also wave
speciﬁc. The multivariate ordered probit model assumes the following relationships













4We create ﬁve diﬀerent demographic groups (G = 5): males born before 1945, females born before
1945, males born between 1945 and 1965, females born between 1945 and 1965 and individuals born
after 1965.
5We use the Stata module CMP developed by Roodman (2011) for the estimation of the multivariate
ordered probit model.
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The ﬁrst step of the estimation procedure yields for each demographic group g an








t )′, t = 1, . . . , 4 and ρg = (ρg21, ρg31, ρg41, ρg32, ρg42, ρg43)′. In the second step
we apply a minimum distance estimation procedure in which we impose the restriction
that the parameters of the index functions and the threshold parameters are not wave
speciﬁc, i.e. ηg1 = . . . = ηg4 = ηg = (βg
′
,λg
′)′.6 This second step yields consistent
estimates of the vector: θ∗g = (βg′ ,λg′ ,ρg′)′. In the third step we follow Jürges (2007)
and apply a minimum distance step in which we impose the restriction that there is
no ‘index shifting’. In other words, we assume that βg = β and ρg = ρ. In the fourth
and ﬁnal step of the estimation procedure we impose the restriction that the error term
εit can be decomposed into a random individual eﬀect ci and an AR(1) distributed
idiosyncratic term uit. These restrictions imply the following relation between the
‘auxiliary’ parameter vector ρ and the ‘deep’ parameters σ2c and γ:
ρ21 = ρ32 = ρ43 = (1− γ)σ2c + γ (5.4a)
ρ31 = ρ42 = (1− γ2)σ2c + γ2 (5.4b)
ρ41 = (1− γ3)σ2c + γ3. (5.4c)
5.2.4 Prediction of the health index in a large administrative
data set
Next, we use the estimated parameters γ, σ2c and β to construct a health index for a
large random sample of the Dutch population. The health index is a linear prediction
of true health status
yˆ∗it = x′itβˆ + c˜i + u˜it. (5.5)
where x′itβˆ is the estimated conditional expectation of true health status given observed
health indicators. As mentioned before, SRH is only used in the construction of the
6See e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for more information about the minimum distance estimation
procedure.
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index but not in the prediction of the index. To correct for the stochastic properties
of the error term we add a simulated composite residual c˜i + u˜it to x′itβˆ, similar to
stochastic regression imputation to restore lost variability in the data (Little et al.,
2002).
For the simulation of the composite error term we ﬁrst assign each person an indi-
vidual random eﬀect c˜i by drawing it from a normal distribution with zero mean and
variance σˆ2c . Next, we impute a value of the idiosyncratic error term in the ﬁrst period
u˜i1 by performing a random draw from a normal distribution with zero mean and vari-
ance 1 − σˆ2c . Finally we draw ζ˜it, t = 2, · · · , T from a zero mean normal distribution
with variance (1− γˆ2)(1− σˆ2c ) to simulate u˜it for subsequent periods exploiting that uit
follows an AR(1) process.
5.3 Data
We distinguish between two samples. The ﬁrst sample contains survey data on SRH
from the Longitudinal Internet Study in the Social Sciences (LISS) between 2007 and
2010. We link this ‘LISS sample’ to administrative medical data. In addition, we use
a large sample of 200,000 individuals on 1 January 2006 from the Dutch municipal
population register for which we predict the health index. This sample is linked to
administrative medical data and administrative data which contain socio-economic and
demographic measures.
5.3.1 LISS
Survey data are taken from the LISS panel, gathered by CentERdata. This panel
is recruited through address-based sampling (no self-selection). Households without
a computer and/or internet connection receive an internet connection and computer
for free. Residents of institutions and nursing homes are excluded from the survey.
This roughly nationally representative household panel (Van der Laan, 2009) receives
online questionnaires each month, on diﬀerent topics. When respondents complete a
questionnaire they receive a monthly incentive. A variety of data is available from
studies conducted in the LISS panel.7 In this chapter we use the yearly survey on
health.
In the LISS panel we select all respondent of the yearly survey on health from 2007
to 2010. This data set consists of 24,486 individual-year observations. To link adminis-
trative data to the panel members, an opt-out consent method was used. In September
2011 all panel members received an email asking whether they objected against match-
7For more information, see http://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/.
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ing their survey responses with administrative resources (Das and Couper, 2014). A
small minority objects against linkage. Unfortunately, not all of our respondents were
still participating in September 2011. For these people we have no consent and because
of ethical considerations we could not link their survey answers to the administrative
data. Administrative records can be retrieved for 17,114 of the 24,486 observations
(70%). Nonetheless, in 2007 SRH among those who can be linked to administrative
data is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the SRH among those who cannot be linked.
This suggests that the loss of observations due to linking with administrative data does
not yield an endogenous sample selection.8 When we pool the data for all years (2007-
2010), SRH is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 5 percent level for those who can and cannot
be linked to administrative records.9 The diﬀerences, however, are not substantial as
can be seen in table 5.1. Since we are interested in the working age population, we select
all individuals of age 15 and older. The resulting sample consists of 16,720 observations.
To measure SRH, we use the following two questions in the LISS questionnaire.
How would you describe your health in general? With response options: Poor, Moder-
ate, Good, Very Good and Excellent.
Can you indicate whether your health is poorer or better, compared to last year? With
response options: considerably poorer, somewhat poorer, the same, somewhat better
and considerably better.
The ﬁrst question gives us what we call the ‘uncorrected SRH’. The latter question
is used to construct what we call the ‘corrected SRH’. By using the second question
we account for inconsistencies in individual response pattern of health status over time.
For the construction of the corrected measure of SRH status we use the following steps:
ﬁrst, we assume that in the ﬁrst period we observe a persons’ ‘true health status’. Next,
we assess whether the health status of the same persons improves, stays the same, or
degenerates in the subsequent period. We compare this change in the level of SRH with
the self-reported change in health status (SRCH), which can be either “poorer”, “the
same”, or “better”. If the change in the reported level of health does not correspond
with the reported change in health, we will modify this measure as follows: (1) if the
level improves or degenerates and no change is reported we assume that true health
status remains the same; we adjust the level of health in the subsequent period by
reducing/increasing the level of SRH by one unit.10
8The p-value corresponding to the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence is equal to 0.733
9The p-value corresponding to the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence is equal to 0.011
10A more detailed description of the adjustment is available upon request.
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Table 5.2 shows that the distribution of corrected and uncorrected SRH is almost the
same. Most people have a good health status (60%). Transitions, however, occur less
often when using corrected SRH. The diagonals in table 5.3 present the percentage
of people with unchanged health status. Most of the people in good health are also
in good health in the next period (79% and 88% for uncorrected and corrected SRH,
respectively). With the uncorrected measure of self-reported health about 40-55% of
the people in excellent of very good health end up in a worse health status in the next
period. For the corrected health measure this is about 18-22%.
5.3.2 Administrative sample
From the Municipal Population Register (in Dutch: Gemeentelijke Basisregistratie) we
draw a random sample of 200.000 Dutch residents for whom educational attainment
is available. This register contains demographic information on age, gender, marital
status, among others.
For the sample to be representative, we sample with a higher probability from the
older age groups. That is because for middle aged and older individuals, educational
attainment is not available in educational registers. For a large part of the older popula-
tion—approximately 10 percent of the population—educational attainment is registered
in the Labor Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a representative large scale rotating panel
for the noninstitutionalized population which started in 1996. Once a person partici-
pates in the LFS, educational attainment is registered. Furthermore, it is updated if a
higher educational level is registered in a subsequent survey. The LFS does not sample
institutionalized persons, such as individuals in nursing homes. However, educational
attainment is available for this group if observed in the LFS before a person perma-
nently moves to a nursing home. As a result, educational attainment is also available
for many persons who stay in a nursing home (although these people are not included
in the analysis).
We link administrative records on health (which we describe in the next paragraph)
and on income, wealth and education to the Municipal Population Register on the basis
of a unique personal identiﬁer. Wealth and income data are based on the national tax
register and on data from banks, which are available for the whole population.
For a small number of individuals we are unable to link the data records on income
(0.77% of the sample). We have checked whether this is related to the person’s age or
health status (i.e. proximity to death), but this seems not to be the case. We drop
these observations from our sample.
From the administrative records on income and wealth we create a variable measur-
ing total household wealth (net worth), a variable measuring net household income, a
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dummy for home ownership, variable measuring household size and dummy variables
for labor market status. Educational attainment refers to the highest level of completed
education, according to the Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (SOI). In the analysis
we distinguish between three groups: lower education (primary education or ﬁrst stage
secondary education), intermediate education (second stage secondary education) and
higher education (University Bachelor or University Master or higher).
Again, we select all individuals age 15 and older since we are interested in the working
age population. In addition we exclude persons from the year of entering a nursing home
to make the sample comparable with the LISS survey. Table 5.4 shows the sample
statistics.
5.3.3 Administrative medical data
In the analysis we use dichotomous indicators of having a medical condition in a speciﬁc
year. We derive these medical conditions from two sources: (1) the use of prescrip-
tion medication, and (2) the main diagnosis responsible for hospitalization. The data
about prescription medication is administered by the National Health Care Institute
(in Dutch: Zorginstituut Nederland). In the data set the dispensed drugs is classiﬁed
by the Anatomical therapeutic chemical (ATC) code. With this code we identify the
presence of speciﬁc medical conditions. We use the same mapping between a speciﬁc
substance and medical condition as Lamers and van Vliet (2004) and Chini et al. (2011).
For example, the ATC-code for insulin is ‘A10A’ which is used medically to treat (some
forms) of diabetes.11 The derived conditions are mainly chronical.
The main diagnosis responsible for hospitalization is based on the Tenth edition of
the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases, ICD10, derived from the hospital discharge
register (in Dutch: Landelijke Medische Registratie, LMR). The LMR contains data
about hospital admission (inpatient stays) and covers all general and university hospitals
and most specialized hospitals.12 We use the data from 2007-2010 and identify the
same group of medical conditions as the group of conditions derived from prescription
medication.13 In addition to the indicators of having a medical condition we create
three indicator variables of medical utilization: (1) hospital admission (2) prescription
drug use, and (3) receiving care at home. The data set on the use of long-term care is
provided by CAK (in Dutch: Centraal Administratie Kantoor).
Table 5.5 provides an overview of the prevalence of medical utilization and the preva-
lence of medical conditions in both the LISS survey and the administrative sample. We
11Table 5.12 in the appendix describes the exact mapping of diseases to chronical conditions.
12The LMR covers approximately 88% of all inpatient hospital stays (Van der Laan, 2013).
13The analysis is primarily based on the prescription medication data. We use the hospital data as
a sensitivity check. In that case we classify a person as having a disease if a condition is observed in
either one of both sources.
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distinguish between men and women in the LISS sample and the administrative sample.
The prevalence of medical utilization and medical conditions is about the same in the
two samples, as we would expect given that the LISS panel is a representative sam-
ple of the Dutch population. The LISS survey asks respondents, in addition to SRH,
whether they are currently taking medicine at least once a week for a speciﬁed condition
and whether the physician has told them that they suﬀer from a speciﬁc disease last
year. We use this information to create an indicator variable of having a ‘self-reported’
medical conditions.
Column three of table 5.5 reports the self-reported prevalence of medical condition
based on both questions. Comparing the self-reports to administrative records suggests
that respondents tend to underreport medical conditions such as mental problems while
for cardiac diseases and diabetes the prevalence is about the same. Bharadwaj et al.




Table 5.6 shows the estimation results of the health index model. As we explained in
section 5.2 these estimates are obtained by ﬁrst estimating for each demographic group
a multivariate ordered probit model in order to obtain estimates for some auxiliary
parameters and then perform sequentially some minimum distance estimation (MDE)
steps. In the ﬁrst MDE step we impose for each demographic group the restriction that
the β and threshold parameters are constant over time. The results of the goodness of
ﬁt tests indicate that it is allowed to impose these restrictions.
The second MDE step hinges on the hypothesis that all parameters of the health index
model except the threshold parameters do not vary across the demographic groups which
we consider in this study. The goodness-of-ﬁt test statistic indicates that this hypothesis
should be rejected at any reasonable signiﬁcance level. Nonetheless, we choose to impose
these restrictions because we can then construct a ‘unique’ health index which does not
depend on a chosen reference group. In the last MDE step we estimate the parameters
γ and σ2c from the autocorrelation coeﬃcients (cf. the system of equations 5.4). The
goodness of ﬁt test indicates that the stochastic part of the health index model can be
eﬀectively modeled by means of a random individual eﬀect and an AR(1) distributed
idiosyncratic error term.
We ﬁrst consider the model using only information on chronic diseases and do not
consider inpatient treatment for the same chronical condition. In the ﬁrst column of
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table 5.6 the ‘uncorrected’ SRH measure is the dependent variable. The estimated
coeﬃcients, of the impact of a disease on SRH, are displayed in order. All coeﬃcients
have the expected negative sign and are highly signiﬁcant except for tuberculosis, which
has the wrong sign but is insigniﬁcant, and glaucoma, which is insigniﬁcant but has the
correct sign. It is informative to compare our results with other studies to interpret the
magnitude of the eﬀect of speciﬁc chronic illnesses on subjective health. In line with
earlier clinical studies (see e.g. Sprangers et al., 2000 and Gilliam, 2003) we ﬁnd that
neurologic conditions, such as epilepsy and Parkinson’s disease, have a sizeable negative
association with perceived health. For diabetes, we ﬁnd a relative large negative eﬀect in
comparison with other studies, and for rheumatic conditions a relative small association.
For the other conditions we ﬁnd a similar ranking of the coeﬃcients.
The lower part of table 5.6 reports the estimated threshold parameters. The estimates
of the threshold parameters suggest that reporting behavior diﬀers signiﬁcantly across
the ﬁve demographic groups which we distinguish in this study (cut-point shifts). If we
only compare males and females born before 1945 with the same health index y∗it it turns
out that males are more positive about their health status than females: for instance,
elderly females are more likely to report ‘moderate’ or ‘poor’ health than elderly males.
There does not seem to exist large gender-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the reporting behavior
of the ‘middle’ generation (born between 1945 and 1965). The youngest generation
(born after 1965) has a higher tendency to report that their health is ‘very good’ or
‘excellent’ than other generations. It should be stressed again that all the ﬁndings on
reporting behavior hinges on the assumption that the β-parameters of the health index
(cf. equation 5.1) do not diﬀer across demographic groups.
The estimates of the parameters σ2c and γ imply that correlation between y∗it and y∗it−1
is equal to (1− γ) ·σ2c + γ = 0.70. This ﬁrst autocorrelation coeﬃcient is not that large:
if we use these estimates to impute values of the health index in the administrative
data set (cf. equation 5.5) we ﬁnd that health evolves over the life cycle in a rather
erratic way (i.e. big upward and downward shocks in the value of the health index).
That is the reason that we also constructed a ‘corrected health’ measure to account for
reporting error. Column two of table 5.6 reports the estimates of health index model
with the corrected health measure as the dependent variable. It turns out that in this
case the estimates of σ2c and γ are completely diﬀerent: σˆ2c = 0.161 and γˆ = 0.856.
We obtain a larger estimate for the ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the health
index y∗it: 0.88 versus 0.70. For both measures of SRH, objective medical conditions,
such as having diabetes, aﬀect SRH in a similar way. Overall, the estimates of the
β and threshold coeﬃcients become slightly smaller in absolute value if we take the
corrected SRH measure as dependent variable in the health index model instead of the
uncorrected one.
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In the previous estimations we did not account for inpatient treatment for the sam e
chronical condition, which might inﬂuence the results. Inpatient treatment can either
be interpreted as a health shock (ﬁrst occurrence of the disease) or a treatment to cure
someone’s health. Column 3 shows the results when we combine the medical information
on chronical conditions based on prescription drug use and hospitalization. We classify
a person as having a disease if a medical condition is observed in either the hospital data
or prescription drug data. We have excluded the insigniﬁcant disease groups glaucoma
and tuberculosis and include the disease groups: Alzheimer, dementia and psychosis;
osteoporosis and Paget disease; and migraine to the speciﬁcation. The results are very
similar to the results which only use the prescription drug data. For the added variables
we ﬁnd that both having Alzheimer, dementia or psychosis and having osteoporosis and
Paget disease has a large negative inﬂuence on health.
Next, we analyze whether the results change if we estimate the index ‘solely’ on the
basis of self-reported medical conditions as reported in the LISS survey. We therefore
substitute the disease groups as observed in the administrative data (column 3 of ta-
ble 5.6) by self-reported medical conditions in the LISS survey. The variables of which
no self-reported information is available are indicated in the table.14 Column 4 of the
table shows that there are noteworthy diﬀerences. For most diseases we ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cantly lower coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcients of diabetes and cardiac diseases for which
there seems little underreporting in the LISS data remain very similar in magnitude.
This suggests that we should take measurement error issues seriously.
To examine the ﬁt of the health measurement model we use the estimated coeﬃcients
to predict the transition probabilities for the LISS sample. We calculate these in-sample
predictions as follows:
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where the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient equals ρˆ12 = (1− γˆ) σˆ2c + γˆ. Table 5.7
shows the in-sample predictions. A comparison of table 5.3 and table 5.7 shows that
for both the uncorrected and uncorrected health measures the predicted and empirical
transition probabilities agree reasonably well although the health measurement model
14For the following variables no self-reported information is available: Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer,
dementia and psychosis; Epilepsy; Thyroid disorders; Chronic pain and Migraine.
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assigns somewhat higher probabilities to the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the transition
matrix.
5.4.2 Persistence in health
Table 5.8 shows transition probabilities for predicted health in the administrative sample
by educational attainment. We construct predicted health status on the basis of the
estimated thresholds. We use the thresholds of middle-aged males as a reference group
for all individuals in the sample.
The table shows that lower educated people are much more likely to stay in poor
health than higher educated people (university bachelor or master). This does (by
construction) not depend on using either the uncorrected measure or corrected measure.
Table 5.9 shows the transition matrix by income quintile (only for the uncorrected
measure). We observe a higher persistence of staying in poor health for low income
households than for their high income counterparts. We do not observe important
diﬀerences in health persistence if we stratify the sample by wealth quintile (Table 5.9).15
5.4.3 Evolution of health status over the life-cycle
To describe the evolution of health over the life cycle we estimate ﬁxed eﬀects mod-
els on the administrative sample. The ﬁxed eﬀect captures unobserved time-invariant
individual eﬀects, such as cohort eﬀects. The model contains a dummy for every age
and is estimated separately by gender and educational level. We present the results for
the linear prediction of health since the (un)corrected measure generates a somewhat
erratic pattern for the highest age groups. As we estimate a ﬁxed eﬀect model we can
only interpret the slope, or the evolution, in health status as people age, and not the
diﬀerence in the (initial) level of health. For an easier comparison we let all ﬁgures start
at zero.
Figure 5.1 reports the estimated age pattern for both males and females. Health
deteriorates with age; as from age 50 we observe that health starts to decline at a faster
rate for both males and females. For both males and females we observe that health
declines at a similar pace up to about age 60. For men, we observe a further increase
in the rate of deterioration in health as from age 60. As a results, there is about a
0.3 standard deviation diﬀerence in health between men and women at age 95, which
corresponds to having cardiac disease.
Figure 5.2 reports the health pattern for diﬀerent levels of education for males. We
observe strong diﬀerences in the age gradient by level of education. For lower educated
males we observe a relative high gradient already from age 25 onwards; as from age 50
15We notice that the level of income and wealth also diﬀers by age-group.
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the level of health starts to decline at an even faster rate. For males with an intermediate
level of education, the level of health declines slowly up to age 55, after that age the
deterioration in health steadily start to accelerate. For highly educated males we also
observe a relatively ﬂat age gradient, after age 55 health starts to decline more rapidly.
The gradient is however ﬂatter than for males with an intermediate level of education.
Figure 5.3 stratiﬁes the health proﬁle for females by education. There are three
important diﬀerences compared to the health proﬁles for males: First, for lower educated
women, the gradient is less steep than for men. Second, for higher and intermediate
levels of education the gradient is very similar to men, but the gradient stays relatively
linear up to age 70; thereafter health starts to decline at a somewhat faster rate (but
not as fast as for men). Finally, also for lower educated women, the increase in the
deterioration of health starts at a later age and the gradient is less steep than for men.
These ﬁgures show two broad patterns. First, there is a strong gradient in education.
Second, we observe a gender and education diﬀerence in the timing when the rate of
worsening in health speeds-up. This moment arrives earlier for males and persons with
a lower level of education.
Do education and economic resources reduce the risk to get in poor health and how
does this diﬀer by gender? Table 5.11 gives results from a regression of health esti-
mated separately for men and women. The diﬀerent models include dummies for the
level of educational attainment (the reference category is lower education), income and
wealth quantiles (the bottom quantile is the reference category), a homeowner dummy,
a dummy variable for being married and a variable measuring household size. All
estimated models account for age as well.
Women are on average in worse health than men. Woman’s health advantages more
from higher education than men. This even holds after controlling for economic re-
sources. The results also suggests that economic variables as income and wealth are
more protective for women’s health than for men’s health. A possible explanation is
that poor health is in particular detrimental for household income when this aﬀects
the earning capacity of the main earner; women more often work part-time than men.
Indeed when we account for labor market status the association between income and
health disappears for men.
5.5 Conclusions
We construct a health measurement model where we combine survey data on SRH
linked to a rich set of health measures from medical records. The estimated health
model allows us to predict health for the population at large. We thereby account for
unobserved heterogeneity and the persistence in unobserved health shocks by exploiting
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that we have panel data on SRH at our disposal. To account for inconsistent reporting
patterns in SRH over time we introduce a ‘corrected’ health measure. We show that
this ‘corrected’ measure substantially increases the estimated persistence in health.
We use predicted health to study the evolution of health as individuals age and the
interaction with economic variables and education. We ﬁnd that people of low socio-
economic status are more likely to stay in poor health —independent from the measure
we use. Studies using SRH usually ﬁnd a weaker pattern.
The age at which health starts to decline at a greater rate arrives earlier for males and
persons with a lower level of education. Finally, we show that women on average are in
worse health than men due to a higher prevalence of chronic diseases that have a relative
detrimental eﬀect on health. Women’s health seems to beneﬁt more from having higher
education than men. We also provide evidence that income and wealth are protective
of health over and above education. Since a woman’s health deteriorates at a lower rate
over the life-cycle then the health of men, their health status will converge.
These stylized facts are able to explain the variation in the decline in health status
for diﬀerent socio-economic groups which is also reported in other studies using SRH
(e.g. Case and Deaton, 2005). However, we believe we ﬁnd a somewhat higher level of
decay for older persons than usually observed in studies using SRH.
5.6 Tables and ﬁgures
Table 5.1: Self-reported health for observations which can and cannot be linked to
administrative records, N = 24, 486




Very good 19.5 18.9
Excellent 5.4 5.8
Table 5.2: Uncorrected and corrected self-reported health, N = 16, 720




Very good 19.2 19.1
Excellent 5.2 5.3
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Table 5.3: Transition probabilities uncorrected and corrected self-reported health, N =
16, 720
Panel A: Uncorrected health measure
t− 1 \ t Poor Moderate Good Very good Excellent
Poor 46.8 46.8 6.4 0.0 0.0
Moderate 3.3 59.5 36.3 0.9 0.1
Good 0.2 8.3 78.6 11.7 1.3
Very good 0.1 1.6 37.3 51.6 9.5
Excellent 0.2 0.7 17.6 37.1 44.5
Panel B: Corrected health measure
t− 1 \ t Poor Moderate Good Very good Excellent
Poor 70.6 25.7 3.7 0.0 0.0
Moderate 2.5 74.0 22.7 0.9 0.0
Good 0.2 5.7 88.4 5.3 0.5
Very good 0.1 1.3 16.6 78.4 3.6
Excellent 0.2 0.7 6.8 14.3 78.1





Household size 2.709 1.400
Primary education 0.032 0.176
Secondary education, 1st stage 0.185 0.389
Secondary education, 2nd stage 0.338 0.473
University bachelor 0.278 0.448
University master 0.167 0.373
Owner occupied house 0.642 0.480
Employed 0.579 0.494
Job seeker 0.015 0.120
Exempted from job seeking 0.020 0.139
(Partial) disabled 0.031 0.172
Retired 0.179 0.383
Student 0.092 0.289
No paid work 0.085 0.279
Yearly net household income 35,395 25,829
Total household wealth 202,004 673,287
Distribution p25 p50 p75
Yearly net household income 20,994 32,371 44,792
Total household wealth 9,724 90,494 244,892
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Table 5.5: Prevalence of hospital care, homecare, prescription drug use and chronic
conditions (based on prescription drug information)
Men Women





Hospital care 15.72 14.24 9.37 19.59 19.30 11.61
Homecare 0.75 1.85 1.87 0.77 3.45 3.45
Prescription drug use 66.56 62.03 43.95 84.08 81.37 48.41
Coronary disease 12.45 11.43 7.26 9.14
Epilepsy 1.54 1.41 1.88 1.83
Cardiac disease 19.28 16.62 20.29 18.05 19.45 17.04
Inﬂammation and rheumatism 20.16 18.20 4.48 26.69 23.31 9.15
Hyperlipidemia 14.83 11.13 13.72 8.24 8.76 7.65
Malignancies 0.67 0.43 0.47 0.51
Parkinson disease 0.64 0.45 0.56 0.54
Diabetes 5.10 4.41 4.85 3.22 4.22 3.02
Glaucoma 1.53 1.41 1.53 1.11 1.35 1.11
Peptic acid disease 14.37 11.91 6.72 16.77 15.40 6.84
Respiratory illness, asthma 7.85 7.53 4.80 9.37 9.23 5.29
Thyroid disorders 1.00 0.86 4.66 4.01
Crohn 0.49 0.51 0.68 0.59
Pain 4.09 3.23 5.08 5.26
Depression, anxiety 7.54 7.32 3.12 11.68 12.78 4.70
This table shows the prevalence of hospital care, homecare, prescription drug use and chronic
conditions (based on prescription drug information). We distinguish between men and women
in the LISS sample and the large random administrative sample. ‘Objective’ indicates the objec-
tive health measures in the administrative data and ‘Self-reported’ indicates the self-reported
health measures in the LISS survey.
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Parkinson’s disease * -0.589 0.060 -0.645 0.052
Diabetes -0.578 0.029 -0.534 0.028
Osteoporosis and Paget disease
Alzheimer, dementia and psychosis *
Epilepsy * -0.436 0.034 -0.416 0.028
Anxiety and depression -0.337 0.014 -0.288 0.012
Malignancies -0.288 0.054 -0.181 0.045
Cardiac disease -0.282 0.015 -0.244 0.013
Respiratory illness, asthma -0.274 0.016 -0.198 0.014
Thyroid disorders * -0.269 0.031 -0.258 0.030
Chronic pain * -0.250 0.019 -0.239 0.016
Stomach Ulcers -0.218 0.013 -0.154 0.011
Coronary disease -0.163 0.020 -0.171 0.018
High blood cholesterol -0.137 0.019 -0.127 0.018
Migraine *
Rheumatic conditions -0.062 0.009 -0.051 0.008
Glaucoma -0.027 0.043 -0.110 0.039
Tuberculosis 0.062 0.043 0.062 0.036
Hospital use -0.121 0.011 -0.091 0.010
Home care -0.150 0.046 -0.142 0.038
Prescription drugs use -0.153 0.010 -0.090 0.008
λg1,1 -3.382 0.061 -3.109 0.057
λg1,2 -1.721 0.027 -1.566 0.027
λg1,3 0.392 0.024 0.508 0.025
λg1,4 1.347 0.033 1.556 0.036
λg2,1 -2.903 0.035 -2.590 0.032
λg2,2 -1.447 0.018 -1.312 0.018
λg2,3 0.434 0.016 0.484 0.016
λg2,4 1.445 0.021 1.559 0.022
λg3,1 -2.902 0.032 -2.703 0.031
λg3,2 -1.556 0.015 -1.428 0.014
λg3,3 0.272 0.012 0.323 0.011
λg3,4 1.276 0.014 1.335 0.014
λg4,1 -3.734 0.093 -3.453 0.092
λg4,2 -1.507 0.026 -1.264 0.026
λg4,3 0.449 0.025 0.515 0.026
λg4,4 1.463 0.038 1.500 0.038
λg5,1 -3.059 0.037 -2.773 0.035
λg5,2 -1.440 0.018 -1.273 0.017
λg5,3 0.521 0.016 0.577 0.016
λg5,4 1.412 0.021 1.494 0.022
γ 0.253 0.018 0.856 0.020
σ2c 0.602 0.009 0.161 0.112
For the threshold parameters we distinguish on basis of the variables ‘gender’ and ‘year-of-
birth’ ﬁve diﬀerent demographic groups (G = 5): (1) males born before 1945, (2) males born
between 1945 and 1965, (3) individuals born after 1965, (4) females born before 1945, (5) fe-
males born between 1945 and 1965. * In column (4) we do not replace the indicated variables
(*) by self-reported medical conditions because there is no information on these medical con-
ditions in the LISS data.
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Table 5.6: Estimation results of the health index model, N = 16, 720
(3) (4)
Chronic and inpatient treatment
Uncorrected Uncorrected
Parkinson’s disease * -0.563 0.059 -0.361 0.055
Diabetes -0.588 0.029 -0.562 0.061
Osteoporosis and Paget disease -0.437 0.040 -0.288 0.019
Alzheimer, dementia and psychosis * -0.429 0.048 -0.365 0.060
Epilepsy * -0.350 0.029 -0.414 0.034
Anxiety and depression -0.313 0.014 -0.187 0.032
Malignancies -0.210 0.037 -0.076 0.019
Cardiac disease -0.272 0.015 -0.214 0.016
Respiratory illness, asthma -0.273 0.016 0.009 0.044
Thyroid disorders * -0.244 0.031 -0.248 0.019
Chronic pain * -0.256 0.019 -0.248 0.023
Stomach Ulcers -0.216 0.012 -0.598 0.030
Coronary disease -0.177 0.019 -0.169 0.020
High blood cholesterol -0.127 0.019 -0.506 0.019
Migraine * -0.121 0.033 -0.357 0.024
Rheumatic conditions -0.044 0.010 0.027 0.044
Glaucoma
Tuberculosis
Hospital use -0.095 0.011 -0.194 0.012
Home care -0.161 0.045 -0.124 0.024
Prescription drugs use -0.158 0.010 -0.401 0.012
λg1,1 -3.367 0.060 -3.492 0.060
λg1,2 -1.717 0.027 -1.821 0.026
λg1,3 0.396 0.024 0.339 0.024
λg1,4 1.351 0.033 1.320 0.033
λg2,1 -2.900 0.035 -3.025 0.036
λg2,2 -1.445 0.018 -1.510 0.018
λg2,3 0.435 0.016 0.428 0.015
λg2,4 1.445 0.021 1.458 0.021
λg3,1 -2.895 0.033 -2.989 0.033
λg3,2 -1.553 0.015 -1.566 0.014
λg3,3 0.273 0.012 0.312 0.010
λg3,4 1.276 0.014 1.327 0.013
λg4,1 -3.803 0.090 -3.865 0.097
λg4,2 -1.534 0.026 -1.618 0.026
λg4,3 0.433 0.025 0.398 0.025
λg4,4 1.452 0.038 1.446 0.038
λg5,1 -3.055 0.037 -3.223 0.038
λg5,2 -1.440 0.018 -1.533 0.017
λg5,3 0.519 0.016 0.519 0.015
λg5,4 1.409 0.021 1.432 0.020
γ 0.248 0.018 0.256 0.018
σ2c 0.607 0.008 0.581 0.009
For the threshold parameters we distinguish on basis of the variables ‘gender’ and ‘year-of-
birth’ ﬁve diﬀerent demographic groups (G = 5): (1) males born before 1945, (2) males born
between 1945 and 1965, (3) individuals born after 1965, (4) females born before 1945, (5) fe-
males born between 1945 and 1965. * In column (4) we do not replace the indicated variables
(*) by self-reported medical conditions because there is no information on these medical con-
ditions in the LISS data.
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Table 5.7: In-sample predictions: ‘uncorrected’ and ‘corrected’ SRH, N = 16, 720
t \ t+ 1 Poor Moderate Good Very good Excellent
Poor 36.2 56.3 7.5 0.0 0.0
Moderate 4.4 52.5 42.5 0.5 0.0
Good 0.1 10.7 74.3 13.7 1.2
Very good 0.0 0.4 43.9 43.3 12.4
Excellent 0.0 0.0 14.4 43.6 41.9
Poor 58.3 41.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
Moderate 4.5 66.7 28.8 0.0 0.0
Good 0.0 8.0 81.9 9.9 0.2
Very good 0.0 0.0 30.1 60.1 9.8
Excellent 0.0 0.0 1.9 37.0 61.1
Table 5.8: Health persistence by Educational Attainment, N=163,695
t \ t+ 1 Poor Moderate Good Very good Excellent
Panel A: Uncorrected health measure
Lower Poor 36.7 55.6 7.6 0.0 0.0
Moderate 5.1 50.5 43.8 0.6 0.0
Good 0.2 12.0 74.2 12.5 1.2
Very good 0.0 0.7 48.3 39.9 11.1
Excellent 0.0 0.1 18.5 43.9 37.6
Higher Poor 31.2 60.4 8.5 0.0 0.0
Moderate 3.1 47.7 48.7 0.6 0.0
Good 0.1 10.0 74.9 13.7 1.3
Very good 0.0 0.5 46.8 40.8 11.9
Excellent 0.0 0.0 16.8 44.6 38.6
Panel B: Corrected health measure
Lower Poor 50.1 47.7 2.2 0.0 0.0
Moderate 4.8 60.2 35.0 0.1 0.0
Good 0.1 10.2 78.9 10.6 0.3
Very good 0.0 0.1 38.6 51.6 9.7
Excellent 0.0 0.0 6.1 43.6 50.3
Higher Poor 39.9 58.1 2.0 0.0 0.0
Moderate 3.5 58.4 38.0 0.1 0.0
Good 0.1 8.6 79.5 11.5 0.4
Very good 0.0 0.1 37.1 52.8 10.0
Excellent 0.0 0.0 5.4 44.2 50.4
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Table 5.9: Health persistence by 2006 Income quintile, Uncorrected health measure,
N=163,695
t \ t+ 1 Poor Moderate Good Very good Excellent
Q1 Poor 39.5 53.0 7.5 0.0 0.0
Moderate 6.1 51.8 41.6 0.5 0.0
Good 0.3 13.2 73.6 11.9 1.1
Very good 0.0 0.9 48.4 39.9 10.9
Excellent 0.0 0.1 18.2 44.1 37.6
Q2 Poor 36.9 55.9 7.2 0.1 0.0
Moderate 5.1 50.8 43.5 0.6 0.0
Good 0.2 12.4 74.2 12.1 1.1
Very good 0.0 0.7 49.2 39.2 10.9
Excellent 0.0 0.1 18.9 43.9 37.2
Q3 Poor 33.3 57.7 8.8 0.1 0.0
Moderate 3.9 49.1 46.4 0.6 0.0
Good 0.1 10.9 74.7 13.0 1.2
Very good 0.0 0.5 47.2 40.6 11.7
Excellent 0.0 0.0 17.4 45.1 37.5
Q4 Poor 32.9 60.0 7.2 0.0 0.0
Moderate 3.6 47.5 48.3 0.6 0.0
Good 0.1 10.3 74.6 13.7 1.4
Very good 0.0 0.6 47.5 40.4 11.6
Excellent 0.0 0.1 17.8 44.0 38.1
Q5 Poor 28.1 62.5 9.4 0.0 0.0
Moderate 3.1 48.2 48.1 0.6 0.0
Good 0.1 10.0 75.0 13.6 1.3
Very good 0.0 0.5 46.8 40.8 11.9
Excellent 0.0 0.0 17.1 43.7 39.1
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Table 5.10: Health persistence by 2006 Wealth quintile, Uncorrected health measure,
N=163,695
t \ t+ 1 Poor Moderate Good Very good Excellent
Q1 Poor 36.5 54.7 8.8 0.0 0.0
Moderate 4.6 49.0 45.8 0.7 0.0
Good 0.2 11.0 74.5 13.1 1.2
Very good 0.0 0.6 47.3 40.7 11.4
Excellent 0.0 0.0 17.5 44.5 38.0
Q2 Poor 39.3 54.0 6.7 0.1 0.0
Moderate 5.2 50.4 43.8 0.6 0.0
Good 0.2 11.9 74.2 12.5 1.3
Very good 0.0 0.7 47.2 40.4 11.7
Excellent 0.0 0.1 17.7 44.3 38.0
Q3 Poor 29.9 61.1 8.9 0.1 0.0
Moderate 3.9 49.0 46.6 0.5 0.0
Good 0.1 10.7 74.4 13.5 1.3
Very good 0.0 0.6 47.7 40.2 11.5
Excellent 0.0 0.0 18.0 45.2 36.8
Q4 Poor 35.5 55.7 8.8 0.0 0.0
Moderate 4.2 49.6 45.7 0.5 0.0
Good 0.2 11.4 74.6 12.6 1.3
Very good 0.0 0.6 48.1 39.9 11.4
Excellent 0.0 0.1 18.1 44.9 36.9
Q5 Poor 34.4 59.2 6.4 0.0 0.0
Moderate 4.4 50.1 44.9 0.6 0.0
Good 0.2 11.5 74.5 12.7 1.2
Very good 0.0 0.6 48.5 40.0 11.0
Excellent 0.0 0.1 17.7 42.0 40.2
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Table 5.11: Estimation results, dependent variable: predicted health, N=163,695
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Intermediate education 0.083 *** 0.098 *** 0.064 *** 0.070 *** 0.056 *** 0.068 ***
Higher education 0.124 *** 0.175 *** 0.093 *** 0.126 *** 0.084 *** 0.121 ***
Married -0.002 0.013 * -0.011 -0.015 ** -0.013 * -0.017 *
Household size 0.003 0.012 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
Homeowner 0.026 *** 0.010 0.022 ** 0.005
2nd income quintile 0.018 * 0.048 *** 0.012 0.039 ***
3th income quintile 0.019 * 0.037 *** 0.006 0.025 **
4th income quintile 0.028 ** 0.053 *** 0.011 0.038 ***
5th income quintile 0.022 * 0.080 *** 0.000 0.060 ***
2nd wealth quintile 0.032 *** 0.046 *** 0.026 *** 0.038 ***
3th wealth quintile 0.045 *** 0.045 *** 0.040 *** 0.038 ***
4th wealth quintile 0.069 *** 0.095 *** 0.064 *** 0.089 ***
5th wealth quintile 0.094 *** 0.137 *** 0.088 *** 0.130 ***
Retired -0.056 *** -0.065 ***
Unemployed -0.045 ** -0.085 ***
Disabled -0.348 *** -0.314 ***
Self-employed 0.010 0.018
Other 0.020 -0.011
Constant -0.169 *** -0.369 *** -0.195 *** -0.384 *** -0.183 *** -0.359 ***
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level.
Table 5.12: Mapping prescription drugs to chronic conditions
Chronic disease ATC-code in medical reg. Matching variable
LISS survey
Coronary disease B01A, C04A
Epilepsy N03A
Cardiac disease C01, C03C Heart or brain in-
farction,
other heart diseases
Hypertension C02, C03A, C07, C08, C09A,B High blood pressure
Tuberculosis J04A
Rheumatic conditions H02, M01, M02 Joint pain or joint
infection
High blood cholesterol C10A High blood choles-
terol
Malignancies L01
Parkinson’s disease N04B, N04A
Diabetes A10A, A10B Diabetes
Glaucoma S01E
Stomach Ulcers A02A, A02B Heartburn
Respiratory illness, asthma R03 Chronic bronchitis,
asthma
Thyroid disorders H03A, H03B
Chronic pain N02A
Anxiety and depression N05B, N06A Anxiety or depres-
sion
Alzheimer, dementia, psychotic illness N06D, N05A
Osteoporosis and Paget’s disease M05 Osteoporosis (non-
hormonal)
Migraine N02C Other pains (such
as headache, back-
ache)
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Health, Lifestyle and Disability Transitions
of Self-Employed Workers
6.1 Introduction
While most countries have compulsory public insurance for employees oﬀering income
protection in case of illness, income insurance for self-employed is optional and only
available from private insurance companies in many European countries (Frick and Malo,
2008). Insurance companies play an important role in countries where income insurance
for self-employed is organized privately instead of collectively. First, they decide whether
or not to provide income insurance to self-employed and if so, against what premium
level. From contract theory it is known that risk assessment generally plays a more
important role in private than in public insurance due to adverse selection.1 In the
presence of adverse selection insurance companies oﬀering income insurance engage in
medical underwriting to obtain information about the riskiness of applicants. High-risk
individuals might become subject to additional restrictions on the insurance (known as
limited coverage) or have to pay a higher premium. In extreme cases they might even be
denied coverage. Second, when a self-employed with income insurance receives disability
beneﬁts, it is the insurance company paying the beneﬁts who has to decide about
the best way to get the policyholder back to work. The insurance company’s actions
This chapter is co-authored with Laura Spierdijk and Gijsbert van Lomwel. We are grateful to
the audiences of the annual meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists,
several Netspar conferences and workshops, and seminars at the University of Groningen, KU Leuven,
University of Wyoming and University of Southern California. Special thanks goes to Rob Alessie,
Katrien Antonio, Gerard van den Berg, Pilar García-Gómez, Adriaan Kalwij, Arie Kapteyn, Hans van
Kippersluis, Ruud Koning, Maarten Lindeboom, Erik Meijer and Linda Thunström. Laura Spierdijk
gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support by a Vidi grant (452.11.007) in the
Vernieuwingsimpuls-program of the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research (NWO).
1Adverse selection arises when high-risk individuals are more likely to purchase insurance than
low-risk individuals.
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can vary between doing nothing and applying active insurance-based case management
(Spierdijk et al., 2009). Insurance company’s decisions about who to provide income
insurance, for how long, under what conditions and against what premium level have
important welfare implications.
Private income insurance has gained importance in the Netherlands after the abolish-
ment of the compulsory public income insurance for self-employed workers as of August
2004. In 2008 about half of the Dutch self-employed labor force was privately insured
against income loss due to disability (SER, 2010). Since the abolishment of the public
income insurance for self-employed there have been serious concerns about the aﬀord-
ability of private income insurance among politicians, policymakers and self-employed.
The main concerns are the high insurance premiums and the limited availability of
income insurance for particularly high-risk groups of self-employed. Asymmetric infor-
mation between the insurance company and the self-employed about the health and
disability risks incurred by the latter can result in rising premiums, while potentially
leaving healthy people without income insurance. Recent evidence suggests that the
availability and expensiveness of income insurance may aﬀect the decision to become
self-employed (Heim and Lurie, 2010).
Self-employed workers play an important role in the economy by contributing to
economic viability (e.g., Carree and Thurik, 2010; Koellinger and Thurik, 2012). Fur-
thermore, self-employment provides an important pathway to retirement (Cahill et al.,
2013). The European Union and various national governments have addressed the im-
portance of self-employed workers and have been promoting self-employment (European
Commission, 2004). Given self-employed workers’ important role in the economy, lim-
ited availability and expensiveness of income insurance can have substantial welfare
implications.
Bearing in mind the important role of insurers, the goal of this study is to analyze
the relation between health and lifestyle habits and self-employed workers’ entry into
and exit out of disability using an insurance portfolio. The income insurance portfolio
that we analyze belongs to the largest private insurance company of the Netherlands
(Achmea) and covers both short-run and long-run (even permanent) disability, regard-
less of its cause (either work-related or not). Our unique data sample, covering the
period 2005 – 2013, contains more than 20,000 income insurance contracts of Dutch
self-employed workers and more than 5,500 approved disability claims of which about
85% were completed within the sample period.
According to the literature, health and lifestyle factors are important determinants
of labor market outcomes in general and disability transitions in particular. We thus
expect ill-health and bad lifestyle habits to have adverse eﬀects on self-employed workers’
disability outcomes, but at the same time we expect diﬀerences between the various
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groups of policyholders. For example, we anticipate that bad lifestyle habits (such
as smoking and being overweight) exacerbate the impact of physical and mental ill-
health on disability outcomes. Similarly, we hypothesize that certain bad lifestyle habits
exacerbate the inﬂuence of other bad lifestyle habits. We also expect diﬀerences between
men and women (García-Gómez et al., 2010; Kapteyn and Meijer, 2013). Hence, the
main contribution of this chapter is assessing the impact of health and lifestyle habits
on disability outcomes across diﬀerent subgroups of policyholders, such as smokers and
non-smokers, overweight and normal-weight self-employed, and men and women. The
subgroup analysis will reveal, for instance, whether the eﬀect of ill-health on the risk
of becoming disabled is stronger for heavy smokers than for non-smokers. We are not
aware of any studies that analyze the interaction between bad lifestyle habits and ill-
health, and its impact on disability outcomes.
Each disability claim in our portfolio is based on a medical certiﬁcate provided by a
doctor, such that our analysis does not suﬀer from a subjective deﬁnition of disability.
Information about health and lifestyle factors is available from the questionnaire that
each self-employed completes upon buying income insurance. The lifestyle habits that
we consider are smoking and drinking behavior, doing sports, and being overweight.
We use a latent variable approach to predict an objective summary measure of physical
health (e.g., Kapteyn and Meijer, 2013). We construct the latent measure of physical
health on the basis of previously diagnosed physical health problems, which can be con-
sidered as relatively objective. Our analysis distinguishes between initial physical and
mental health and allows the latter to have a diﬀerent impact on disability transitions
than the former (García-Gómez et al., 2010). We use previously experienced mental
health problems as an indicator of initial mental health. This measure is based on the
observation that many mental disorders are persistent and show high rates of recurrence
(e.g., Spijker et al., 2002).
We investigate the impact of health and lifestyle habits on disability transitions using
a mixed proportional hazards (MPH) approach, allowing for unobserved individual het-
erogeneity. In addition to health and lifestyle eﬀects, we also correct for risk factors such
as socio-demographic status (age and gender), occupational class, the type of disease
causing the disability, cohort eﬀects, and the properties of the insurance contract. We
estimate separate MPH models for diﬀerent subgroups of policyholders, such as smokers
and non-smokers, overweight and normal-weight self-employed, men and women, and
self-employed belonging to a speciﬁc occupational class. The subgroup analysis allows
the observed risk factors to impact diﬀerently on the incidence and recovery rates of
diﬀerent groups and additionally permits group-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. We
test the hypothesis that certain bad lifestyle habits exacerbate the impact of other bad
lifestyle habits and ill-health on disability outcomes. Furthermore, by estimating sepa-
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rate MPH models for policyholders with diﬀerent insurance contracts – such as those
with limited coverage or a speciﬁc deferment period – we account for selection into spe-
ciﬁc types of insurance contracts on the basis of policyholders’ unobserved risk factors
(cf. Hill et al., 2013).
Physical ill-health, mental ill-health and bad lifestyle habits turn out to have adverse
eﬀects on the disability outcomes of self-employed workers with income insurance. Yet
the main results of our study is that accurate assessment of the relation between health,
lifestyle and disability outcomes requires a subgroup analysis that distinguishes several
groups of policyholders (such as smokers and non-smokers, overweight and normal-
weight self-employed, and men and women). The subgroup analysis is crucial because
important diﬀerences between subgroups tend to vanish in an aggregate analysis. More
speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the impact of mental ill-health and smoking on the risk of
becoming disabled is exacerbated by overweight, while the eﬀects of physical ill-health,
mental ill-health and overweight on recovery from disability are exacerbated by current
and past smoking. Men and women diﬀer in the way smoking and playing sports
aﬀect their risk of becoming disabled. Furthermore, they also diﬀer in the way mental
ill-health aﬀects their risk of becoming disabled due to a mental disorder or severe
conditions such as cancer. The results continue to hold after correction for other risk
factors and selection eﬀects with respect to the properties of the insurance contract.
Moreover, the eﬀects of health and lifestyle habits are both statistically signiﬁcant and
economically relevant.
The results of our case study can contribute to more eﬀective criteria for risk selection
and underwriting, the development of risk-based insurance premiums for income insur-
ance, prevention of disability among self-employed, and optimization of their return-to-
work process. The aforementioned discussion in the Netherlands about the aﬀordability
of private income insurance further emphasizes the need for our work.
The remainder of chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief literature
review and Section 6.3 describes the data. We discuss the empirical framework in
Section 6.4. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 discuss the empirical results for transitions into and
out of disability, respectively. Finally, Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Literature review: health, lifestyle and labor mar-
ket outcomes
We review the literature that has analyzed the inﬂuence of health and lifestyle habits on
labor market outcomes. We also consider the empirical literature that has analyzed the
potential diﬀerences between self-employed and employees in terms of e.g. individual
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characteristics, job characteristics and health status. Throughout, we provide a brief
overview of some relevant studies, but do not attempt to be exhaustive in reviewing the
huge amount of studies in this ﬁeld.
The literature on sickness absence has shown that mental and physical ill-health
have adverse eﬀects on employees’ disability transitions, in addition to the inﬂuence of
other risk factors such as sociodemographic characteristics, disease category and severe-
ness, economic incentives, educational attainment, job and company characteristics and
macro-economic factors.2 Furthermore, several studies have shown that bad lifestyle
factors, such as smoking and drinking, have negative eﬀects on employees’ labor market
performance in general (Van Ours, 2004; Morris, 2006). We are not aware of any studies
that analyze the interaction between bad lifestyle habits and ill-health, and its impact
on disability outcomes.
Self-employed form a special group in terms of individual characteristics such as risk-
averseness, job characteristics, working conditions, job satisfaction, and remuneration
methods (Tetrick et al., 2000; Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Beugelsdijk and Noorder-
haven, 2005; Spierdijk et al., 2009). Some studies report that self-employed have more
job control (Prottas and Thompson, 2006; Bjuggren et al., 2012), while others ﬁnd that
self-employed face higher levels of job demand and workload relative to employees (But-
tner, 1992; Stephan and Roesler, 2010). Several studies have found that self-employed
and employees diﬀer in terms of health status (Tetrick et al., 2000; Bradley and Roberts,
2004; Stephan and Roesler, 2010). The literature has provided two possible explana-
tions for this phenomenon: a contextual eﬀect and a selection eﬀect (Rietveld et al.,
2013).
Existing studies analyzing disability among self-employed are scarce and have typ-
ically not analyzed the eﬀect of health and lifestyle habits on self-employed workers’
disability transitions (Hartman et al., 2003; Spierdijk et al., 2009; Richter et al., 2011;
Spierdijk and Koning, 2014).3 Furthermore, such studies have focused on self-employed
workers’ recovery from disability, while the present study also analyzes transitions into
disability. Together, transitions into and out of disability provide a complete picture of
the disability risks self-employed policyholders are exposed to.
The medical and epidemiological literature has typically analyzed the impact of health
and lifestyle factors on disability outcomes of speciﬁc groups of wage workers (not self-
employed), such as employees with low back pain or pregnant women. The general
ﬁnding is that physical ill-health, mental ill-health and bad lifestyle habits have adverse
2See also, among others, Johansson and Palme (1996), and Knutsson and Goine (1998), Johansson
and Palme (2002), Väänänen et al. (2003), Johansson and Palme (2005), Andrén (2007), Johansen
et al. (2008), Bernström (2013), Arends et al. (2014), and Helgertz and Persson (2014).
3For completeness we notice that these two studies use totally diﬀerent insurance portfolios than
the present one.
168 Chapter 6. Health, Lifestyle and Disability Transitions of Self-Employed Workers
eﬀects on disability outcomes. The surveys by Duijts et al. (2007) and Beemsterboer
et al. (2009) provide detailed overviews of the main ﬁndings in this ﬁeld. Some recent
studies in this rapidly growing research area are Ahola et al. (2008), Bratberg et al.
(2009), Koopmans et al. (2011), Hjarsbech et al. (2011), Hystad and Bye (2012), and
Knudsen et al. (2013).
Another important diﬀerence between our study and the existing literature is the
young average age of the policyholders in our sample. Studies analyzing the relation
between health and labor market outcomes have traditionally focused on older workers
and their retirement decisions (e.g., Currie and Madrian, 1999; Van Ooijen et al., 2010;
Kapteyn and Meijer, 2013; Insler, 2014), while we analyze a relatively young population
(as will become apparent in Section 6.3). Only few studies analyze the impact of health
on the labor market transitions of younger wage workers; see e.g. Contoyannis and
Rice (2001), Dano (2005), García-Gómez and López-Nicolás (2006), and García-Gómez
et al. (2010, 2013) and García-Gómez (2011). These studies establish both short-run
and long-run eﬀects of adverse health shocks on wages and entries into and exits out of
employment and disability.
6.3 Data
Our sample consists of 21,755 income insurance policies sold by the largest private
insurance company in the Netherlands (Achmea). The policies have a contract date
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2010. 4,084 policyholder ﬁled one or more
valid disability claims during the period January 1, 2005 – June 30, 2013, resulting in
5,592 approved disability claims.
Our sample contains a few invalid disability claims, which we exclude from the sample.
More precisely, 184 claims were invalid, which is only about 3% of the total number
of claims. We have also deleted all claims due to pregnancy, since the corresponding
durations are likely to be much more predictable than claim durations corresponding
to other diseases (Spierdijk et al., 2009; Spierdijk and Koning, 2014).4
The income insurance that we consider covers both short-run and long-run (even
permanent) disability, regardless of its cause (either work-related or not). Here disability
is deﬁned as the inability to work due to illness. This section provides more details on
the properties of the disability insurance. We also provide a detailed data description
and sample statistics of the insurance portfolio and the associated claims.




Upon application, self-employed have to complete an insurance form with questions
about health and lifestyle-related behavior. The questionnaire includes, among others,
questions about self-employed workers’ current health status and pre-existing medical
conditions. The insurer applies medical underwriting criteria to decide about oﬀering
full coverage or limited coverage. Limited coverage means that one or more disorders
are not covered by the oﬀered insurance. In extreme cases the insurance company may
deny coverage.
The questionnaire asks the applicants whether they currently have been experiencing
any complaints or inﬁrmities and whether they are currently on medication or follow
a diet. They are also asked whether they are currently disabled. Based on their an-
swers, we create an indicator variable for the presence of current health problems. This
indicator variable has the value 1 if the respondent answers aﬃrmative to at least one
of these questions. One of the sample statistics reported in Table 6.1 is the sample
mean of the indicator variable for current health problems (‘curr.compl’). About 10%
of the self-employed in the sample reports positive on current health problems. This
percentage increases with age and equals 17.8% for self-employed whose age is between
45 and 55 years (not reported in the table).
The applicants are also asked whether they have ever experienced any speciﬁc health
problems. The disease categories listed on the form are listed in Table 6.1 (‘experienced
health problems’). We create an indicator variable for each speciﬁc health problem.
The most common previously experienced health problems are issues with the joints
(48.6% for the total sample of claimants and non-claimants), skin problems (28.2%),
back problems (19.4%), ear/nose/throat problems (15.9%), arms/neck/shoulder issues
(14.9%) and mental disorders (11.0%).
In addition, the questionnaire contains health- and lifestyle-related questions, asking
for height and weight, smoking and drinking behavior, and physical exercise. The
questions about the intensity and duration of smoking and drinking are to be answered
by the respondent in the form of an open-ended answer. In order to distinguish between
current smokers and past smokers we use a parsing algorithm that identiﬁes part of the
string that is being answered. Reporting terms such as ‘currently’, ‘still’, ‘until now’
and similar are grouped in a indicator variable indicating current smokers. We also
create indicator variables for past smokers, current drinkers, policyholders who play
sports, and policyholders with overweight. The latter indicator variable is based on the
policyholder’s body mass index (BMI), which is calculated from its length and weight.
Overweight is deﬁned as a BMI exceeding 25, obesity as a BMI exceeding 30. About
20.3% of the policyholders reports being a current smoker, while 24.0% is a past smoker.
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Approximately 86.9% of the self-employed reports positive on drinking alcohol, whereas
68.6% of the policyholders does sports. Almost 40% of the policyholders has overweight.
The questionnaire’s information about policyholders’ lifestyle habits is on a self-
reported basis. The lifestyle questions in the questionnaire apply to fairly objective
issues such as smoking, drinking, playing sports and being overweight, so comparability
across respondents does not seem to be a problem here. There is, however, the possibil-
ity that policyholders who fear a high premium or exclusion from income insurance will
not give honest answers to the lifestyle questions. There is contractual pressure to an-
swer the questions honestly, though. In the insurance company’s terms and conditions
it is explicitly stated that dishonest or incomplete answers to the questions might lead
to a denial of coverage in case of disability. Hence, because dishonest and incomplete
answers can have serious ﬁnancial consequences, self-employed have an incentive to ﬁll
in the questionnaire honestly and in complete detail. For both insurer and policyholder
it is therefore common to assume uberrima ﬁdes on the part of the other side of the
contract.
Besides information about policyholders’ health and lifestyle habits, the answers to
the questionnaire give information about insurants’ socio-demographic characteristics
(age and gender), occupational class (agriculture, technical and industrial, medical and
paramedical, retail and wholesale, commercial and administrative, transport, care and
services), and the terms of the insurance contract (full/limited coverage, the length of
the deferment period and the level of the replacement income).5 The complete list of
remaining explanatory variables is given in Table 6.2.
Some explanatory variables deserve additional explanation. Self-employed with lim-
ited coverage are not fully insured against disability; i.e., certain illnesses and disorders
are excluded from coverage. Usually the excluded diseases are the ones self-employed
suﬀered from prior to or upon buying income insurance (known as preexisting condi-
tions). The insurance company decides about granting either full or limited coverage to
a self-employed. The replacement income is the annual income paid by the insurance
company to the self-employed in case of 100% disability. The replacement income is
bound to the insured’s average annual three-year income prior to buying income insur-
ance.6 The deferment period is the waiting period prior to receiving replacement income.
Only after expiry of this period the insurance company starts paying the replacement
income to the self-employed. The deferment period allows the insurance company to
determine the policyholder’s health status more exactly and to prevent her from receiv-
ing replacement income for relatively minor health problems. The possible deferment
5The occupational class is derived from the ROA 2002 classiﬁcation system. See the section
‘Beroepen’ in the document available at http://www.roa.unimaas.nl. [January 30, 2014].
6Our sample only provides information about the insured income in Euro and not about the insured
income as a % of the policyholder’s (average) annual income.
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periods are 15 days, 1, 2, or 3 months, or 1, 2 or 3 years. The level of the replacement
income and the length of the deferment period are chosen by the policyholder herself
upon buying insurance. The insurance premium is inversely related to the deferment
period and increases with the replacement income.
The average age of self-employed upon buying income insurance is almost 35 years,
while the minimum and maximum ages are 16 and 60, respectively. The interquartile
range of policyholders’ age is [28, 41] and only 5% of the policyholders is older than
50 years upon buying income insurance. Men constitute 84.8% of the sample, which
we explain from the fact that many women in the Netherlands work only part-time.
Because they are not the breadwinner, they probably do not consider it necessary to
purchase income insurance. Another explanation for the low percentage of women in
the sample is the dominance of technical/industrial and agricultural professions in our
sample (31.0% and 13.4%, respectively). The annual replacement income has a sample
mean of 34,042 Euro and its interquartile range is [22, 511; 40, 000]. Approximately,
21.3% of the policyholders has limited coverage. The most frequently chosen deferment
period is 30 days, which applies to 50.2% of the insurance contracts in our sample. More
detailed sample statistics are given in Table 6.2.
The sample statistics in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 highlight some notable diﬀerences between
claimants and non-claimants in terms of playing sports, smoking, occupational class
and characteristics of the insurance contract. The analyses in Sections 6.5 and 6.6
will provide formal evidence on the role of these risk factors in explaining disability
transitions.7
6.3.2 Medical certiﬁcate
In the absence of disability, the health status of the policyholder is relatively constant,
in the sense that she remains healthy enough to work as a self-employed. In case of
disability, however, the policyholder’s initial health status is updated accordingly, using
the medical certiﬁcate corresponding to the disability claim.8 The medical certiﬁcate,
which is provided by a doctor, contains detailed information about the diagnosed dis-
order causing disability as mentioned on the accompanying medical certiﬁcate. The
diagnosis is based on a classiﬁcation scheme that is derived from the International
Classiﬁcation of Diseases ICD-10 developed by the World Health Organization.9
The bottom panel of Table 6.2 lists the indicator variables for the various ICD-10 diag-
noses. In case of disability, the most frequently reported diseases in the ICD-10 medical
7For completeness we notice that our data sample does not contain any information about insurance
premiums or about the self-employed who were denied coverage.
8Also lifestyle habits might change over time, but this is not very likely (e.g., Breslow and Enstrom,
1980).
9See http://apps.who.int/classiﬁcations/icd10. [January 30, 2014].
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certiﬁcate are muscular-skeletal disorders (37.6%), injuries and poisoning (20.6%, with
only a single case of poisoning), and mental disorders (12.1%). The main diﬀerence be-
tween muscular-skeletal disorders and injuries is that the latter have an external cause,
such as an accident. The most frequently reported mental disorders are depression and
burn-out. More sample statistics can be found in Table 6.2.
6.3.3 Data visualization
Figure 6.1 provides a visual overview of the data and the data collection process. We
distinguish three states: the start of the insurance contract, disabled and non-disabled.
Upon buying income insurance self-employed complete the aforementioned question-
naire, providing a wide range of explanatory variables that can be used to explain
the policyholders’ disability transitions. At the start of the insurance contract the
self-employed is, per deﬁnition, non-disabled. Although a tiny percentage of the self-
employed in the portfolio indicate that they are ‘disabled’ upon ﬁlling in the question-
naire (see Table 6.1), acceptance by the insurance company implies that the policyholder
is able to work.10 Because all self-employed start their contract as non-disabled, there
is no initial conditions problem (Heckman, 1981). If self-employed become unable to
work due to illness, they enter the state ‘disabled’. In this case their initial health-status
is updated accordingly, using the information about the ICD-10 diagnosis causing the
disability. If a self-employed does not ﬁle a claim during the sample period, her dura-
tion until the ﬁrst claim is right-censored. As soon as self-employed are able to resume
work, they move to the state ‘non-disabled’. If the sample period ends before a self-
employed completes her disability spell, the resulting disability duration is marked as
right-censored. Because the sample of disability durations is an inﬂow sample, there
is again no initial conditions problem. Self-employed can ﬁle multiple disability spells
during the sample period.
Figure 6.1 also provides sample statistics. 18.8% of the 21,755 policyholders ﬁles
one or more valid disability claims during the sample period that starts on January
1, 2005 and ends on June 30, 2013. About 16.7% of the disability durations is right-
censored, which means that those spells do not end before the aforementioned end
date. The average number of claims per claimant equals 1.37. Claimants’ average
duration until their ﬁrst disability claim is 909 days (2.5 years), while the median of
this duration equals 791 days (2.2 years). The claimants’ average duration until recovery
from disability is 262 days (0.7 years), which is much larger compared to the median
duration of 115 days (0.3 years). The diﬀerence between mean and median disability
duration indicates that there are several cases of long-term disability. This is explored
10The results of the remaining analysis are not aﬀected by leaving out this small group of policyhold-
ers.
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in more detail in Figure 6.2, which displays two unconditional Kaplan-Meier survival
functions, representing the probability that a duration exceeds a certain number of days.
The survivor function of the duration until the ﬁrst claim is relatively ﬂat. After 3 years
only 10% of the policyholders have ﬁled a claim. The survivor function of the disability
duration declines very steeply until about 150 days of disability, when about 60% of the
disability claims have already been followed by recovery. The survivor function ﬂattens
out after about 3 years of disability, indicating that recovery is unlikely to occur after
this period.
Our sample contains some missing information about the type of insurance contract.
For 1,286 out of 21,755 claims the information about limited coverage and/or the defer-
ment period is missing. We will later deal with this by estimating models using slightly
reduced samples.
6.3.4 Measuring initial physical and mental health
To examine the eﬀect of a self-employed’s initial physical health on her disability tran-
sitions, we need an objective summary measure of initial physical health. To avoid
multicollinearity and to facilitate the interpretation of marginal eﬀects we do not want
to use all health-related variables in our models (Bound et al., 1999). Furthermore,
there are concerns about the validity of self-reported health measures as an indicator
of current health to assess the impact of health on disability outcomes; see for example
Bound (1991) and Kalwij and Vermeulen (2008). The main concern is that subjec-
tive judgements about someone’s own health status might not be entirely comparable
across respondents. Lack of comparability between individuals will result in measure-
ment error, which might lead to underestimation of the eﬀect of health on disability
outcomes.
To deal with these issues, we estimate the comprehensive measure of initial physical
health as a function of relatively objective indicators of health: the previously expe-
rienced physical health problems that have been reported in the questionnaire. The
underlying idea is that these objective indicators of health are not inﬂuenced by report-
ing bias.
We use a probit model to estimate the latent physical health index, which is in
line with the existing literature (e.g., Bound, 1991; Bound et al., 1999; Lindeboom and
Kerkhofs, 2009; García-Gómez et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2010; Kapteyn and Meijer, 2013).
The relatively subjective indicator for current physical health problems (‘curr.compl’),
as introduced in Section 6.3.1, is used as the dependent variable in this model. This indi-
cator variable has the value 1 if the self-employed reports health problems upon buying
income insurance. The (relatively objective) explanatory variables are related to the
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previously experienced physical health problems that are reported by the self-employed
upon buying income insurance; see Table 6.1. The resulting latent health index is rear-
ranged in percentiles, where the ﬁrst percentile represents the best health and the 100th
percentile the poorest health. The interpretation of the latent health index is that it is
the conditional expectation of current physical ill-health given previously experienced
physical health problems.
The estimation results for the probit model can be found in the appendix. Most
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and have the expected positive sign, while the probit model’s
pseudo R2 equals 17.4%. We calculate the average values of the probit-based latent
physical health measure for diﬀerent subgroups of policyholders. Self-employed who
report no health problems upon buying income insurance have an average value of 47.0,
while individuals with health issues have an average value of 77.2. Smaller diﬀerences
in initial health exist between claimants (52.2) and non-claimants (49.5). Moreover,
individuals with limited coverage have an average health index of 61.5, while those with
full coverage have an average health index of 46.7. Self-employed with limited coverage
also report more current health problems than policyholders with full coverage (19.5%
versus 7.3%) and more frequently report past health problems. On average men are in
better initial physical health than women. Their average health scores equal 48.9 and
56.3, respectively. Women also report more current health problems than men (12.1%
versus 9.7%), and also report more previously experienced health problems.
Our analysis distinguishes between initial physical and mental health and allow men-
tal health to have a diﬀerent impact on disability transitions than other dimensions of
health; see García-Gómez et al. (2010) who also make this distinction in their study
of labor market transitions. We use previously experienced mental health problems as
an indicator of initial mental health. The indicator variable for mental health health
problems takes the value 1 when the policyholder reports any previously experienced
mental health problems in the questionnaire upon buying income insurance. The indi-
cator for mental health is motivated by the observation that many mental disorders are
persistent and show high rates of recurrence (e.g., Spijker et al., 2002).
Because physical health, mental health and lifestyle habits are measured upon buying
income insurance, they are predetermined with respect to the subsequent disability
transitions. By contrast, some studies measure both the onset of disability and health
problems around the same time (e.g., Johansson and Palme, 1996).
6.4 Methodology
This section discusses the empirical framework for modeling the impact of health and
lifestyle habits on entries into and exits out of disability.
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6.4.1 Mixed proportional hazard model
The focus of this study is on the hazard rates corresponding to self-employed workers’
entries into and exists out of disability. Hazard rates are particularly suitable to deal
with censored and truncated data. We are interested in the incidence-of-disability rate
and the recovery-from-disability rate. We will henceforth refer to these hazard rates
as the ‘incidence rate’ and the ‘recovery rate’. The incidence rate is based on self-
employed workers’ duration until the ﬁrst disability, while the recovery rate is derived
from the disability durations. Both durations are potentially right-censored. We are
mainly interested in the way these two hazard rates are aﬀected by risk factors related
to health and lifestyle habits.
The disability rate reﬂects the risk of becoming disabled at time t, conditional on no
disability until time t. We use a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model to specify
the disability rate. The MPH model has been shown to be particularly suitable for
modelling durations in economics and has been widely used in other studies in the ﬁeld
(Van den Berg, 2001). The MPH model is of the form
λD(t | X, v) = λD0 (t) exp(X ′βD + v), (6.1)
where X is a KD-dimensional vector of observed covariates (where D stands for ‘dis-
ability’), βD a vector of coeﬃcients of the same dimension, and λD0 (·) the baseline
hazard. Moreover, v reﬂects individual-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity, which can be
interpreted as a function of unobserved explanatory variables (Van den Berg, 2001).
Similarly, the recovery rate reﬂects the rate of recovery at time t, conditional on no
recovery until time t. We also use a MPH model to specify the recovery rate:
λR(t | Z,w) = λR0 (t) exp(Z ′βR + w), (6.2)
where Z is a KR-dimensional vector of observed covariates (where R stands for ‘recov-
ery’) containing possibly (but necessarily) diﬀerent covariates than X, βR a vector of
coeﬃcients of the same dimension, and λR0 (·) the baseline hazard. Moreover, w reﬂects
individual-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity.
Throughout, we account for unobserved individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity to capture
any omitted variables related to e.g. education, risk aversion, and individual workplace
heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity, when not taken into account, aﬀects the shape
of the baseline hazard function and may lead to a downwards bias in the estimated model
coeﬃcients and duration dependence; see e.g. Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (2002). More
details about unobserved heterogeneity will be provided in Section 6.4.2.
The single-spell and multi-spell MPH models are non-parametrically identiﬁed under
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the assumptions listed in Van den Berg (2001); see also Honoré, 1993 for MPH models.
In the single-spell case these assumptions include the requirement that there is at least
one continuous covariate and that the unobserved heterogeneity is independent of the
covariates.
Health and lifestyle conditions are likely to impact diﬀerently on the hazard rates
associated with diﬀerent disorders. For example, a poor mental health is likely to have
a large impact on the occurrence of mental problems and a less substantial eﬀect on
physical impairments such as fractures. We therefore estimate a competing risks version
of the MPH model for disability incidence, distinguishing between diﬀerent disorders
causing the disability (e.g., Markussen et al., 2011). We therefore adopt an independent
competing risks approach. The hazard rate corresponding to the m-th competing risk
equals
λCm(t | X,u) = λm0 (t) exp(X ′βmC + u), (6.3)
where βmC is a vector of coeﬃcients of dimension KD, λm0 (·) the baseline hazard and u
the individual-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity.
6.4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
We follow the standard approach in the economic literature to model dependence among
multiple durations and assume that, conditional on the observed covariates and the un-
observed heterogeneity, a policyholder’s duration until the ﬁrst claim is independent of
any subsequent disability spells (Van den Berg, 2001, Section 8.1). Similarly, we assume
that, conditional on the observed covariates and the individual-speciﬁc unobserved het-
erogeneity, multiple disability durations corresponding to the same policyholder are
independent. Conditional on the observed covariates only, however, durations of the
same policyholder are dependent due to the related unobserved determinants. Note
that the relation between the durations of the same policyholder is spurious to the
extent that it only follows from the unobserved heterogeneity. Durations of diﬀerent
policyholders are independent.
Throughout, we assume a Weibull baseline hazard (allowing for constant, increasing,
or decreasing duration dependence) and a discrete Heckman-Singer frailty distribution
with an endogenous number of mass points (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Heckman-
Singer frailty is a non-parametric way of modeling unobserved heterogeneity. The
frailty probability distribution in the incidence model satisﬁes IP(v = vi) = pi, where∑N
i=1 pi = 1 in case of a Heckman-Singer frailty distribution with N mass points (where
the appropriate value of N is determined by the Heckman-Singer procedure). Later we
will run robustness checks using partial likelihood and gamma frailty, while leaving the
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baseline hazard unspeciﬁed.
We estimate the hazard rates for disability incidence and recovery separately using
marginal maximum likelihood (ML), resulting in estimates of βD, βR, λD0 (·), λR0 (·)
and the marginal frailty probability distributions f(v) and g(w). For the independent
competing risks approach we estimate separate MPH models for the various competing
risks, yielding estimates of βmC , λm0 (·) and the frailty distributions hm(u), for each m.
The appendix provides explicit expressions for all log-likelihood functions estimated in
this study.
Additional eﬃciency can be achieved by joint ML estimation of the incidence and
recovery rates as speciﬁed in Equations (6.1) and (6.2), resulting in a multivariate MPH
model (Van den Berg, 2001). Joint estimation requires explicit assumptions about the
speciﬁc form of the joint frailty probability distribution k(v, w). For example, one can
assume two shared frailty terms in both the incidence and recovery rates, combined with
a two-factor loading (Van den Berg, 2001). Because the beneﬁt of additional eﬃciency
due to joint estimation is oﬀset by the need for additional distributional assumptions
and the substantial increase in computational complexity, we conﬁne our main analysis
to marginal ML estimation of the incidence and recovery rates.
6.4.3 Selection eﬀects
Our insurance portfolio is potentially subject to health-related selection into self- em-
ployment (see e.g. Rietveld et al., 2013), adverse selection and risk-selection by the
insurance company. Furthermore, the policyholders are relatively young, with an av-
erage age of 35 years upon buying income insurance. Because the insurance portfolio
consists entirely of relatively young self-employed with disability insurance, it is not
possible to disentangle, analyze or control for the aforementioned selection eﬀects. Our
analysis is conditional on the selection, which is a common feature of studies using
insurance data (e.g. Spierdijk et al., 2009; Spierdijk and Koning, 2014). A conditional
analysis like ours is still relevant from an insurance perspective, because it can con-
tribute to more eﬀective criteria for risk selection and underwriting, the development
of risk-based insurance premiums for income insurance as described in Spierdijk and
Koning (2014), prevention of disability among self-employed, and optimization of their
return-to-work process.
We do control for selection with respect to the generosity of the insurance contract
though. Our sample contains policyholders with diﬀerent types of insurance contracts.
The contracts may diﬀer in terms of full/limited coverage, the length of the deferment
period and the level of the replacement income. Since the diﬀerent types of income
insurance contracts are not randomly assigned to self-employed, signiﬁcant unobserved
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diﬀerences could arise between policyholders with diﬀerent income insurance contracts
(Hill et al., 2013). For example, self-employed with diﬀerent deferment periods may
also diﬀer in terms of unobserved risk factors (Cox and Gustavson, 1995). Individuals
choosing a short deferment period are possibly more risk averse than those opting for
a longer waiting time (Spierdijk et al., 2009). Pooling policyholders with long and
short deferment periods could therefore bias the estimation results. Throughout, we
account for selection on the basis of policyholders’ unobserved risk factors by estimating
separate MPHmodels for diﬀerent subgroups of policyholders, such as those with limited
coverage or a speciﬁc deferment period.
Similarly, we estimate separate MPH models for self-employed with diﬀerent lifestyle
habits (such as smokers and non-smokers), for men and women, and for self-employed
belonging to a speciﬁc occupational class. Estimating separate MPHmodels for diﬀerent
subgroups allows for group-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity and additionally permits
the observed risk factors to impact diﬀerently on the incidence and recovery rates of
diﬀerent groups.
Another form of selection arises when policyholders leave the sample because they
do not want to continue their insurance policy (lapsing) or because they die. We deal
with this form of selection by marking the relevant durations as censored.
6.5 Transitions into disability
This section uses survival analysis to assess the impact of health and lifestyle habits on
self-employed workers’ transitions into disability.
6.5.1 Full sample
We estimate a MPH model for the duration until the ﬁrst claim. The corresponding
incidence rate is speciﬁed as in Equation (6.1). Apart from initial physical and mental
health, we also correct for policyholders’ socio-demographic characteristics (age and gen-
der), occupational class (agriculture, technical and industrial, medical and paramedical,
retail and wholesale, commercial and administrative, care and services), the character-
istics of the insurance contract (full/limited coverage, deferment period, replacement
income), and cohort eﬀects (using time dummies based on the year in which the in-
surance policy was bought).11 The policyholder’s age enters the model both linearly
and quadratically to capture any nonlinearities. To account for cohort and time-ﬁxed
eﬀects, caused by e.g. institutional changes, changes over time in the business cycle
11Due to the small percentage of policyholders working in the transport sector, we have aggregated
this occupational class with technical and industrial professions.
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and changes in the conditions of the insurance policy, we include cohort dummies for
the year in which the insurance policy was bought.
Throughout, we focus on the impact of health and lifestyle habits on the risk of
becoming disabled. For completeness we also report the eﬀects of age and gender
here.12
The estimation results can be found in ﬁrst panel of Table 6.3, captioned ‘all disorders’.
The estimates in the column captioned ‘exp(βD)’ reﬂect hazard ratios, which boil down
to the exponentiated coeﬃcients. They reﬂect the change in the hazard rate due to
a ceteris paribus unit increase in one of the explanatory variables. They facilitate
interpretation of marginal eﬀects. For the gender dummy, for example, the hazard ratio
expresses the hazard rate of a male self-employed as a percentage of the hazard rate of
a comparable female self-employed. For continuous covariates, such as age, the hazard
ratio expresses the hazard rate of somebody aged n+1 as a fraction of the hazard rate
of somebody aged n, ceteris paribus.13
Initial physical ill-health leads to a signiﬁcantly higher risk of entering disability in
a later stage, ceteris paribus. A self-employed with a latent physical health score of 75
has a 12% higher risk of becoming disabled than a policyholder with initial health score
50. Persons who experienced mental health problems prior to buying income insurance
have a 26% higher incidence rate than persons who did not experience such disorders.
Hence, the eﬀect of poor mental health is equivalent to a deterioration in physical health
of more than 50 percentage points. The eﬀects of initial physical and mental ill-health
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Smokers have a 22% higher risk of entering disability;
an eﬀect that is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The distinction between current and past
smoking is important, because the increased risk of becoming disabled only applies to
current smokers and not to past smokers. We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for being
overweight, playing sports and drinking alcohol.14 There is a large and highly signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in disability risk between men and women. Men have a 36% lower risk of
becoming disabled than women. The signiﬁcant gender eﬀect may be caused by large
diﬀerences between men and women in living conditions, lifestyle, education, family
situation, social network, violence, and total (paid and unpaid) workload (Alexanderson
et al., 1996). As expected, old age goes hand in hand with a signiﬁcantly higher risk
12The eﬀects of the remaining risk factors and a detailed interpretation are available upon request.
13Throughout, we scale all durations by a factor 100 to avoid hazard rates that become too small in
the numerical optimization of the MPH models. This scaling only aﬀects the scale of the estimated
frailty mass points.
14The answers to the open-end questions about the self-employed workers’ smoking and drinking
behavior allow us to reﬁne the information for some policyholders, for example by considering the
amount of cigarettes smoked per day. Unfortunately, not all self-employed complete the open questions
with the same amount of detail, due to which the reﬁned variables contain many missing values. We
therefore only use the indicator variables for drinking, smoking and playing sports.
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of becoming disabled, but the relation between age and disability risk is non-linear.15
It follows a parabola that opens upward. The disability risk is lowest around the age
of 25. Unobserved heterogeneity is captured by a Heckman-Singer frailty distribution
with two mass points, which divides the sample into self-employed with favorable (84%
of the sample) and unfavorable (16%) unobserved risk factors.
We establish increasing duration dependence, indicating that the risk of becoming
disabled increases with the time elapsed since the start of the insurance contract. This
result will turn out robust across all speciﬁcations estimated.
6.5.2 Subgroup estimations: good vs. bad lifestyle habits
To test whether certain bad lifestyle habits exacerbate the impact of other bad lifestyle
habits and initial health on the risk of becoming disabled, we estimate the MPH for the
incidence rate separately for the following subgroups of workers: (1) policyholders who
have never smoked and those who currently smoke or smoked in the past; (2) overweight
and normal-weight policyholders; (3) policyholders who drink and those who don’t; (4)
policyholders who play sports and those who don’t. By estimating separate MPH
models for diﬀerent subgroups, we allow for group-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity
and additionally permit the observed risk factors to impact diﬀerently on the incidence
rates of these groups.
The subgroup estimations show that being overweight is the only lifestyle factor that
exacerbates the relation between health, lifestyle and disability incidence. The estima-
tion results for normal-weight and overweight policyholders are shown in Table 6.4.16
Overweight exacerbates the eﬀect of mental-ill health on the risk of becoming disabled.
For normal-weight policyholders initial mental health does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
risk of becoming disabled. By contrast, for overweight policyholders this variable is
highly signiﬁcant, implying that mental ill-health is an important risk factor for the
onset of disability among overweight policyholders. These outcomes suggest that the
signiﬁcance of initial mental health as established in the MPH model applied to all
policyholders (see Section 6.5.1) is due to those who are overweight and emphasize the
importance of the subgroup analysis. The interrelatedness of overweight and mental
health problems is well-known from the medical literature (e.g., Larsson et al., 2002)
and now turns out to aﬀect disability incidence as well. We emphasize that these results
are not driven by the group of obese policyholders. They continue to hold when we
leave out the latter group of self-employed and only consider overweight policyholders
whose bodymass index is between 25 and 30.
15In all models the two age coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant according to a Wald test.
16The estimation results for the other lifestyle subgroups are omitted to save space, but available
upon request.
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Several other results emerge from Table 6.4. Smoking does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
incidence rate of policyholders with a normal weight, while for overweight policyholders
this variable is highly signiﬁcant. The latter ﬁnding suggests that the adverse eﬀect of
smoking on disability incidence driven by the group of overweight policyholders. The
coeﬃcient of initial physical health has a relatively high magnitude in the model for
policyholders with a normal weight; it is even signiﬁcantly larger than in the model for
overweight policyholders according to a Wald test. A possible explanation is that the
dominance of mental health problems masks the onset of physical health problems in
the group of overweight policyholders.
6.5.3 Subgroup estimations: gender, generosity of the insurance
contract, occupational class
The literature has shown that the eﬀects of health on labor market transitions might
diﬀer across men and women (García-Gómez et al., 2010; Kapteyn and Meijer, 2013).
Furthermore, male and female self-employed might also diﬀer in terms of unobserved
heterogeneity. We therefore estimate the MPH model separately for men and women;
see the ﬁrst panel (men) and the second panel (women) of Table 6.5. The eﬀect of initial
physical and mental health is signiﬁcant for both men and women, but for women the
two eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 5% level only. The reduced signiﬁcance for women is
likely due to the relatively modest percentage of women in the portfolio (15%). The
magnitude of the eﬀect of initial physical and mental health does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
across male and female self-employed workers, according to a Wald test. We establish
gender diﬀerences in the way smoking and playing sports aﬀects the risk of becoming
disabled though. For men, the risk of becoming disabled is 24% higher for smokers
than for non-smokers; this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Yet there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in disability incidence between smoking and non-smoking women. Of the 15%
women in our sample, only about 16% reports positive on being a current smoker, which
might be insuﬃcient to establish a signiﬁcant eﬀect for smoking. Another explanation is
that women may smoke less than men. Another gender diﬀerence relates to the impact
of playing sports on becoming disabled. Although playing sports does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the risk of becoming disabled for men, it does for women. Female self-employed
who do sports have a 21% lower risk of entering disability; an eﬀect that is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. A possible explanation is that women do diﬀerent types of sports than
men (e.g., sports with less injury risk) or that they exercise more frequently than men.
We will come back to this issue later in Section 6.5.4. We emphasize that the estimation
results for men and women do virtually not change when we allow for gender-speciﬁc
measures of initial physical health.
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Self-employed with limited coverage are not fully insured against disability. Usu-
ally the disorders excluded from coverage are the ones that the self-employed suﬀered
from prior to or upon buying income insurance. Our sample only contains policyhold-
ers’ claims that are not excluded from coverage. In Section 6.3.4 we reported that
self-employed with limited coverage report more current health problems than policy-
holders with full coverage (19.5% versus 7.3%) and that they also experience more
previously experienced complaints. For example, self-employed with limited coverage
more frequently report previously experienced mental complaints than policyholders
with full coverage (21.7% versus 7.9%). Moreover, the former group has a worse initial
physical health than the latter group (61.5 versus 46.7). Policyholders with limited
and full coverage may also diﬀer in terms of unobserved risk factors. We now present
a more formal analysis by estimating separate MPH models for the two groups; see
the third panel (full coverage) and fourth panel (limited coverage) of Table 6.5. The
coeﬃcient of initial physical health remains signiﬁcant when the sample is restricted
to those with limited coverage (albeit at the 5% level), while the eﬀect of previously
experienced mental health problems is no longer signiﬁcant. The insurance company’s
risk selection on the basis of previously experienced mental health becomes apparent
here: for self-employed with limited coverage the risk of becoming disabled is not sig-
niﬁcantly related to their initial mental health. Yet initial physical health signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the risk of becoming disabled for those with limited coverage and the magnitude
of this eﬀect does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those with full coverage. We also observe
that the eﬀect of smoking is no longer signiﬁcant for the group with limited coverage.
This suggests that heavy smokers, with a high risk of developing health problems due
to smoking, have been given limited coverage.
The sample statistics show that self-employed with a short/medium deferment pe-
riod tend to diﬀer from policyholders with a long deferment period mainly in terms
of the occupational class and only marginally in terms of other observed risk factors
such as initial health. The percentage of self-employed with an agricultural profession
is particularly high among those with a long deferment period, while the percentage of
technical and industrial professions is relatively low. As noted in Spierdijk et al. (2009),
self-employed with diﬀerent deferment periods may also diﬀer in terms of unobserved
risk factors. Another complication related to the deferment period is that policyholders
with a longer deferment period might not always report their illness to the insurance
company when the illness is not expected to lead to a disability duration in excess of
the deferment period, resulting in selection eﬀects with respect to the severeness of the
claims ﬁled. We investigate the consequences of these issues in more detail by estimating
a separate MPH model for policyholders with a 1-month deferment period. This rela-
tively homogenous group covers 50.2% of the total sample. The estimation results in the
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ﬁrst panel of Table 6.6 (captioned ‘1-month deferment period’) diﬀer only marginally
from the full sample results reported in Table 6.3. The lack of notable diﬀerences sug-
gests that selection on the basis of unobserved characteristics and underreporting of
minor health problems has only little impact on the estimation results.
The second panel of Table 6.6 (captioned ‘technical and industrial professions’) dis-
plays the estimation results for the MPH model applied to policyholders with technical
and industrial professions. Technical and industrial professions are the largest occupa-
tional class in our sample with 31% of the policyholders belonging to this group. Again,
the subsample and full-sample estimates are similar.
We re-estimate all MPH models for the incidence rate and include interaction terms
between the lifestyle indicators and the measures for physical and mental health. This
extended speciﬁcation allows bad lifestyle habits and physical and mental ill-health to
exacerbate each other’s eﬀect on the risk of becoming disabled. In several models the
interaction between the indicators for overweight and initial mental health problems
turns out signiﬁcantly positive. This is the case in the model for men and in the model
for policyholders with limited coverage. In these two models overweight and mental
ill-health exacerbate each other’s eﬀect on the risk of becoming disabled. Furthermore,
we observe that the indicator for mental health problems loses its signiﬁcance in the
presence of the interaction variable in the model for male policyholders. The latter
ﬁnding suggests that the adverse eﬀect of mental ill-health on disability incidence among
men is driven by the group of overweight policyholders.
6.5.4 Competing risks approach
The results until sofar have revealed a signiﬁcant impact of initial physical and mental
health on transitions into disability. We expect that initial health will have a less
substantial inﬂuence on minor complaints than on more severe disabilities. Similarly,
we expect initial mental health to be a very important predictor of disability due to
mental problems. We therefore continue the analysis with independent competing risks
models (e.g., Van den Berg, 2001). In our speciﬁc setting competing risks models boil
down to MPH model applied to self-employed who enter disability due to a speciﬁc
disorder; see also Markussen et al. (2011).
Because certain disorders are observed relatively infrequently, we cannot estimate
separate MPH models for each speciﬁc ICD-10 disorder. We therefore restrict the com-
peting risks analysis to three main categories. We ﬁrst estimate a separate MPH model
for self-employed who become disabled due to mental disorders (such as depression and
burn-out). We also estimate a separate MPH model for policyholders who enter dis-
ability due to muscular-skeletal disorders, injury and poisoning (henceforth referred to
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as physical impairments, since poisoning occurs only once in our sample). This disease
category encompasses disorders such as a fractured ankle and low back pain. Finally, we
estimate a MPH model for policyholders who enter disability due to severe conditions
(including cancer, diseases of blood and blood-forming organs, circulatory disorders, en-
docrine and nervous diseases); see Smith (2004) who identiﬁes severe conditions in a
similar way.
Section 6.5.1 has shown that initial physical and mental ill-health, as well as being
a smoker, signiﬁcantly increases the risk of entering disability on the aggregate level.
Panels 2 – 4 of Table 6.3 reﬁne these results.17 There is considerable heterogeneity in
terms of the disorder causing the disability. Physical ill-health, mental ill-health, smok-
ing and a lack of physical exercise signiﬁcantly increase the risk of entering disability
due to a mental disorder. The positive eﬀect of playing sports on disability outcomes
(which is signiﬁcant at the 10% level) is in line with results reported in the medical
literature (e.g., Duijts et al., 2007; Hendriksen et al., 2010). It is also consistent with
studies showing that physical exercise has a positive inﬂuence on avoiding depression
(e.g., Mammen and Faulkner, 2013). The inﬂuence of physical exercise is not merely
positive though. Doing sports increases the risk of becoming disabled due to physical
impairments by 15%. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Since physical impair-
ments include injuries such as a fractured ankle, this eﬀect is likely to reﬂect sports
injuries.
The economic relevance of the aforementioned health and lifestyle eﬀects is substan-
tial. An increase in the physical health score of 25 percentage points results in a 8.5%
drop in the incidence rate of mental disorders; self-employed whose experienced mental
disorders in the past have a 74% higher incidence rate than individuals who did not;
smoking increases the risk of becoming disabled by 42%; and playing sports reduces
the risk of entering disability due to a mental disorder by 17%. As expected, the eﬀect
of initial mental health on the risk of becoming disabled due to a mental disorder is
signiﬁcantly higher than the eﬀect of initial mental health on the overall incidence rate.
This conﬁrms evidence from the medical literature that mental disorders tend to be
persistent and recurring (e.g., Spijker et al., 2002).
Several other eﬀects are worth mentioning. Initial physical ill-health signiﬁcantly
increases the disability risk due to physical impairments: an increase in the physical
health score of 25 percentage points results in a 10% rise in the incidence rate. The risk
of entering disability due to severe conditions is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by previously
experienced mental health problems, but is signiﬁcantly increased by initial physical
ill-health. As before, drinking alcohol does not have signiﬁcant impact on the risk of
becoming disabled.
17The complete estimation results are available upon request.
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Smoking signiﬁcantly increases the risk of becoming disabled, regardless of the dis-
order causing the incapacity. In particular, we ﬁnd that smokers are exposed to an
increased risk of entering disability due to a mental disorder. Although the literature
has shown that the relation between smoking and mental health is complex, there is
indeed evidence that smoking increases the risk of getting mental disorders (Cuijpers
et al., 2007; West and Jarvis, 2005). The relation between smoking and disability due
to severe conditions such as cancer and cardiovascular diseases is well-known from the
medical literature.
There are no signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the risk of entering disability due to
physical impairments, but there are such diﬀerences with respect to the risk of becoming
disabled due to mental problems and severe conditions though. Men face a signiﬁcantly
lower risk of entering disability than women in these two cases. The higher disability
risk of women due to mental disorders is in line with evidence from the medical literature
that women have a higher risk of getting mental disorders (WHO, 2000).18
Because of potential diﬀerences between men and women, we estimate the competing
risks models for men only as a robustness check; see Table 6.7.19 The aforementioned
results remain valid, with two main exceptions. For men, playing sports does not sig-
niﬁcantly decrease the risk of becoming disabled due to a mental disorder. This seems
in line with the result in Table 6.5 that only for women playing sports signiﬁcantly
decreases the risk of becoming disabled in general. Second, for men previously experi-
enced mental health problems signiﬁcantly increase the risk of becoming disabled due
to severe conditions. It is worth noting here that the severe conditions of the men and
women in our sample diﬀer a lot. For women we frequently observe breast and ovarium
cancer as severe conditions, while for men cardiovascular diseases prevail.20 The rela-
tion between mental disorders and cardiovascular diseases is conﬁrmed by the medical
literature, where it has been shown that depression is a risk factor for the onset of a
wide range of cardiovascular diseases; (e.g., Van der Kooy et al., 2007).
We re-estimate all competing risks models and include interaction terms between the
lifestyle indicators and the measures for physical and mental health. The interaction
between the indicators for overweight and initial mental health problems is the only
interaction term that turns out signiﬁcant in some of the competing risks speciﬁcations.
This interaction term is signiﬁcantly positive in the MPH model for entry into disability
18We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant unobserved heterogeneity for self-employed entering disability due to
a mental disorder; the estimated Heckman-Singer frailty distribution is degenerate. We establish
unfavorable frailty (resulting in relatively slow recovery) for 98.7% of the policyholders that enter
disability due to severe conditions.
19We do not have enough female self-employed in the sample to estimate the competing risks models
for women only.
20Because we do not have enough observations per disease category, it is not possible to use the more
detailed information about the speciﬁc disorder in the MPH model.
186 Chapter 6. Health, Lifestyle and Disability Transitions of Self-Employed Workers
due to physical impairments and in the MPHmodel for entry into disability due to severe
conditions. In the latter two models overweight and mental ill-health exacerbate each
other’s eﬀect on the risk of becoming disabled. None of the interaction terms turns out
signiﬁcant in the competing risks models for men.
6.6 Transitions out of disability
This section uses MPH models to assess the impact of health and lifestyle factors on
self-employed workers’ transitions out of disability.
6.6.1 Full sample
We include the same covariates as in the incidence model, with three exceptions. First,
the included cohort dummies now apply to the year in which the disability started.
Second, we measure age at the moment of becoming disabled. Third, we account for
the type of disorder causing the disability using the health information in the medical
certiﬁcate that is supplied with each disability claim. In the MPH model we use the
aggregated disease categories (1) mental disorders, (2) physical impairments (muscular-
skeletal disorders, injuries and poisoning), (3) severe conditions (neoplasms, diseases of
blood and blood-forming organs, circulatory disorders, endocrine and nervous diseases),
(4) unknown diseases and (5) mild disorders (infectious, eye, ear, respiratory, digestive,
skin and genitourinary diseases). The latter category is chosen as the benchmark cat-
egory in the estimations. We conﬁne the discussion here to the health and lifestyle
related factors, type of disorder, gender, and age.21 The ﬁrst panel of Table 6.8 (cap-
tioned ‘full sample’) reports the relevant estimation results for a MPH model with a
three mass-point Heckman-Singer frailty distribution applied to the entire set of disabil-
ity durations.
Initial physical health does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the speed of recovery.
Having mental problems prior to buying income insurance slows down recovery by 21%
though. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Physical ill-health thus has a much
more substantial eﬀect on the incidence rate than on the recovery rate, while the eﬀect
of mental ill-health on entry into and exit out of disability is of the same magnitude.
Policyholders with overweight have a 7% lower recovery rate than those with a normal
weight, but the p-value is slightly too large for this eﬀect to be signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. Both smoking and playing sports do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the recovery
rate. Somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁnd that drinking alcohol increases the recovery rate
by 11%; an eﬀect that is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. It is well-known that moderate
21Complete estimation results are available upon request.
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alcohol intake is associated with a decreased risk of cardiovascular disease (e.g., O’Keefe
et al., 2007), yet it is diﬃcult to use this result to explain faster recovery from disability.
It seems more likely that drinkers are more healthy than non-drinkers. A possible
explanation could be that many non-drinkers are former drinkers who have quitted
for health reasons, explaining why they are less healthy and recover more slowly than
people who still drink (Cook and Moore, 2000). These considerations illustrate that we
should be cautious in interpreting our results as causal eﬀects. Despite our eﬀorts to
control for unobserved heterogeneity and selection eﬀects with respect to the properties
of the insurance contract, it is possible that we have not fully controlled for factors that
aﬀect both lifestyle (or health) and disability. In such a scenario the estimated eﬀects
would reﬂect correlations instead of causal relations.
Relative to mild diseases (the benchmark category), mental disorders have a 84%
lower recovery rate (which is signiﬁcant at each reasonable signiﬁcance level). For se-
vere conditions this percentage equals 64%. The negative eﬀects of muscular-skeletal
disorders and injuries on the recovery rate are also signiﬁcant, but of a lesser magnitude
(42% and 25%, respectively). The recovery rate of unknown diseases does not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀer from the benchmark category. The signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of mental
disorders on self-employed workers’ recovery rate is in line with the results of Spierdijk
et al. (2009) and Spierdijk and Koning (2014) and also coincides with what has been
found for employees (e.g., Duijts et al., 2007; Koopmans et al., 2011; Knudsen et al.,
2013).
The recovery rate of men is 16% higher than that of women, with signiﬁcance at the
5% level. As mentioned before, the signiﬁcant gender eﬀect may be caused by diﬀerences
between men and women in living conditions, lifestyle, education, family situation,
social network, violence, and total (paid and unpaid) workload (Alexanderson et al.,
1996). Spierdijk and Koning (2014) ﬁnd that self-employed men recover faster than
women, while Spierdijk et al. (2009) do not establish any signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences
in the speed of recovery. This diversity in results suggests that the eﬀect of gender on
recovery from disability can be very sample speciﬁc, which could be related to the fact
that both their and our sample contains relatively few female self-employed. The eﬀect
of age on the recovery rate is signiﬁcant and described by a concave and decreasing
function.
Unobserved heterogeneity is captured by a three-point Heckman-Singer frailty distri-
bution, which divides the sample into self-employed with favorable, medium favorable
and unfavorable unobserved risk factors (64%, 21%, and 15% of the policyholders, re-
spectively). Estimation of the same MPH model without frailty reveals a considerably
lower log-likelihood value, illustrating the importance of accounting for frailty. The
important role for unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the cross-sectional variation
188 Chapter 6. Health, Lifestyle and Disability Transitions of Self-Employed Workers
in recovery rates is in line with the ﬁndings of Markussen et al. (2011) (employees) and
Spierdijk and Koning (2014) (self-employed).
In line with Spierdijk and Koning (2014), we establish increasing duration dependence.
This indicates that the recovery rate increases with the time elapsed since the start of
the disability.
6.6.2 Subgroup estimations: good vs. bad lifestyle habits
To test whether certain bad lifestyle habits exacerbate the impact of other bad lifestyle
habits and initial health on recovery from disability, we estimate the MPH model sepa-
rately for the following subgroups of workers: (1) policyholders who have never smoked
and those who currently smoke or smoked in the past; (2) overweight and normal-weight
policyholders; (3) policyholders who drink and those don’t; (4) policyholders who play
sports and those who don’t. As before, estimating separate MPH models for diﬀerent
subgroups allows for group-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity and additionally permits
the observed risk factors to impact diﬀerently on the recovery rates of these groups.
The subgroup estimations reveal that being a current or past smoker is the only
lifestyle factor that exacerbates the relation between health, lifestyle and recovery. The
estimation results for smokers and non-smokers are in shown Table 6.9. Physical and
mental ill-health signiﬁcantly slow down smokers’ recovery. For non-smokers, however,
neither physical health nor mental health signiﬁcantly aﬀect the recovery rate. The
relation between smoking and (both mental and physical) ill-health is well-known from
the literature and now also turns out to aﬀect recovery from disability.
Two other ﬁndings emerge from Table 6.9. For smokers drinking alcohol has a positive
impact on the recovery rate (similar to what we found for the full sample), while its
eﬀect is insigniﬁcant for non-smokers. Furthermore, overweight signiﬁcantly slows down
smokers’ recovery rate, while overweight turns out insigniﬁcant for non-smokers. The
medical literature has already shown that the combination of smoking and overweight
involves considerable health risks (Akbartabartoori et al., 2006). Our results point out
that the combination of these two bad lifestyle habits has substantial adverse eﬀects on
recovery from disability.
The insigniﬁcance of initial mental health in the model for non-smokers in combi-
nation with the signiﬁcance of the mental health measure for smokers suggests that
the signiﬁcance of initial mental health in the overall model of Section 6.6.1 is driven
by the current and past smokers among the policyholders. Similarly, the estimation
results suggest that the (almost) signiﬁcance of overweight in the overall model of Sec-
tion 6.6.1 is due to the current and past smokers among the policyholders. These results
emphasize once more the importance of our subgroup analysis.
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6.6.3 Subgroup estimations: gender, generosity of the insurance
contract, occupational class
Bearing in mind the possibility of selection on the basis of unobserved risk factors, we
apply a subsample analysis to assess the robustness of our results. We focus on the
following populations: men, policyholders with full coverage, self-employed with a 1-
month deferment period, and policyholders with a technical or industrial profession.
The estimation results are displayed in Tables 6.8 (panels 2 – 5). We observe several
diﬀerences in comparison with the full sample as displayed in the ﬁrst panel of Tables 6.8.
Men with overweight have a 10% lower recovery rate than men with a normal weight.
The p-value of this eﬀect is 0.03. In the full-sample model the p-value of the overweight
coeﬃcient just exceeds 0.10. Drinking alcohol does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
recovery rate of men, while it signiﬁcantly increases the recovery rate for the full-sample.
Drinking alcohol does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the recovery rate of claimants with
full coverage, but we notice that the p-value only slightly exceeds 0.10. Drinking alcohol
and being male does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the recovery rate of self-employed with
a 1-month deferment period. For policyholders in technical and industrial professions
(which are virtually all men) drinking alcohol does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the recovery rate, while being overweight slows down their hazard rate by 19% (with
signiﬁcance at the 1% level). Given the diﬀerences across subsamples, there might have
been some selection on the basis of unobserved risk factors. Yet the eﬀects of physical
and mental ill-health, overweight, female gender and the type of disorder are fairly
robust across diﬀerent subsamples.
We re-estimate all MPH models for the recovery rate and allow for interaction be-
tween the lifestyle indicators and the measures for physical and mental health. However,
these interaction terms do not turn out signiﬁcant. As in Section 6.6.2, we ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant interaction between the indicators for current/past smoking and overweight in all
previously estimated MPH models for the recovery rate. The resulting MPH model
allows smoking and overweight to exacerbate each other’s eﬀect on the recovery rate.
In all models the mental health measure continues to be signiﬁcant in the presence of
the interaction term, while the indicator for overweight loses its signiﬁcance. This result
suggests that the signiﬁcance of overweight in the previously estimated subgroup mod-
els is due to the current and past smokers among the policyholders. The combination
of smoking and overweight has considerable adverse eﬀects on recovery from disability,
which extends the ﬁnding in the medical literature that the combination of smoking
and overweight involves substantial health risks (Akbartabartoori et al., 2006).
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6.7 Conclusions
Because of the important economic role of insurance companies oﬀering income insur-
ance to self-employed, this case study has analyzed self-employed workers’ disability
outcomes from an insurance perspective.
Using the income insurance portfolio of the largest Dutch insurance company, our
mixed proportional hazards approach has revealed that physical ill-health, mental ill-
health and bad lifestyle habits generally have adverse eﬀects on the disability outcomes
of self-employed workers with income insurance. Yet the main result of our study is that
accurate assessment of the relation between health, lifestyle and disability outcomes
requires a subgroup analysis that distinguishes several groups of policyholders, such
as smokers and non-smokers, overweight and normal-weight self-employed, and men
and women. The subgroup analysis is crucial because important diﬀerences between
subgroups tend to vanish in an aggregate analysis.
More speciﬁcally, we have shown that the impact of mental ill-health and smoking on
the risk of becoming disabled is exacerbated by overweight, while the eﬀects of physical
ill-health, mental ill-health and overweight on recovery from disability are exacerbated
by current and past smoking. We have also established signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
male and female self-employed. Men and women diﬀer in the way smoking and playing
sports aﬀect their risk of becoming disabled. Furthermore, they also diﬀer in the way
mental ill-health aﬀects their risk of becoming disabled due to a mental disorder or
severe conditions such as cancer. The results continue to hold after correction for other
risk factors and possible selection eﬀects with respect to the properties of the insurance
contract. Furthermore, the eﬀects of health and lifestyle habits are both statistically
signiﬁcant and economically relevant.
Our ﬁndings can contribute to more eﬀective criteria for risk selection and underwrit-
ing, the development of risk-based insurance premiums for income insurance, prevention
of disability among self-employed, and optimization of their return-to-work process.
We would like to emphasize that some caution is required in interpreting our estimates
as purely causal eﬀects. Despite our eﬀorts to control for unobserved heterogeneity and
selection eﬀects with respect to the properties of the insurance contract, it is possible
that we have not fully controlled for factors that aﬀect both lifestyle (or health) and
disability. In such a scenario the estimated eﬀects would reﬂect correlations instead of
causal relations.
There are several directions for future research. We hope that the impact of health
and lifestyle factors on self-employed workers’ disability transitions will be explored
in more detail using alternative data sources. Furthermore, several important ques-
tions remain to be answered. For example, are programs to prevent disability or to
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improve occupational health and also eﬀective for self-employed when they were actu-
ally designed for employees? We leave such questions as an important topic for future
research.
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Figure 6.1: Visual representation of the data
Notes: This diagram visualizes the data and its collection process. We dis-
tinguish three states: the start of the insurance contract, disabled and non-
disabled. Upon buying income insurance self-employed complete the afore-
mentioned questionnaire, which provides the covariates for modeling the
incidence rate. At the start of the insurance contract the self-employed is,
per deﬁnition, non-disabled. If self-employed become unable to work due
to illness, they enter the state ‘disabled’. In this case their health-status is
updated with additional information about the ICD-10 diagnosis causing
the disability. If a self-employed does not ﬁle a claim during the sample
period, her duration until the ﬁrst claim is right-censored. As soon as self-
employed are able to resume work, they move to the state ‘non-disabled’.
If the sample period ends before a self-employed completes her disability
spell, the resulting disability duration is marked as right-censored. Self-
employed can ﬁle multiple disability spells during the sample period.
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Figure 6.2: Kaplan-Meier estimates for duration until ﬁrst claim and disability






















duration until 1st claim
disability duration
95% conf.interval
Notes: This ﬁgure shows Kaplan-Meier estimates of the unconditional survivor func-
tions corresponding with the durations until the ﬁrst claim (upper curve) and the
disability durations (lower curve).
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Table 6.1: Questionnaire: current health, previously experienced health problems and
lifestyle factors
Current health status claim no claim all
curr.compl current complaints 11.0 9.8 10.0
curr.disabled being disabled 0.3 0.1 0.2
curr.complaints complaints of any sort 4.3 3.9 4.0
curr.medication on mediation 7.0 7.0 7.0
curr.inﬁrmities inﬁrmities 1.1 0.6 0.7
curr.diet being on a diet 0.9 0.7 0.7
Experienced health problems
complaint.psy mental disorders 12.3 10.8 11.0
complaint.trop tropical diseases 0.6 0.4 0.4
complaint.std sexually transmitted diseases 1.3 1.4 1.4
complaint.ent ear, nose and throat problems 17.3 15.6 15.9
complaint.lung respiratory disorders 11.0 10.9 10.9
complaint.heart heart/blood vessel problems 6.8 6.1 6.2
complaint.hormone diabetes and high cholesterol 4.3 4.0 4.1
complaint.stomach stomach problems 10.3 9.2 9.4
complaint.uri urinal inf. and genitourinary dis. 7.4 7.1 7.2
complaint.joints physical problems (limbs, joints) 54.2 47.3 48.6
complaint.ans arm, neck or shoulder complaints 17.9 14.2 14.9
complaint.back back problems 21.4 18.9 19.4
complaint.head headaches, dizziness, faints 5.2 4.7 4.8
complaint.blood anaemia, haemophilia 4.5 4.1 4.2
complaint.sleep sleeping, appetite and defecation 1.8 1.6 1.6
complaint.derm skin problems 26.7 28.5 28.2
complaint.rest any other complaints 19.2 16.8 17.2
Lifestyle factors
length length (in centimeters) 181.0 181.0 181.3
weight weight (in kilograms) 80.0 81.0 80.5
smoker current smoker 23.8 19.5 20.3
smoked former smoker 23.9 24.1 24.0
sports play sports 85.9 87.1 86.9
alcohol drink alcoholic beverages 65.0 69.4 68.6
overweight overweight 39.7 38.5 38.8
obese obese 3.3 3.2 3.2
Notes: This table describes the explanatory variables related to policyholders’ current and previ-
ously experienced health problems, as well as their life style habits. This information is obtained
from the questionnaire that they ﬁll in upon buying income insurance. The ﬁgures in the columns
captioned ‘claim’, ‘no claim’ and ‘all’ are sample means (in % for the indicator variables) cal-
culated over the policyholders who ﬁled a claim, who did not ﬁle a claim and all policyholders,
respectively.
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Table 6.2: Explanatory variables: sociodemographic status, occupational class, insur-
ance contract and type of disorder
Sociodemographic factors claim no claim all
age age (in years) 35.1 34.8 34.8
male males 83.0 85.3 84.8
Occupational class
o.agricultural agricultural sector 15.1 13.0 13.4
o.commercial commercial and administrative 14.5 29.9 27.0
o.technical technical and industrial 42.1 28.5 31.0
o.medical medical and paramedical 12.5 9.9 10.4
o.retail retail or wholesale 8.7 10.8 10.4
o.services services and care sector 5.6 6.1 6.0
o.transport transport sector 1.6 1.8 1.7
Insurance contract
repl.income annual replacement income (EUR) 32,993 34,285 34,042
lim.cov limited coverage 24.9 20.4 21.3
defer.15 deferment period of 15 days 15.3 7.9 9.3
defer.30 deferment period of 1 month 57.8 48.3 50.2
defer.60 deferment period of 2 months 7.2 8.5 8.2
defer.90 deferment period of 3 months 12.3 18.9 17.6
defer.1 deferment period of 1 year 3.7 8.0 7.2
defer.23 deferment period of 2 or 3 years 3.7 8.4 7.5
Type of ICD-10 disorder
diag.infectious infectious and parasitic diseases 1.3
diag.neoplasms neoplasms 1.6
diag.blood diseases of the blood(-forming organs) 0.6
diag.endocrine endocrine diseases 0.9
diag.mental mental disorders 12.1
diag.nervous diseases of the nervous system 2.6
diag.eye diseases of the eyes 0.8
diag.ear diseases of the ears 0.3
diag.circular diseases of the circular system 3.3
diag.respiratory respiratory disorders 3.6
diag.digestive digestive diseases 4.5
diag.skin diseases related to the skin 1.5
diag.musculoskeletal diseases of the musculoskeletal system 37.6
diag.genitourinary genitourinary diseases 2.4
diag.injury injuries and poisoning 20.6
diag.unknown unknown diseases 6.2
Notes: This table provides descriptions of several groups of explanatory variables that ﬁnd their
origin in the questionnaire completed by the self-employed upon buying income insurance. The co-
variates relate to policyholders’ socio-demographic status, their occupational class, the properties of
their insurance contract and (in case of a claim) their ICD-10 diagnosis. The ﬁgures in the columns
captioned ‘claim’, ‘no claim’ and ‘all’ are sample means (in % for the indicator variables) calculated
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Table 6.4: Transitions into disability: normal weight vs. overweight
normal weight overweight
exp (βD) stdev p-value exp (βD) stdev p-value
health.index 1.0064 0.0011 0.0000 1.0029 0.0013 0.0219
complaint.psy 1.1142 0.0971 0.2654 1.4882 0.1082 0.0002
smoker 1.1321 0.0762 0.1034 1.3702 0.0894 0.0004
smoked 1.0050 0.0752 0.9474 1.0010 0.0829 0.9909
sports 1.0837 0.0651 0.2173 0.9637 0.0752 0.6229
alcohol 0.8934 0.0861 0.1905 1.0153 0.1036 0.8836
male 0.6641 0.0860 0.0000 0.5594 0.1366 0.0000
age 0.9306 0.0238 0.0025 0.9268 0.0320 0.0176
age2 1.0014 0.0003 0.0000 1.0013 0.0004 0.0019
estim stdev p-value estim stdev p-value
v1 -6.7181 0.7885 0.0000 -5.4878 1.0200 0.0000
v2 -3.7530 0.7749 0.0000 -2.7872 1.0162 0.0061
p 0.8393 0.0199 0.0000 0.8246 0.0389 0.0000
γ 1.1638 0.1075 0.0000 1.1851 0.0415 0.0000
logL -12,867.7 -8,388.2
# obs. 12,563 7,906
Notes: This table displays the estimation results for MPH speciﬁcations of the
incidence rates of two groups of policyholders: normal-weight and overweight self-
employed. The models include additional control variables not listed in the table:
occupational class (model for a 1-month deferment period only), characteristics of
the insurance contract (including the indicator variables for the length of the defer-
ment period in the model for technical/industrial professions), and cohort eﬀects
(both models). The columns captioned ‘exp(βD)’ provide hazard ratios. As usual,
the standard deviations and p-values correspond with βD. The discrete Heckman-
Singer frailty distribution is speciﬁed as IP(v = v1) = 1 − IP(v = v2) = p. The
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Table 6.6: Transitions into disability: 1-month deferment period and techni-
cal/industrial professions
1-month deferment period technical/industrial professions
exp (βD) stdev p-value exp (βD) stdev p-value
health.index 1.0044 0.0012 0.0002 1.0037 0.0015 0.0119
complaint.psy 1.3484 0.0988 0.0025 1.3248 0.1301 0.0306
overweight 0.9487 0.0667 0.4300 0.9970 0.0797 0.9699
smoker 1.2626 0.0803 0.0037 1.2433 0.0921 0.0181
smoked 1.0314 0.0784 0.6934 0.9821 0.0955 0.8501
sports 1.0346 0.0691 0.6228 1.1363 0.0789 0.1051
alcohol 0.9656 0.0920 0.7035 0.9907 0.1200 0.9378
male 0.6750 0.0990 0.0001
age 0.9523 0.0264 0.0643 0.9358 0.0343 0.0532
age2 1.0010 0.0004 0.0046 1.0012 0.0005 0.0149
estim stdev p-value estim stdev p-value
v1 -8.2625 0.8884 0.0000 -7.6391 1.2987 0.0000
v2 -5.2172 0.8685 0.0000 -4.5761 1.2888 0.0004
p 0.8457 0.0173 0.0000 0.8078 0.0218 0.0000
γ 1.2339 0.1215 0.0000 1.2640 0.1317 0.0000
logL -12,016.3 -8,559.2
# obs. 10,267 6,467
Notes: This table displays the estimation results for MPH speciﬁcations of the in-
cidence rates of two groups of policyholders: with a 1-month deferment period and
with a technical or industrial profession. Because there are virtually no female poli-
cyholders in technical and industrial professions, there is no gender dummy included
in the MPH. The models include additional control variables not listed in the table:
occupational class (model for a 1-month deferment period only), characteristics of
the insurance contract (including the indicator variables for the length of the defer-
ment period in the model for technical/industrial professions), and cohort eﬀects
(both models). The columns captioned ‘exp(βD)’ provide hazard ratios. As usual,
the standard deviations and p-values correspond with βD. The discrete Heckman-
Singer frailty distribution is speciﬁed as IP(v = v1) = 1 − IP(v = v2) = p. The










































Table 6.8: Transitions out of disability: full sample, men, full coverage, 1-month deferment period and technical/industrial profes-
sions
full sample men full coverage 1-month deferment period technical/industrial professions
exp (βR) stdev p-value exp (βR) stdev p-value exp (βR) stdev p-value exp (βR) stdev p-value exp (βR) stdev p-value
health.index 0.9994 0.0008 0.4632 0.9995 0.0009 0.5624 0.9987 0.0009 0.1555 1.0002 0.0010 0.8214 1.0007 0.0012 0.5635
complaint.psy 0.7921 0.0684 0.0007 0.7685 0.0782 0.0008 0.8207 0.0929 0.0333 0.8185 0.0866 0.0206 0.6827 0.1035 0.0002
overweight 0.9293 0.0455 0.1073 0.8968 0.0490 0.0264 0.8820 0.0534 0.0188 0.8746 0.0581 0.0210 0.8136 0.0665 0.0019
smoker 0.9969 0.0548 0.9549 0.9999 0.0595 0.9985 1.0088 0.0641 0.8915 1.0404 0.0709 0.5762 1.0040 0.0759 0.9580
smoked 0.9584 0.0540 0.4310 0.9121 0.0591 0.1194 1.0102 0.0635 0.8725 1.0197 0.0687 0.7767 0.9578 0.0808 0.5936
sports 1.0174 0.0463 0.7092 1.0400 0.0506 0.4384 1.0289 0.0539 0.5973 0.9800 0.0590 0.7316 1.1008 0.0657 0.1438
alcohol 1.1142 0.0631 0.0864 1.0640 0.0728 0.3944 1.1283 0.0744 0.1048 1.0941 0.0841 0.2846 1.0397 0.0981 0.6914
male 1.1586 0.0716 0.0397 1.2354 0.0836 0.0114 1.0707 0.0947 0.4708
age 0.9999 0.0176 0.9943 1.0119 0.0192 0.5380 1.0059 0.0202 0.7717 0.9890 0.0232 0.6351 1.0368 0.0277 0.1924
age2 0.9998 0.0002 0.4055 0.9997 0.0002 0.1579 0.9997 0.0003 0.2588 1.0000 0.0003 0.9702 0.9993 0.0004 0.0620
diag.mental 0.2623 0.0804 0.0000 0.2614 0.0892 0.0000 0.2579 0.0947 0.0000 0.2614 0.1005 0.0000 0.5808 0.1018 0.0000
diag.musco 0.5793 0.0602 0.0000 0.5906 0.0658 0.0000 0.6231 0.0702 0.0000 0.5909 0.0773 0.0000 0.3486 0.1521 0.0000
diag.injury 0.7492 0.0682 0.0000 0.7447 0.0726 0.0000 0.7662 0.0806 0.0010 0.7670 0.0907 0.0034 1.6562 0.1316 0.0001
diag.severe 0.3612 0.0817 0.0000 0.3523 0.0919 0.0000 0.4012 0.0955 0.0000 0.4421 0.0985 0.0000 1.2443 0.1356 0.1071
diag.unknown 0.9935 0.0757 0.9313 1.0583 0.0843 0.5012 0.9666 0.0859 0.6926 0.7075 0.0970 0.0004 1.8867 0.1098 0.0000
estim stdev p-value estim stdev p-value estim stdev p-value estim stdev p-value estim stdev p-value
w1 0.3914 0.6123 0.5227 1.7386 0.7225 0.0161 0.5703 0.7050 0.4186 1.0385 0.7962 0.1921 2.2470 1.1509 0.0509
w2 -2.1710 0.6157 0.0004 0.5131 0.7242 0.4787 -2.0423 0.7071 0.0039 -2.6762 0.8049 0.0009 1.0321 1.1476 0.3685
w3 1.6750 0.6103 0.0061 -2.2316 0.7272 0.0021 1.8400 0.7015 0.0087 -0.2398 0.8089 0.7669 -2.0174 1.1467 0.0785
p1 0.3807 0.0259 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0299 0.0000 0.9288 0.0004 0.0000 0.9184 0.0001 0.0000
p2 0.3455 0.0156 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000 0.3440 0.0177 0.0000 0.0481 0.0042 0.0000 0.0689 0.0021 0.0000
γ 1.2575 0.0509 0.0000 1.2795 0.0578 0.0000 1.2792 0.0620 0.0000 1.2684 0.0679 0.0000 1.3306 0.0842 0.0000
logL -8,345.5 -6,840.8 -6,217.2 -4,792.4 -3,449.9
# obs. 5,427 4,554 4,070 3,157 2,399
Notes: This table displays the estimation results for MPH speciﬁcations of the recovery rates of ﬁve groups of claimants: all of them, men, with full coverage, with a 1-month
deferment period, and with a technical or industrial profession. All models include additional control variables not listed in the table (occupational class, characteristics of the
insurance contract, and cohort eﬀects). The columns captioned ‘exp(βR)’ provide hazard ratios. As usual, the standard deviations and p-values correspond with βR. The discrete
Heckman-Singer frailty distribution is speciﬁed as IP(w = wi) = pi. The parameter γ is the shape parameter of the Weibull baseline distribution.
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Table 6.9: Transitions out of disability: non-smokers vs. smokers
non-smokers smokers
exp (βR) stdev p-value exp (βR) stdev p-value
health.index 0.9990 0.0011 0.3262 0.9979 0.0012 0.0949
complaint.psy 0.8557 0.0958 0.1039 0.7699 0.0937 0.0053
overweight 0.9737 0.0595 0.6542 0.8930 0.0676 0.0941
sports 1.0134 0.0587 0.8206 1.0507 0.0690 0.4738
alcohol 1.0293 0.0778 0.7102 1.2681 0.1007 0.0183
male 1.2061 0.0875 0.0322 0.9829 0.1117 0.8776
age 0.9875 0.0233 0.5898 0.9795 0.0276 0.4520
age2 1.0000 0.0003 0.9479 1.0000 0.0003 0.9895
diag.psych 0.2796 0.1076 0.0000 0.2491 0.1205 0.0000
diag.musco 0.5750 0.0760 0.0000 0.5627 0.0940 0.0000
diag.injury 0.8232 0.0872 0.0256 0.6873 0.1032 0.0003
diag.severe 0.3499 0.1026 0.0000 0.3872 0.1312 0.0000
diag.unknown 0.8943 0.1053 0.2885 1.2812 0.1174 0.0348
estim stdev p-value estim stdev p-value
w1 -1.1667 0.8118 0.1507 1.7458 0.9988 0.0805
w2 0.4669 0.7902 0.5546 2.9160 0.9966 0.0034
w3 -3.5945 0.8248 0.0000 -0.9134 1.0005 0.3613
p1 0.1476 0.0204 0.0000 0.2483 0.0253 0.0000
p2 0.7407 0.0044 0.0000 0.5781 0.0097 0.0000
γ 1.2390 0.0672 0.0000 1.2756 0.0798 0.0000
logL -4,327.4 -3,990.5
# obs. 2,825 2,602
Notes: This table displays the estimation results for MPH speciﬁcations of the re-
covery rates for smokers (deﬁned as self-employed who currently smoke or smoked
in the past) and non-smokers (self-employed who have never smoked). All mod-
els include additional control variables not listed in the table (occupational class,
characteristics of the insurance contract, and cohort eﬀects). The columns cap-
tioned ‘exp(βR)’ provide hazard ratios. As usual, the standard deviations and
p-values correspond with βR. The discrete Heckman-Singer frailty distribution is





For completeness we provide the log-likelihood functions of all estimated MPH models.
Throughout, we use the same notation as in Section 6.4.22
Incidence rate
Let









Now let Dk be the duration until the ﬁrst claim of policyholder k = 1, . . . , nD, with vec-
tor of observed covariatesXk and unobserved heterogeneity v. We assume that v follows
a discrete Heckman-Singer distribution with ND mass points; i.e. v ∈ {v1, . . . , vND}.
Let δDk = 0 if Dk is right-censored. The joint likelihood function is obtained by inte-








D(Dk | Xk, vℓ)λD(Dk | Xk, vℓ)δDk
)
, (6.5)
where pℓ = IP(v = vℓ) for ℓ = 1, . . . , ND.
Recovery rate
Let









Zooming in on policyholders whole ﬁle at least one claim, let Rjk be the j-th disabil-
ity spell of policyholder k = 1, . . . , nR, with vector of observed covariates Zjk and
unobserved heterogeneity w. We assume that w follows a discrete Heckman-Singer dis-
tribution with NR mass points; i.e. w ∈ {w1, . . . , wNR}. Furthermore, we assume that
policyholder k ﬁles a total of jk disability spells and write δRjk = 0 if Rjk is right-censored.
22Throughout, all estimations have been done in R 3.0.2 using the maxLik package. The code is
available upon request.
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SR(Rjk | Zjk, wℓ)λR(Rjk | Zjk, wℓ)δRjk
)
, (6.7)
where pℓ = IP(w = wℓ) for ℓ = 1, . . . , NR.
Competing risks
Let









Now let Ckm be the duration until the ﬁrst claim of policyholder k = 1, . . . , nD, resulting
in a disorder of type m. Assume a vector of observed covariates Xk and unobserved
heterogeneity um. Furthermore, we assume that um follows a discrete Heckman-Singer
distribution with NCm mass points; i.e. um ∈ {um1 , . . . , umNC}. Here m = 1 applies to
mental disorders, m = 2 to physical impairments and m = 3 to severe conditions. Let
δCkm = 1 if the duration until the ﬁrst claim of policyholder k leads to a disorder of type
m and δCkm = 0 in case of exit to another type of disorder or right censoring. The joint














where pℓm = IP(um = umℓ ) for ℓ = 1, . . . , NCm.
6.9.2 Sanity check on latent measure for physical health
The estimated probit model is displayed in Table 6.10. Only the coeﬃcients associated
with tropical, sexually transmitted and urinal/genitourinary diseases turn out insignif-
icant. The remaining coeﬃcients have the expected positive sign.
To make sure that our latent physical health index has a clear economic interpreta-
tion, we investigate its Spearman partial rank correlation with the other risk factors
more formally; see Table 6.11. Partial correlations are correlations that have been cor-
rected for the inﬂuence of other covariates, like in a multiple regression. They reﬂect
associations instead of causal relations, which avoids endogeneity issues. We relate the
latent physical health measure to socio-demographic factors (age and gender), lifestyle
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Table 6.10: Probit regression
coef stdev z-value p-value
intercept -1.9853 0.0259 -76.6149 0.0000
complaint.trop -0.2650 0.1935 -1.3694 0.1709
complaint.std -0.1725 0.1088 -1.5852 0.1129
complaint.ent 0.1480 0.0327 4.5287 0.0000
complaint.lung 0.4617 0.0345 13.3950 0.0000
complaint.heart 0.9349 0.0395 23.6855 0.0000
complaint.hormone 1.1634 0.0467 24.9352 0.0000
complaint.stomach 0.3566 0.0378 9.4431 0.0000
complaint.uri 0.0646 0.0446 1.4476 0.1477
complaint.joints 0.1446 0.0257 5.6199 0.0000
complaint.ans 0.1057 0.0336 3.1416 0.0017
complaint.back 0.0683 0.0311 2.1935 0.0283
complaint.head 0.2911 0.0512 5.6874 0.0000
complaint.blood 0.4276 0.0513 8.3291 0.0000
complaint.sleep 0.4071 0.0802 5.0781 0.0000
complaint.derm 0.3860 0.0266 14.4956 0.0000
complaint.rest 0.3936 0.0301 13.0966 0.0000
Notes: This table displays the estimation results for the probit
model used to predict the latent summary measure of initial
physical health. The dependent variable in the probit model
is the indicator for current health problems (‘curr.compl’) and
the explanatory variables are the indicators for previously ex-
perienced health problems.
characteristics reported upon buying income insurance, occupational class, and the
properties of the insurance contract (full/limited, the length of the deferment period
and the level of the replacement income). As expected, we ﬁnd that older policyholders
tend to be less healthy. Males are on average in better health than females. Individ-
uals with poor health are associated with limited coverage policies. The results also
highlight notable diﬀerences in initial health across occupations and the level of replace-
ment income. Surprisingly, playing sports is associated with poor health, which might
be due to sports-related injuries like a fractured ankle (an issue that will come back
in Section 6.5). As expected, current smoking, past smoking, and drinking alcohol are
associated with poor health.
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Notes: This table displays the Spearman
partial rank correlations between the latent
measure of initial physical health and sev-
eral covariates. The reported p-values corre-
spond with the null hypothesis that the par-
tial correlation is 0.
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Levenscyclusgedrag onder onzekerheid - Essays over besparingen, hypotheken en ge-
zondheid.
De ﬁnanciële crisis van 2007-2008 laat zien dat onzekerheid er toe doet. De sterke
daling in aandelenprijzen en huizenprijzen, in combinatie met riskante hypotheeklenin-
gen, heeft een grote invloed op de ﬁnanciële positie van huishoudens. Diverse bezuini-
gingsmaatregelen die zijn doorgevoerd hebben de komende jaren mogelijk verstrekkende
ﬁnanciële gevolgen. Het doel van dit proefschrift is te achterhalen in welke mate onze-
kerheid het ﬁnanciële keuzegedrag van huishoudens beïnvloedt, zoals het spaargedrag
en de aanschaf van ﬁnanciële producten zoals een hypotheek. Wij zijn geïnteresseerd in
verschillende bronnen van onzekerheid.
Op basis van een unieke enquête, laten wij zien dat de onzekerheid omtrent toekomstig
beleid met betrekking tot een hervorming van de hypotheekrenteaftrek ervoor zorgt dat
huishoudens meer gaan sparen om mogelijke ﬁnanciële tegenvallers op te vangen. Deze
extra besparingen door beleidsonzekerheid zijn weliswaar beperkt, maar brengen kosten
met zich mee. Beleidshervormingen moeten daarom geloofwaardig zijn en eventuele
additionele hervormingen moeten direct worden aangekondigd.
Wij onderzoeken vervolgens of een beperkte ﬁnanciële kennis van complexe produc-
ten heeft geleid tot het afsluiten van riskante(re) hypotheekleningen. Wij tonen aan
dat huishoudens over het algemeen goed bekend zijn met de risico’s van de eigen hypo-
theeklening. Riskante hypotheken worden vaker afgesloten door huishoudens die meer
verstand hebben van leningen en door huishoudens die gebruik maken van een hypo-
theekadviseur. Onzekerheid over de eigen ﬁnanciële kennis leidt juist tot een meer
gedegen keuze wat betreft het afsluiten van hypotheekleningen, tenzij er gebruik wordt
gemaakt van een tussenpersoon. Dit benadrukt het belang van onafhankelijk ﬁnancieel
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advies.
Vervolgens onderzoeken wij de ﬁnanciële positie van ouderen, die in het bijzonder door
de hervormingen (in de ouderenzorg en pensioenen) worden getroﬀen. Hierbij maken
wij gebruik van gedetailleerde belastinggegevens. Hieruit blijkt dat ouderen gemiddeld
gezien vermogend zijn, maar hun spaargeld nauwelijks aanspreken, zelfs niet op een zeer
hoge leeftijd (of in slechte gezondheid aan het einde van het leven). Deze bevinding is in
tegenspraak met de economische levenscyclustheorie (indien mensen geen erfenismotief
hebben) en kan niet worden verklaard door inkomensonzekerheid of onzekerheid over
toekomstige gezondheidsuitgaven.
De gezondheidstoestand speelt wel een belangrijke rol om verschillen in besparingen
tussen huishoudens te verklaren. Gepensioneerden met gezondheidsproblemen hebben
gemiddeld gezien een lager (pensioen)vermogen opgebouwd. Er zijn aanwijzing dat
het optreden van gezondheidsproblemen resulteert in meer besparingen, vermoedelijk
omdat de consumptiebehoeften lager zijn dan vooraf voorzien. In het proefschrift be-
spreken wij een aantal beleidsopties om het gebruik van eigen vermogen voor bijvoor-
beeld ouderenzorg te faciliteren en ﬁnanciële middelen beter aan te laten sluiten bij de
consumptiebehoeften van ouderen.
Om de samenhang tussen gezondheid en besparingen verder te onderzoeken ontwik-
kelen wij vervolgens een generieke gezondheidsmaatstaf op basis van door mensen zelf
ervaren gezondheidstoestand en objectieve gezondheidskenmerken uit medische regis-
ters. Wij laten zien dat gezondheid meer persistent is en sneller afneemt op oudere
leeftijd dan kan worden geconcludeerd op basis van enkel gerapporteerde gezondheid.
Tot slot onderzoeken wij de wisselwerking tussen de initiële mentale en fysieke gezond-
heid en levensstijl op het risico van arbeidsongeschiktheid. Hierbij maken wij gebruik
van de gezondheidsverklaring die zelfstandigen invullen bij het afsluiten van een po-
lis voor een arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering. Het is van belang om een onderscheid
te maken tussen verschillende subgroepen in de populatie (zoals rokers en niet rokers,
mensen met en zonder overgewicht, mannen en vrouwen). In het bijzonder mentale ge-
zondheidsproblemen in combinatie met een ongezonde levensstijl (roken en overgewicht)
vergroot het risico op langdurige arbeidsongeschiktheid. Deze uitkomst draagt bij aan
een betere risicoselectie (dan wel het stimuleren van gezond gedrag) door verzekeraars.
Dit is van belang voor de toegankelijkheid en betaalbaarheid van een particuliere inko-
mensverzekering.
